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“Science is not a heartless pursuit of
objective information. It is a creative
human activity, its geniuses acting more
as artists than as information
processors.”
— Stephen Jay Gould
I dedicate this thesis to my parents, and to those who taught me that scientific temper is
required for social revolution including some wonderful teachers whom I have had the privilege of
learning from.
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Zusammenfassung
Die meisten experimentellen und theoretischen Untersuchungen zu o¨ko-evolutiona¨rer Dynamik
basieren auf biologischen Interaktionen zwischen verschiedenen Akteuren, die entweder zur sel-
ben oder zu verschiedenen Spezies geho¨ren. Wenn wir das gesamte Bild betrachten, sind Indi-
viduen gleichzeitig an mannigfaltigen Interaktionen beteiligt, und je nach Interaktion nehmen sie
verschiedene Rollen ein oder wenden verschiedene Strategien an. Um die evolutiona¨re Dynamik
einer Population zu untersuchen, ist es deswegen wesentlich, die kombinierten E↵ekte aller Inter-
aktionen zu erfassen, an denen ein Individuum beteiligt ist. Zu diesem Zweck entwickle ich im
ersten Teil dieser Arbeit einen mathematischen Rahmen innerhalb der evolutiona¨ren Spieltheo-
rie, der es erlaubt, mannigfaltige Interaktionen zu beru¨cksichtigen. Fu¨r unendliche Populationen
finde ich, dass die Zusammensetzung einer Population, in der Individuen an einer Kombination von
Spielen beteiligt sind, andere dynamische Trajektorien aufweist und andere Gleichgewichtspunkte
einnimmt verglichen mit einer Population, in der Individuen nur an einzelnen Spielen in Isolation
betrachtet teilnehmen. Fu¨r endliche Populationen leite ich einen Ausdruck fu¨r die Berechnung
der Fixationswahrscheinlichkeit einer Strategie her, die eine wichtige stochastische Gro¨ße darstellt.
Auch hier finde ich, dass sogar die Kombination eines neutralen Spiels mit einem anderen Spiel die
Dynamik a¨ndern kann. Im zweiten Teil verwende ich die im ersten Teil entwickelte Theorie, um die
Dynamik in den Zahlen ma¨nnlicher und weiblicher Individuen in einer Population zu untersuchen,
wenn gleichzeitig mehrere Life-history traits betrachtet werden. Life-history traits ko¨nnen Unter-
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schiede zwischen den Geschlechtern aufweisen. Unter Verwendung von evolutiona¨rer Spieltheorie
und Populationsdynamik zeige ich, dass geschlechtsspezifische Unterschiede in elterlichem In-
vestment, in Ornamenten und in der Immunantwort zu einer ungleichen Anzahl an ma¨nnlichen
und weiblichen Individuuen in einer Population fu¨hren. Meine Ergebnisse sind im Einklang mit
empirischen Beobachtungen in einer Vielzahl von Taxa. In der vorangegangenen Untersuchung
waren die geschlechtsspezifischen Unterschiede in bestimmten Life-history traits ein vorgegebener
Parameter. Aber wie sind diese geschlechtsspezifischen Unterschiede in verschiedenen Merk-
malen des Lebenszyklus u¨berhaupt entstanden? Der letzte Teil dieser Arbeit stellt die Evolution
des sexuellen Dimorphismus in Immunita¨t dar mit Bezug zu elterlichem Investment. Experi-
mentelle Ergebnisse zeigen, dass vermehrtes elterliches Investment zu besseren Immunantworten
fu¨hren kann. Ich verwende eine zustandsabha¨ngige dynamische Optimierungsmethode, wobei
elterliches Investment und Immunkompetenz als zwei verschiedene Merkmale eines Individuums
betrachtet werden. Jedes Individuum hat zu jedem Zeitpunkt eine bestimmte Energiereserve.
Ich untersuche die Trade-o↵s zwischen der Verwendung der Reserven eines Individuums auf die
elterlichen Aufgaben und auf Immunita¨t, so dass sie die Fitness des Individuums maximieren. Mit
dieser Studie zeige ich, dass es fu¨r die meisten Spezies optimal ist, mehr in Immunkompetenz zu
investieren, wenn die Zeit elterlicher Pflege lang ist. Diese Arbeit verwendet also Populationsdy-
namik, evolutiona¨re Spieltheorie und zustandsabha¨ngige dynamische Optimierungsmethoden, um
unser Versta¨ndnis u¨ber mehrere miteinander verknu¨pfte Interaktionen zwischen Individuuen oder
Merkmalen innerhalb eines Individuums zu fo¨rdern.
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Summary
Most of the experimental and theoretical studies of eco-evolutionary dynamics are based on
biological interactions between various agents from either the same species or from di↵erent
species. If we look at the whole picture, individuals take part in diverse interactions simultaneously,
and they adopt varied roles or strategies in each interaction. To study the evolutionary dynamics
of a population, it is therefore crucial to capture the combined e↵ects of all the interactions that
an individual is a part of. To that aim, in the first part of my thesis, I construct a mathematical
framework residing in evolutionary game theory that allows to account for multiple interactions. In
infinite populations, I find that the composition of a population in which individuals are involved
in combined games shows di↵erent dynamical trajectories and di↵erent equilibrium points as
compared to a population in which individuals only take part in single games considered in
isolation. For finite populations, I derive an expression for calculating the fixation probability of
a strategy, which is an important stochastic property and here too, I find that combining even
a neutral game with another game could change the dynamics. In the second part, I use the
framework developed in the first part to study the dynamics in the numbers of male and female
individuals in a population when jointly considering several life-history traits. Life-history traits
may have sex-specific di↵erences. Using evolutionary game theory and population dynamics, I
show that sex-specific di↵erences in parental investment, ornamentation, and immune response
give rise to skewed adult sex ratios. My results fit with empirical observations from a wide range
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of taxa. In the previous study, the sex-specific di↵erences in certain life-history traits were a given
parameter. But how did these sex-specific di↵erences in various life-history traits emerge in the
first place? The last part of this thesis presents the evolution of sexual dimorphism in immunity in
relation to parental investment. Experimental results show that an increase in parental investment
may give rise to better immune responses. I use a state-dependent dynamic optimization method,
where parental investment and immunocompetence are considered to be two di↵erent traits of
an individual. Every individual has a certain amount of energy reserves at a certain time. I
study the trade-o↵ between allocating reserves to parental e↵ort and to immunity in such a way
that they maximize an individual’s fitness. Through this study, I show that for most species
systems, it is optimal to invest more in immunocompetence when the time spent in parental
investment is longer. Thus, this thesis uses population dynamics, evolutionary game theory, and
state-dependent dynamic optimization modeling in order to advance our understanding of eco-
evolutionary consequences of multiple interlinked interactions between individuals or traits within
individuals.
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Chapter 1
Multiple interspecies and intraspecies
interactions
“What makes it so hard to organize the
environment sensibly is that everything
we touch is hooked up to everything
else.”
— Isaac Asimov
1.1 Multiple intertwined interactions in nature
The theory of evolution by natural selection was first detailedly set out in the book On the Origin
of Species in 1859 by Charles Darwin. All forms of life evolve over generations through genetic
changes that correspond to the changes in the observable traits of the organisms. Biological
interactions are at the core of every evolutionary process and are broadly classified as competition,
predation, commensalism, mutualism, and parasitism. Theoretical and empirical studies related
to cooperation, antagonism, host-pathogen co-evolution, sexual selection, gene interplay, all focus
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on some of the above-mentioned class of interactions between various agents. Each interaction
involves di↵erent types of individuals and the number of members or frequency of each type may
vary.
Interactions may occur both within (intraspecies) and between species (interspecies), and such
interactions can be found among every living organism from unicellular prokaryotes like bacteria
to archaea and eukaryotes. However, no interaction happens in isolation from other interac-
tions. One intra-species and interspecies interaction would be linked to other interactions. Gut
microbiota is an excellent host-microbe system consisting of individuals taking part in multiple in-
teractions. Within a host, one can find diverse interspecies and intra-species interactions between
the gut microbiomes. The microbiomes also interact with the host, and the host’s interaction
with its environment might also a↵ect the microbial interactions. (Clemente et al., 2012; Nichol-
son et al., 2012). Therefore, looking at merely one interaction of interest will not grasp the entire
story since this interaction might be coupled with other interactions as well.
Intriguing instances of combined interactions exist in diverse milieus and modeling these sce-
narios will provide more knowledge to the pursuit of detailed understanding of interactions and
how they a↵ect evolution. The goal of this thesis was to construct mathematical models that
investigate the dynamics of multiple interactions. The interactions could be between and within
individuals, and also scenarios such as competition for resources between multiple traits within
an individual. A few examples of multiple interspecies and intraspecies interactions across a wide
range of taxa that highlight the importance of studying multiple interactions’ dynamics are listed
below.
• Interactions between bacterial strains
Pseudomonas fluorescens SBW25 bacterial strains undergo a special spontaneous mutation
called the wrinkly spreader (WS) from the smooth ancestral type (SM) (Rainey and Trav-
isano, 1998). This WS mutant has a lower mass density than the SM wildtype. Therefore,
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it colonizes the air-liquid interface of liquid cultures by forming a biofilm. The WS mutants
interact cooperatively to form this stable biofilm that is well-supplied with oxygen since
it is situated right at the surface separating the liquid medium and air. Therefore, these
mutants are advantageous over the wildtype as their colony gives them greater access to
oxygen (Rainey and Rainey, 2003). WS mutants perform cooperative interactions among
themselves, but they also compete with the SM ancestor, and possibly with other species,
for resources. Thus one colony of a bacterial strain is involved in many interactions.
• Hosts and pathogens
There are multiple examples of host-pathogen interactions (Harvell, 2004). The ecology
and evolution of these interactions determine the fitness of the host and pathogens. Host-
pathogen interactions are in fact diverse interspecies and intraspecies interactions combined
together. Consider human–tuberculosis co-evolution (Gagneux, 2012). This involves inter-
actions within the tuberculosis-causing bacterium Mycobacterium tuberculosis strains and
their interspecies interactions with humans. Another classic example is plant-pathogen in-
teractions (Frank, 1992). The plant immune system undergoes symbiotic interactions with
beneficial microbes as well as antagonistic interactions with pathogens (Hacquard et al.,
2017). For instance, host-pathogen dynamics exhibit the ‘Red Queen dynamics’ (Khibnik
and Kondrashov, 1997). This is a result of what is known as the arms race between the
hosts and various strains of pathogens. When a resistance towards a certain pathogen strain
is developed in a host species, this strain can evolve to a↵ect the host once more. Other
strains may also compete with this strain to infect the host. Again, as the host continu-
ously adapts, there is always scope for the section of new mutations in the pathogens to be
selected for and attack the host. This process goes on and this is a reason why eliminating
pathogens (especially those that mutate fast) is a major challenge. Thus, studying multiple
interlinked host-pathogen interactions is crucial for medicine and agriculture which are two
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important factors for the survival of humankind.
• Mating competitions and mate choice
Evolution of the sexes involves both intrasexual and intersexual interactions (Moore, 1990;
Wiley and Poston, 1996). Members of both the sexes may also have to interact with other
species for foraging, hunting and other everyday tasks. Individuals of the same sex compete
for mates known as intrasexual interaction. This is one reason for the diverse morphologies
between and within the sexes. For instance, the size of testis in primates was shown to
be larger in polygamous mating systems as compared to mating systems with lesser or no
polygamy (Harcourt et al., 1995; Kappeler, 1997). The result of these elaborate mating
competitions is being chosen by members of the other sex for copulation. This is known
as mate choice or intersexual interactions. These intersexual and intrasexual interactions
together cause sexual selection which can be seen in sexually reproducing animals.
1.2 Mathematical models of multiple interactions
Since interactions across a wide range of taxa are usually associated or linked to one another,
taking this into account should be pivotal for both experimental and theoretical research. This
doctoral thesis presents a general framework to study the combined dynamics of multiple in-
teractions. The dynamics of a combination of diverse multiplayer interspecies and intra-species
interactions where each interaction has several strategies can be investigated using this framework.
An important and commonly used mathematical model to study eco-evolutionary interactions is
evolutionary game theory. Games are a proxy for interactions. So one game would be equal to
studying an interaction. The types of members participating in a game are referred to as players.
Each of these players has a set of strategies which are the di↵erent phenotypic trait values, for
instance cooperation and defection. A player interacting with another player receives a payo↵.
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The average payo↵s contribute to the fitness of a strategy that determines its course of evolution.
Details of evolutionary game theory methods shall be discussed in Chapter 2, where I used game
theory and constructed a model that can study any multi-interaction scenario involving many
interactions, players, and strategies. Conditions and outcomes of combining many games were
also explored using this framework. The general results that emerged out of this framework were
applied to study multiple interactions between life-history traits (see Figure 1.1).
Previous works on mathematical models of multiple interactions
Until recently, evolutionary game theory was extensively used to study two-player games i.e. they
assumed pairwise interactions between the agents. However, these were limited to a single game
i.e. an isolated interaction until Cressman et al. (2000) and Hashimoto (2006) investigated
multiple game(s) dynamics. Cressman et al. (2000) investigated two-games dynamics while
Hashimoto (2006) extended this to multiple-games. The multiple-games approach was also used
in a couple of studies that investigated specific biological settings. Dictyostelium discoideum
is a social amoeba that exhibits (plays) two cooperative behaviors (games) under starvation.
One cooperative game is related to fruiting body formation and the other, macrocyst formation.
Fruiting body formation is the process where a few cells di↵erentiate into spore cells. These
spore cells are the ones that end up surviving and reproduce under favorable conditions. The
other cells turn themselves into stalk-cells that disperse the spore cells (Queller et al., 2014). The
second cooperative game is the macrocyst formation. Here, some cells form diploid zygote cells
and produce o↵spring. The rest of the cells that are vegetative supply energy to these zygotes
(O’Day and Keszei, 2012). An evolutionary game theoretical model constructed by Shibasaki and
Shimada (2018) couples these two games. The results showed that cooperation is maintained only
when the amoeba play both these games. The coupling between these games occurs due to the
cyclic adenosine monophosphate compound which is a complex that is a derivative of adenosine
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triphosphate (ATP) and aids in intracellular signal transduction. This chemical signal is central to
both these games. Therefore, a multi-games model that combines interactions connected to an
organism or a niche well-explains the dynamics of that population. The application of evolutionary
game theory in studying cancer has a long-established tradition. In Kareva (2011) it was shown
that aerobic and anaerobic (glycolytic) tumor cells play a game where the former is a ‘defector’
and the latter is a ‘cooperator’. The anaerobic cells secrete lactic acid, a byproduct of glycolysis.
This acid is toxic to normal somatic cells that surround the tumor and allows the tumor cell
population to rise. Another cancer game is the mobility game necessary to start the process in
which cancer cells spread to distant locations in the body also known as metastasis. Phenotypic
plasticity allows some cells to become motile and the remaining to be stationary. ‘Motility’ and
‘stationary’ are the two strategies in this game (Kareva and Karev, 2019). This study by Kareva
and Karev (2019) investigated the combined dynamics of two cancer games that could be applied
to the two games mentioned above. They showed that the dynamics of cooperators and defectors
within the respective games do not change after combination. But, selection causes a temporal
change in the distribution of these games. Thus, multiple-game dynamics are crucial to accurately
study the evolutionary dynamics of unicellular organisms to tumors in multicellular organisms.
A generalized mathematical framework for multiple interactions’ dynam-
ics
All the previous studies related to multiple-games had considered only pairwise interactions.
However, in reality, interactions are among multiple agents. Studies on single evolutionary games
to multiplayer games and multiple strategies expanded the domain of study to public goods games
and other social dilemmas e.g Gokhale and Traulsen (2010). I enhanced the sphere of multiple-
game dynamics that can consider multiplayer games with multiple strategies (Venkateswaran and
Gokhale, 2019). My work has a generalized approach and the method that I have developed
16
can be used for analyzing multiple games, where each involved game could be a multiplayer
(and multi-strategy) game. Thus, this approach enables us to study the entire space of multiple
interactions with multiple strategies consisting of multiple players. In fact, the previous studies on
multi-games dynamics (Cressman et al., 2000; Hashimoto, 2006; Shibasaki and Shimada, 2018;
Kareva and Karev, 2019) can be derived from my general framework. I have also extended the
multiple-games dynamics approach to study the coupled interactions or relationships between
life-history traits (see Figure 1.1).
The remainder of this chapter presents an overview of the thesis.
1.3 Overview of the thesis
As illustrated in Figure 1.1, the next three chapters are devoted to the development of mathe-
matical models to study multiple interspecies and intraspecies interactions that individuals take
part during a period. Chapter 2 describes an evolutionary game theory based model on multiple
interactions and their dynamics. This model gives us information about the dynamics of combined
interactions. A crucial outcome that we obtained from the mathematical framework in Chapter 2
is that investigating combined interactions’ di↵ers from studying a single interaction in isolation.
Another information that we get from this mathematical framework is that interactions influence
each other. A combination of one interaction with an already existing one can change its dynam-
ics in both deterministic (infinite population) and stochastic (finite populations) scenarios. Thus,
the combined interactions’ dynamics present a clearer story about the individuals. A population
dynamics based model presented in Chapter 3 examined interactions between multiple life-history
traits with sex-specific di↵erences in each of them. This helped study the overall life-history of
an individual. Chapter 4 contains a state-dependent dynamic model that focused on two life-
history traits: parental investment and immunocompetence. These two traits interact through
competition for resources i.e. there is a trade-o↵ between the allocation of an individual’s reserves
17
towards o↵spring (parental investment) or survival (immunocompetence). This model illustrates
how sex-specific di↵erences in parental investment can give rise to sexual immune dimorphism.
Synthesis of each of these chapters is listed below.
• Chapter 2: a theoretical framework to study combined interactions
The first phase of my thesis was to construct a mathematical framework for investigating
multiple interactions (or games). The mathematical framework that I have constructed is a
complete and general method to study multiple games with many strategies and players, all
at once. This was done for infinite and finite populations. The results are exhibited in the
paper (Venkateswaran and Gokhale, 2019) attached in Chapter 2. To summarize the results
from this paper: a combination of games (interactions) is not the same as the ‘sum’ of the
individual games. For infinite populations, we found that the combined game(s) dynamics
shows di↵erent trajectories and di↵erent equilibrium points for the strategies as compared
to their dynamics in the individual games. When the games have more than two strategies,
we find that they cannot be separated back to their single game dynamics, in line with
previous findings (Hashimoto, 2006). Interestingly, however, we find a dependency on the
initial conditions i.e., the initial frequencies of each strategy. For certain initial conditions,
one may still be able to capture the single game dynamics from their multi-game dynamics.
Finite populations can account for natural properties like drift. Thus, for finite populations
we also derived an expression for calculating an important stochastic property known as the
fixation probability: when a new mutant enters a resident wild-type population, will it fixate
or not? Our results show that the fixation probability of a single game changes even when
a neutral game is combined with it. The details of these results are shown and discussed in
the following chapter.
• Chapter 3: an application of the theoretical combined interactions’ dynamics
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approach to study the consequences of interacting life-history traits
The model and its results discussed in Chapter 3 is an application of the above mentioned
multiple games approach. I studied the outcome of various interactions during a reproductive
lifetime of the di↵erent sexes in sexually reproducing polygamous animals. The manuscript
(V.R Venkateswaran, O Roth and C.S Gokhale. Consequences of combining life-history traits
with sex-specific di↵erences. bioRxiv doi: https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.01.03.892810) is
attached in Chapter 3. In this manuscript, I show that sex di↵erences in parental investment,
ornamentation and immunity (Trivers, 1972, 2002; Hedrick and Temeles, 1989; Roved et al.,
2017) give rise to a bias in the adult sex ratio (Pipoly et al., 2015). As shown in many
empirical studies, the sex ratio bias among adults has an impact on sex di↵erences and roles
(Liker et al., 2013, 2015; Sze´kely et al., 2014). This model shows that the opposite is also
possible (Kokko and Jennions, 2008) by allowing one to capture the diverse sex-specific
interactions and traits of an individual. Details of this model and its results as illuminated
in Chapter 3
• Chapter 4: relationships between interacting life-history traits
The model presented in Chapter 4 zooms further into interactions between multiple life-
history traits. This study is aimed towards investigating the emergence of species or sex-
specific di↵erences in life-history traits. How do interactions between life-history traits in-
fluences each other? More precisely, how do interactions between life-history traits result
in sex-specific di↵erences or sexual dimorphism in certain traits? The two life-history traits
we consider are parental investment and immunity. There have been studies, both experi-
mental and theoretical to answer the evolution of sexual immune dimorphism (Stoehr and
Kokko, 2006; Nunn et al., 2008; Restif and Amos, 2010). But in the theoretical models,
an important factor is missing - parental investment. Parental investment has three parts:
gamete production, pregnancy (in some cases only internal fertilization) and parental care.
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Experimental results across diverse taxa show that increase in parental investment may give
rise to better immunocompetence (Roth et al., 2011; Lin et al., 2016; Peck et al., 2016;
Keller et al., 2017). Chapter 4 presents my final PhD project which was pursued to study
sexual dimorphism in immune response in relation to parental investment provided. The
manuscript (V.R Venkateswaran, C.S Gokhale, M. Mangel and S. Eliassen. The e↵ect of
parental investment on immunocompetence and sexual immune dimorphism) is attached in
this chapter. In this study, I used state-dependent dynamic programming where an individual
allocates its resources towards maintaining the two traits: parental investment and immune
response i.e. there is a competition for resources between these two traits. An optimal
allocation will grant maximum fitness (reproductive success). Various situations of trade-
o↵s in allocating resources towards parental investment and immunity follow for di↵erent
species systems. This allows us to understand the e↵ect of parental investment on immune
responses. Our results (discussed in detail in Chapter 4) show that for most cases, when
an individual spends more time in pregnancy or brooding period, it allocates more resources
towards its own immunity. The methods and results are presented in Chapter 4.
The overarching conclusion of this thesis is that studying coupled interactions between indi-
viduals or traits within individuals is necessary to obtain more accurate and meticulous results.
This is because our results show that combined interactions’ dynamics di↵ers from studying an
isolated interaction. The dynamics di↵er in terms of trajectories of frequencies of individuals of
every type and the equilibrium values for the frequencies, both. Coupling even a neutral interac-
tion to another interaction a↵ects their dynamics.
I also successfully applied the multiple interactions approach to interactions between life-history
traits. By doing so, I was able to investigate how one trait a↵ects another and also how the
combined dynamics of the traits can result in population-level consequences.
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Many Interactions’ 
Combined Dynamics
Dynamics of Combined Interactions’ 
between Life-History Traits
Influence on one Life-
History Trait by another
Question: What is the 
outcome of the combined 
dynamics of multiple life-
history traits’ (here, parental 
investment, ornamentation 
immune response) dynamics 
that have sex-specific 
differences.
Questions: Is it possible to 
combine diverse multiplayer  
interactions and study the 
resulting dynamics?
How does looking at the 
combined dynamics differ from 
looking at each interaction in 
isolation? 
Question: How does sex-
specific differences occur in 
one life-history trait (here, 
immune response) due to its 
interaction with another trait 
(parental investment).
Thesis Overview  
Chapter 2: Chapter 3: Chapter 4:
Results: A bias in the adult 
sex ratio emerges as an 
outcome of the combination of 
life-history traits with sex-
specific differences.
 
An increase in immune 
heterozygotes within one sex 
as compared to the other can 
also evolve. So this sex may 
show a higher immune 
response on average (due to 
the heterozygous advantage 
i.e. having diverse immune 
alleles helps recognise more 
pathogens). 
Result:  Species or sex-
specific differences in the time 
spent in parental investment 
has an effect on the optimal 
investment towards immunity.
For most species systems, it is 
optimal to invest more in 
immunity when the time spent 
in parental investment is 
longer. 
The sex that can undergo 
pregnancy or brooding 
periods, invests more towards 
its immunity.
Tools: 
Evolutionary game theory,
stochastic Moran process.  
Tools: 
Population genetics,
evolutionary game theory, 
frequency dependent fitnesses
models of sexual selection that 
measure reproductive 
success.  
Tools: 
State-dependent dynamic 
modeling.  
Results: I constructed a 
mathematical framework 
that can combine many multiple 
multiplayer games (interactions) 
with a diverse set of strategies in 
each game.
Combined game dynamics differs 
from single game dynamics in 
terms of trajectories of 
frequencies of individuals of each 
strategy and equilibrium values, 
both.
‘Addition’ of even a neutral game 
to another game, affects its 
dynamics.
Figure 1.1: Overview of the thesis. Chapter 2 presents a mathematical model that I developed
to study combined evolutionary interaction’ dynamics. Two important outcomes from this model
were applied to two other models which I conceived: 1) to investigate lifetime reproduction
success as well as its consequences for the two sexes (Chapter 3), and 2) the emergence of sex-
specific di↵erences in life-history traits due to the interactions (here, competition for resources)
between them (Chapter 4).
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Chapter 2
Evolutionary dynamics of multiple
complex interactions
“The most extraordinary thing about
trying to piece together the missing links
in the evolutionary story is that when
you do find a missing link and put it in
the story, you suddenly need all these
other missing links to connect to the
new discovery. The gaps and questions
actually increase - it’s extraordinary.”
— David Attenborough
2.1 Introduction to evolutionary games
Evolutionary game theory or EGT (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944; Maynard Smith and
Price, 1973) has been applied for studying phenotypes such as sex ratio, social interaction, hunting
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techniques, allocation of resources between male and female functions in a hermaphrodite species.
Evolutionary games are representative of interactions between individuals. In EGT, a set of players
is considered where each player has a fixed strategy while they interact in a game. The strategies
are the di↵erent phenotype trait values. When a player interacts with another player, that
individual gets a payo↵. The average payo↵s contribute to fitness. To illuminate this idea, let us
look at an example of a contest between Hawk (aggressive behavior) and Dove (calmer behavior
and retreats when opponent’s aggressiveness escalates) for a resource V . The cost of injury is
C. When a Hawk meets Hawk, each shares a 50% chance of obtaining the resource and 50%
chance of injury i.e. their payo↵ is (V   C)/2. When Hawk interacts with Dove, it gets a high
payo↵ (V ) and when Dove meets Hawk, the payo↵ is 0 i.e. its fitness does not increase while
interacting with the Hawk. When two Doves interact, they share the resource, leaving each with
a payo↵ equal to V/2.
In almost every scenario, only one game is considered; i.e. individuals can play only one game
at an instant or during a certain period. However, in nature is it highly likely for an individual
to play more than one game with the same or di↵erent groups of individuals, not applying the
same strategy in every game. An individual might perform di↵erent roles in various games. There
also exist scenarios where a division of labor takes place (Wahl, 2002). Organisms have a range
of tasks to execute in various social settings. Thus, the average payo↵s should depend on all
games. Our framework incorporates all these possibilities; to get closer to modeling the world
around us more accurately. Realistic situations can be applied in this model to explain them
better. Take the case of humans interacting in public goods games such as climate change issues
(Milinski et al., 2006). These games usually consist of Cooperators (C) and Defectors (D). The
Cooperators contribute a cost c for the public good but the defectors do not contribute anything.
There are di↵erent versions of such public goods games where we could have additional strategies
such as Punisher, Loner (Hauert et al., 2002). When individuals participate in many public good
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games, the contribution of say, a Cooperator need not be similar in all the games. Their payo↵
will depend on all the games they are associated with (Santos et al., 2008).
A multiple games model could also be used for explaining how the avirulent ‘cheater’ trait
has been evolutionarily stable among fellow subpopulations of virulent ‘cooperators’ in intestinal
pathogen S. typhimurium population. It has been observed that the avirulent types are useful
in the ‘maintaining cooperative virulence’ game (Diard et al., 2013). Likewise, in Pseudomonas
fluorescens communities, the seemingly destructive cheating cells can promote evolution of col-
lectives (Hammerschmidt et al., 2014). So a simple Cooperator-Defector game cannot be the
only game that should be considered while modeling such situations. Over time, the individuals
play other games which may also depend on the population composition and size.
Previous studies on multi-game dynamics (Fig. 2.1) have shown that a combination of games
with more than two strategies cannot be separated into its constituent single game dynamics
(Hashimoto, 2006). However, these results are restricted to two-player games. When more play-
ers are involved, di↵erent dynamics emerge (Pacheco et al., 2009; Gokhale and Traulsen, 2010;
Pen˜a, 2012). For instance, consider lionesses who live in fusion-fission pride. These lionesses
defend their territory against other invading lionesses. They need at least two individuals to
form a territory for breeding, rearing cubs in cre`ches, protecting each other and their cubs from
invading males, etc. So we would expect all the members to cooperate during an attack on their
holding. However, it was observed that not all females cooperate in this territory defending game
(Heinsohn and Parker, 1995). Some lionesses (the leaders) always lead the defense. The others
lag behind. If we merely look at this territory protection as a simple Prisoners’ Dilemma game,
these laggards may end up being classified as defectors. The leaders could turn into defectors
too or they could be more prone to injury/death as they are at a higher risk. Eventually, this
could be deleterious for cooperation and could lead to what is commonly known as the tragedy
of commons. But we do not see this happening since, at a given point in time, they are not
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only players in the territory game. It might not be ideal to ‘judge’ the payo↵s of an individual by
looking at this game in isolation. They could also be mothers (or involved in communal rearing)
or wings/centers in a hunting game (Stander, 1992) and their collective payo↵s from all the
games should be considered to analyze the dynamics. The territory defense by female lions is
beyond a single iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma game.
We deduce that individuals have a particular role in the multiple games they play and the pay-
o↵s could be dependent on each other. Therefore, we need to look at multiplayer multi-game
dynamics. A complete picture of multiple game dynamics, where many players are involved, was
lacking and the aim of our project was to capture that (see Fig. 2.1) and apply it to biological
scenarios. If multiple players and strategies are involved, then can the multiple-game dynamics
be decomposed back into its constituent single game dynamics? If yes, the conclusions drawn
from individual games are valid. If not, it will be necessary to use multi-game dynamics to ob-
tain realistic results. To answer this question, we developed a method to study combinations
of symmetric multiplayer games and provide an analytical framework for analyzing an ensemble
of games in a tractable manner. We present a complete and general method to study multiple
games with many strategies and players, all at once.
2.1.1 Single evolutionary game dynamics
Consider a 2⇥ 2 payo↵ matrix (2.1). There are two players and the two types of strategies they
could employ are 1 and 2. The frequencies of the individuals with strategies 1 and 2 are x1 and
x2, respectively.
0@
1 2
1 a1,(1,0) a1,(0,1)
2 a2,(1,0) a2,(0,1)
1A (2.1)
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Figure 2.1: Scope of this study. (a) Typical evolutionary game dynamics focuses on two player
games with two strategies (solid yellow cube). Extensions to multiplayer games (d) and multiple
strategies (m, solid blue rectangle) expands the domain of study to public goods games and
other social dilemmas. However this is still limited to a single game. Hashimoto (2006) has
extended two player-multi-strategy games in a novel direction of multiple games (N , dotted red
rectangle). (b) Our work generalizes this approach and develops a method for analysing multiple
games, where each involved game could be a multiplayer (and multi-strategy) game. Thus, this
approach enables us to study the entire space of multiple games (N) with multiple strategies (m)
consisting of multiple players (d).
In matrix 2.1, we write the elements in the form ai,↵, where i is the strategy of the focal player.
↵ (using multi-index notation) is a vector written as ↵ = (↵1,↵2). ↵1 and ↵2 together represent
the group composition i.e. the number of strategy 1 and strategy 2 players. The average payo↵s
of the two strategies are given by f1 = a1,(1,0)x1 + a1,(0,1)x2 and f2 = a2,(1,0)x1 + a2,(0,1)x2.
The replicator equation (2.2) (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Nowak, 2006) describes the change
of a frequency xi of strategy i over time.
x˙i = xi[(fi    )] (2.2)
where fi is the fitness of strategy i and   is the average fitness. Here, in this 2 ⇥ 2 game, the
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Figure 2.2: Simplest Evolutionary Game: Two player games with two strategies. For a
payo↵ matrix of the form as shown in matrix (2.1), there can be four possible cases of replicator
or evolutionary dynamics. This depends on the magnitude and sign of the payo↵ matrix elements.
Plotted here is the change in frequency of strategy 1 (x) over time i.e. x˙ for all x. (a) When
a1,(1,0) = a2,(1,0) and a1,(0,1) = a2,(0,1) we see no dynamics. This means that all strategies are
equally selected for as they have the same fitness. Thus we see no change in the frequencies of
strategy 1 and 2 in the population. (b) When a1,(1,0) > a2,(1,0) and a1,(0,1) > a2,(0,1) the whole
population becomes strategy 1 individuals. (c) When a1,(1,0) < a2,(1,0) and a1,(0,1) > a2,(0,1),
the equilibrium x? is unstable and we see bistability. When we start from an initial condition
above the value of x?, the population becomes all strategy 1 individuals. If we start below x?, the
population will be full of strategy 2 individuals. (d)When a1,(1,0) > a2,(1,0) and a1,(0,1) < a2,(0,1),
the equilibrium x? is stable and there will be coexistence of the two types in the population.
replicator equations for strategies 1 and 2 give
x˙ = x(1  x)(f1   f2)
= x(1  x)[(a1,(1,0)   a1,(0,1)   a2,(1,0) + a2,(0,1))x+ a2,(1,0)   a2,(0,1)].
(2.3)
where x1 = x, x2 = 1   x. Apart from the trivial fixed points (x = 0 and x = 1), there is an
internal equilibrium given by,
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Figure 2.3: A two player game with three strategies: Rock-Paper-Scissor game. To
illustrate a 3 ⇥ 3 game or two player game with three strategies, let us consider the famous
childhood game: Rock-Paper-Scissors, where Paper beats Rock, Scissor beats Paper and in turn
Rock beats Scissor. A strategy against itself brings about a tie; gives no yield. Thus the general
payo↵ matrix for R-P-S can be written as shown in the matrix. (a) Case 1: This is a zero-sum
game as the elements of the matrix fulfill the condition aij =  aji. The unique equilibrium
stable solution is given by (1/3, 1/3, 1/3). This point is not asymptotically stable. Starting from
di↵erent initial conditions will lead to di↵erent periodic orbits around this point. (b) Case 2
is when the determinant of the matrix is positive i.e. a1a2a3 < b1b2b3. Then the trajectories
starting from any initial condition will converge to a unique stable equilibrium. (c) Case 3 is
when the determinant of the matrix is negative i.e. a1a2a3 > b1b2b3. Then the unique interior
equilibrium is unstable. All trajectories will converge to the boundary with increase in amplitude
in each cycle.
x? =
a2,(0,1)   a2,(1,0)
a1,(1,0)   a1,(0,1)   a2,(1,0) + a2,(0,1)
. (2.4)
Depending on the payo↵ matrix values one can obtain di↵erent evolutionary dynamics as shown
in figure 2.2.
One can extend this replicator dynamics framework for games with multiple strategies. Figure
2.3 shows an example of a three strategy game. Equation 2.2, in this case, will have to be
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solved for i 2 {1, 2, 3}. However, since the sum of the frequencies of the three strategies
x1 + x2 + x3 = 1, it is enough to obtain the dynamics of x1 and x2. The value of x3 would
then just be 1  (x1 + x2). The dynamics can be projected into a mathematical concept called
a simplex. The dynamics of a three strategy game can be projected by a two dimensional S3
simplex i.e. a triangle where each vertex corresponds to a strategy. The plots in figure 2.2 for
a two strategy were in fact one dimensional S2 simplexes. So for a game with m strategies, the
dynamics will be an m  1 dimensional Sm simplex.
Multiplayer games with multiple strategies
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Figure 2.4: Illustration of a multiplayer game with two strategies. The matrix shown in
this figure is an example of a three player two strategy game. If the focal (row) player adopts
strategy 1, then it can interact with two other players having strategy 1 each, strategy 2 each, or
one opposing player can adopt strategy 1 and the other can adopt strategy 2. The same applies
when the focal player adopts strategy 2. Since we have three players, the number of internal fixed
points (non-trivial solutions) have increased to two as shown in Gokhale and Traulsen (2010).
One of these is a stable equilibrium solution and other is unstable.
Previously, we looked at pairwise interactions. One individual interacts with another by adopt-
ing one of the two strategies. We now extend the dynamics to multiplayer games where we can
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have more than two players. The payo↵ matrix (2.5) represents a three player (d = 3), two
strategy (n = 2) game; a 2⇥ 2⇥ 2 game.
0@
11 12 22
1 a1,(2,0) a1,(1,1) a1,(0,2)
2 a2,(2,0) a2,(1,1) a2,(0,2)
1A (2.5)
The rows correspond to the focal player. Focal player with strategy 1 interacting with two other
players with strategies 1 and 1 will receive a payo↵ a1,(2,0). While interacting with strategy 1 and
strategy 2 players, he will get a1,(1,1). When he interacts with two other individuals both playing
strategy 2, he obtains a payo↵ equal to a1,(0,2). Similarly, we obtain payo↵s for a focal strategy
2. The average payo↵s (or in this case, the fitnesses) will be
f1 = x
2a1,(2,0) + 2x(1  x)a1,(1,1) + (1  x)2a1,(0,2)
f2 = x
2a2,(2,0) + 2x(1  x)a2,(1,1) + (1  x)2a2,(0,2).
(2.6)
The replicator equations give
x˙ = x(1  x)((a1,(0,2)   2a1,(1,1) + a1,(2,0)   a2,(0,2) + 2a2,(1,1)   a2,(2,0))x2
+( a1,(0,2) + a1,(1,1) + a2,(0,2)   a2,(1,1))2x+ a1,(0,2)   a2,(0,2)).
(2.7)
Here for a d = 3 or three player game, the quadratic x2 term (in equation 2.7) will give rise
to a maximum of two interior fixed points (non-trivial solutions) as shown in figure 2.4.
In general, for a d -player two strategy game, the replicator equation will not give just one but
d  1 maximum interior fixed points, since the fitnesses f1 and f2 are polynomials of maximum
d   1 degree. The number of interior fixed points will depend on the magnitudes of the payo↵
matrix elements.
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For an n strategy d-player game, the maximum number of internal equilibria is (d 1)(n 1) (Gokhale
and Traulsen, 2010).
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2.2 Manuscript: Multiple evolutionary game(s) dynamics
To study multiple evolutionary games dynamics, I constructed a mathematical framework that
is a complete and general method to study multiple games with many strategies and players,
all at once (Fig. 2.1) for infinite and finite populations. The results are exhibited in our paper
(Venkateswaran and Gokhale, 2019).
To summarize the results from this paper, we found out that a combination of games (interac-
tions) is not the same as the ‘sum’ of the individual games. For infinite populations, we found
that the combined game(s) dynamics show di↵erent trajectories and di↵erent equilibrium points
for the strategies as compared to their dynamics in the individual games. When the games have
more than two strategies, we find that they cannot be separated back to their single game dy-
namics (SGDs), in line with previous findings. Interestingly, however, I found dependency on the
initial conditions i.e., the initial frequencies of each strategy. For certain initial conditions, one
may still be able to capture the SGDs from their multi-game dynamics (MGD).
This paper also has an analysis of the lionesses’ territory defense question discussed in the intro-
duction of this chapter, where a pride of lionesses is involved in many games. The combined game
dynamics method explains the dynamics of an individual lioness and her pride more accurately.
For finite populations, I derived an expression for calculating the fixation probability which is the
probability with which a new mutant strategy can fixate in the population. I showed that the
fixation probability is di↵erent for scenarios where fitness is calculated using payo↵s at a certain
time and temporal fitness i.e. fitness accumulated over time. I also show that combining even
a neutral game to an existing game can lead to di↵erent combined dynamics (see Figure 2.5).
The evolutionary many-player multi-game method and details of its results are presented in the
following paper. The electronic supplementary material (ESM) of this paper is in Appendix A.
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A2 =
 11 12 22
1  2 3  2
2 0 0 0
!
A1 =
 1 2
1  1 1
2 0 0
!
Figure 2.5: Fixation probability of a single individual playing A11A
2
1 strategy on the edge
A11A
2
1   A11A22 varying with selection intensity for a combination of two games having
two strategies each. The fixation probability is the probability with which a mutant strategy
invades over the entire population. Here, we have a population that is divided into four types:
playing strategy 1 in game A1 and game A2, strategy 1 in A1 and 2 in A2, strategy 2 in A1 and
1 in A2. And finally, strategy 2 in A1 and A2. Thus,we have four types of strategies, A11A
2
1,
A11A
2
2, A
1
2A
2
1 and A
1
2A
2
2. Since there are four ‘categorical types’, the dynamics is shown in an
S4 simplex which is a tetrahedron. Here, we look at the edge A11A
2
1   A11A22 (highlighted by a
black line in the green tetrahedron) where A1 is the same for both vertices i.e. neutral in both
the vertices, and A2 is what matters. The line labeled ‘single game’ corresponds to single game
dynamics of A2. The plots from Method I (mapping payo↵s to fitnesses and then adding the
fitnesses) and Method II (adding the payo↵s first, and then mapping to fitness) for a combination
of the two games A1 and A2. The results from analytics and stochastic simulations are plotted
as solid lines and solid circles, respectively. The simulations are averaged over 106 realizations.
For a population of Z = 10 the fixation probabilities are normalized according to the neutral
fixation probability, 1Z = 0.1. (a) The payo↵s in Game A
1 are zero. Since the payo↵ of playing
strategy 2 in A2 is greater than playing strategy 1, the fixation probability decreases. Since the
payo↵ of playing strategy 1 and 2 in A1 are equal to zero, results from Method II and the single
game dynamics (SGD) of A2 are the same. However, Method I shows a di↵erent result. Thus,
adding another game A1 to A2 can modify the dynamics even when game A1 is neutral. (b)
There are non-zero payo↵s in Game A1. For this combination of the two games A1 and A2, the
multi-game dynamics (MGD) di↵ers from the SGD of A2 over which A1 is added. Within the
MGD, the two methods of mapping from payo↵s to fitness i.e. Method I and Method II di↵er
from each other (shown by the shaded region). The di↵erence is due to the di↵erent baseline
payo↵s that the di↵erent mappings produce.
Therefore, while looking at a combination of various games, there can be di↵erent methods of
mapping and one needs to choose a mapping method that reflects their model best as they can
bring about di↵erent results. 34
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Evolutionary game theory has been successful in describing phenomena from
bacterial population dynamics to the evolution of social behaviour. However,
it has typically focused on a single game describing the interactions between
individuals. Organisms are simultaneously involved in many intraspecies and
interspecies interactions. Therefore, there is a need to move from single games
to multiple games. However, these interactions in nature involve many
players. Shifting from 2-player games to multiple multiplayer games yield
richer dynamics closer to natural settings. Such a complete picture of multiple
game dynamics (MGD), where multiple players are involved, was lacking.
For multiple multiplayer games—where each game could have an arbitrary
finite number of players and strategies, we provide a replicator equation for
MGD having many players and strategies. We show that if the individual
games involved have more than two strategies, then the combined dynamics
cannot be understood by looking only at individual games. Expected
dynamics from single games is no longer valid, and trajectories can possess
different limiting behaviour. In the case of finite populations, we formulate
and calculate an essential and useful stochastic property, fixation probability.
Our results highlight that studying a set of interactions defined by a single
game can be misleading if we do not take the broader setting of the inter-
actions into account. Through our results and analysis, we thus discuss and
advocate the development of evolutionary game(s) theory, which will help
us disentangle the complexity of multiple interactions.
1. Introduction
Evolutionary game theory [1–4] has been used to study phenomena ranging
from the dynamics of bacterial populations to the evolution of social behaviour.
In evolutionary games, individuals are cast as players that interact with each
other in ‘games’, which are metaphorical summaries of interactions. For
example, in the classical Prisoners’ dilemma, individuals can either cooperate
or defect, and each pairwise interaction results in a payoff for the players
involved [3,5]. Over time, players adopt a strategy which either performs
better or worse than the average of the population and thus increases or
decreases in frequency. Tracking the change in their frequencies over time, evol-
utionary dynamics can provide insight into the eventual fate of the strategies in a
game, e.g. whether they dominate, coexist, or go extinct from the population [3].
Considerable effort has gone into making games more realistic (with inter-
actions among multiple players and allowing players to adopt strategies from a
large set [6,7]) shown by the solid blue rectangle in figure 1. As an example
from the micro-scale, we discuss the interactions between microorganisms.
One bacterium interacts with its neighbours. Assuming that a bacterium
would interact only in a pairwise fashion is clearly an assumption. When
more players are involved, dynamics can change not just quantitatively but
qualitatively [9–11]. Multiplayer games in bacterial dynamics can better explain
the coexistence of avirulent ‘cheaters’ and virulent ‘cooperators’ in populations
& 2019 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted use, provided the original
author and source are credited.
of the pathogen Salmonella Typhimurium [12]. Likewise, in
Pseudomonas fluorescens communities, the seemingly destruc-
tive cheating cells can promote evolution of collectives [13],
an inherently multiplayer interaction. The dynamics between
the microbes constituting the microbiome are nonlinear,
lending themselves to multiplayer games [14]. A constituent
of the microbiome may not be playing a single multiplayer
game with the other constituents but is also interacting
with the host. The complete interaction in the holobiont
would then be a collection of several multiplayer games [15].
Do we consider all the different games singly or as one
massive game with a large number of complex strategies?
The answer in short is that under certain conditions, the
single games studied individually do not provide the same
results as when we infer single games from the combined
dynamics. Across scales of organization, single games fail
to satisfactorily capture dynamics ranging from bacterial
dynamics (as above) to human behaviour. Envision the inter-
actions in public goods games such as climate change issues
[16]. When nations’ leaders discuss strategies to improve the
global climate status, they also need to take into account the
interests of the people they are representing. If the leaders
agree to contribute towards achieving the goals of the climate
summit, it often comes at a cost to the private interests of the
nation. Using a different set of strategies, the leaders have to
then appease the electorate. Thus, political leaders are play-
ing at least two multiplayer games: one with other nations
and another within their nation. Therefore, we need to shift
from single game dynamics (SGD) to multiple game
dynamics (MGD) as shown by the dotted red cuboid in
figure 1. Previous studies on MGD have shown that a combi-
nation of games with more than two strategies is inseparable
into its constituent SGD [8]. However, this result is valid only
for 2-player games as shown in the figure. It ignores the com-
plexity of multiplayer games as discussed above. We have
developed a method for analysing multiplayer MGD.
Besides ecological examples, formal analysis of evolution-
ary games in finite populations implies the role of multiple
games. The assumption of weak selection, where the game
has a weak effect on an organism’s fitness, typically is done
not only for mathematical ease but also assuming that, the
payoff differences are small, the strategies are similar, or the
individuals are confused about the strategies [17]. Multiple
games provide a simpler alternative where each game has a
small effect on an individual’s fitness.
A complete picture of MGD, where multiple players are
involved, is lacking. Nonlinearity in the replicator dynamics
increases with increasing number of players. As a result, mul-
tiplayer games can have multiple internal equilibria as
opposed to 2-player games that have at most one internal
equilibrium solution [10]. An initial condition within the
MGD space can converge to another equilibrium solution
than expected from the SGD. Thus, if we are aware that the
dynamics are composed of a set of different games, then is
the simplified use of a single bigger game justified? In
other words, can the MGD be decomposed into its constitu-
ent SGDs? If yes—the conclusions drawn from individual
games are valid. If not—it will be necessary to use MGD to
obtain realistic results.
To answer this question, we first present a complete and
general method to study multiple games with many strat-
egies and players, all at once (figure 1). When the games
have more than two strategies, we find that the MGD do
not correspond to the dynamics of its constituent single
games, in line with previous findings, while we also extend
the analysis to finite populations. Then we discuss a specific
model on how the inclusion of two different games (territor-
ial defence and hunting) can result in the observed division of
labour in lionesses [18,19]. Further, we show that for some
initial conditions the MGDs and SGDs differ not only in the
dynamics but the resulting equilibria as well.
2. Model
(a) Single game dynamics
2-player games with two strategies have been studied exten-
sively, both in infinite as well as finite populations. A game
between two individuals can be represented by the following
payoff matrix:
! 1 2
1 a1,(1,0) a1,(0,1)
2 a2,(1,0) a2,(0,1)
: (2:1)
Thematrix represents a symmetric 2-strategy 2-player game.We
do not study asymmetric games [20]. The two individuals, focal
and co-player are represented by a row and a column, respect-
ively. Each player adopts one of the two strategies, 1 or 2. We
write the elements of the matrix in the form ai,a, where i is the
strategy of the focal (or row) player. The vector a is written as
a ¼ (a1, a2) where ai indicates the number of strategy i
individuals the focal individual interacts with. For example, in
a 3-player game with two strategies, the payoff entry a2,(1,1)
corresponds to a focal player with strategy 2 interacting with
two other players with strategies 1 and 2, respectively.
The average payoff obtained from the game is the repro-
ductive success of that strategy [21]. This analysis has been
extended to interactions having multiple strategies [22] as
well as multiple players [23,24]. To make our notation clear,
d
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m
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1
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s
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Figure 1. Scope of this study. Typical evolutionary game dynamics focuses on
2-player games with two strategies (solid yellow square). Extensions to multi-
player games (d) and multiple strategies (m, solid blue rectangle) expands
the domain of study to public goods games and other social dilemmas. How-
ever, this is still limited to a single game. Hashimoto [8] has extended 2-
player multi-strategy games in a novel direction of multiple games (N,
dotted red cuboid). Our work generalizes this approach and develops a
method for analysing multiple games, where each involved game could be
a multiplayer (and multi-strategy) game. Thus, this approach enables us to
study the entire space of multiple games (N) with multiple strategies (m)
consisting of multiple players (d). (Online version in colour.)
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we illustrate a payoff matrix for a multiplayer (d player) game
with two strategies as
no: of opposing
strategy 1 players d! 1 d! 2 . . . k . . . 0
1 a1,ðd!1,0Þ a1,ðd!2,1Þ . . . a1,ðk,d!1!kÞ . . . a1,ð0,d!1Þ
2 a2,ðd!1,0Þ a2,ðd!2,1Þ . . . a2,ðk,d!1!kÞ . . . a2,ð0,d!1Þ
(2:2)
Even when extending the number of strategies, the
dynamics of this complicated system can still be analysed
by the replicator dynamics [25,26]. For a d player game with
m strategies, the replicator dynamics is given by a set of m
differential equations: _xi ¼ xi(fi ! f) where xi is the frequency
of strategy i, and fi is the average payoff of the strategy i. The
average payoff of the population is given by f ¼ Pmj¼ 1 xjfj.
This simple evolutionary game framework has been used to
describe a wide range of phenomena from chemical reactions
of prebiotic elements to the evolution of social systems [27].
While this extension to multiple players and strategies is
not trivially obtained [28], it still belongs to the domain of a
single game. The framework lacks the ability to incorporate
interactions which have differential impacts on fitness. There-
fore, we now incorporate multiple games and measure their
cumulative impact on individual fitness.
(b) Multi-game dynamics
Individuals may employ different strategies in various games
(e.g. division of labour scenarios [29]) and their (average)
payoffs will depend on their performance in all such
games. Switching between such socially driven games is rea-
listic and not only a matter of theoretical interest but has been
experimentally explored as well [30]. This section generalizes
the multi-game approach by Hashimoto [8] to an arbitrary
number of players. To contrast MGD with the previously
discussed SGD, consider a simple example of two, 2-player
games, each having two strategies:
A1 ¼
! A11 A12
A11 a
1
1,(1,0) a
1
1,(0,1)
A12 a
1
2,(1,0) a
1
2,(0,1)
and A2 ¼
! A21 A22
A21 a
2
1,(1,0) a
2
1,(0,1)
A22 a
2
2,(1,0) a
2
2,(0,1)
:
Combining the strategies from the above two games results in
four categories of individuals. The frequencies of the four cat-
egories are given by x11, x12, x21, and x22 where the first and
second positions (in the subscript) denote the strategies
adopted in games 1 and 2, respectively (figure 2).
For a combination of N games, each game j can be
described by a payoff matrix Aj. Each game j could be a dj
player game with mj number of strategies. The categorical
frequencies would then be given by xi1i2 ...ij...iN , where ij is
the strategy being played in game j. The frequencies of the
individual strategies for all N games can be written down as
p jij ¼
Xk¼ N
k¼ 1,k=j
Xmk
ik¼ 1
xi1i2 ...ij...iN , (2:3)
which allows us to compute the fitness of strategy ij as
f jij ¼
X
jaj¼ dj!1
dj ! 1
a
! "
paa jij ,a: (2:4)
As before, amj is the number of strategy mj players. Using
multi-index notation, we have a ¼ (a1, a2, . . . , amj ) which
gives us the multinomial coefficient, with the absolute value
jaj ¼ a1 þ a2 þ & & & þ amj and the power pa ¼ pa1j1pa2j2 . . . p
amj
jmj .
The average fitness of the population is given by, fj ¼ (pf )j.
Using this, we can write down the time evolution of all the
categorical strategies as
_xi1 i2...ij...iN ¼ xi1i2 ...ij...iN
XN
j¼ 1
(f jij ! fj)
0@ 1A : (2:5)
This system of equations is reminiscent of the replicator
equation for the SGD. The summation in the MGD replicator
equations is due to an assumption of additive fitness effects
from all games [8]. In the following sections, we will explore
the use of this formulation for multiple games where each
game can have a different number of players. Through the
examples of specific cases, we aim to highlight the general
principles of multiple games.
1          a      1,(1,0)
game 1 game 2
A11 A21
A21A11
A12 A22
A22A12
multi-game dynamics
single game dynamics
1          a      2,(1,0)
1          a      1,(0,1)
1          a      2,(0,1)
2          a      1,(1,0)
2          a      2,(1,0)
2          a      1,(0,1)
2          a      2,(0,1)
1A1
1A1
2A1
2A 2
1A2
2A1
1A2
2A2
Figure 2. From SGD to MGD. The population after combination is divided into four types: playing strategy 1 in game A1 and game A2, strategy 1 in A1 and 2 in A2,
strategy 2 in A1 and 1 in A2. And finally, strategy 2 in A1 and A2. Thus, we have four types of strategies, A11A
2
1, A
1
1A
2
2, A
1
2A
2
1, and A
1
2A
2
2. Their respective frequencies are
x11, x12, x21, and x22. Since there are four ‘categorical types’, the dynamics is shown in an S4 simplex. (Online version in colour.)
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3. Results
(a) Multiplayer game(s) with multiple strategies
Combining multiplayer games, frequency feedback between
strategies is possible. Moreover, an individual can take part in
different interactions. A lioness can be part of forming the defen-
sive line (tragedy of the commons) and hunting (stag–hunt
game). Strategies in game 1 would be Cooperator, Defector,
Loner, etc. Strategies in game 2 could be hunting positions
Wing, Centre, and so on. Thus in our framework, an individual
can have utterly different strategy sets for each game.
(i) 2-player game with 2-strategiesþ3-player game with 2-
strategies.
To illustrate games with two strategies, we shall use the
payoff matrices shown in (3.1).
A1 ¼
! 1 2
1 !1 1
2 0 0
and A2 ¼
! 11 12 22
1 !2 3 !2
2 0 0 0
:
(3:1)
Here,A1 is a2-playercoexistencegameandA2 is a3-playergame.
In A2, the values a1,(k,d212k)2 a2,(k,d212k) and a1,(kþ1,d2k)2
a2,(kþ1,d2k) havedifferent signs forall k. Thus solving for this scen-
ario using our replicator-like equation (2.5), we have two interior
fixed point solutions: a stable and an unstable. The equilibrium
solutions for strategy 1 in the two SGDs in (3.1) are q'1 ¼ 0:5 for
A1 and q'2 ¼ (q'21 , q'22 ) ¼ (0:27, 0:73) for A2. Since A2 is a 3-
player game, it has at most two internal equilibrium solutions
[10]. The result of combining these games, i.e. their MGD, is
shown in electronic supplementary material, figure A.4. The
first panel shows the SGD of both the games A1 and A2. We
choose three initial conditions ic1, ic2, and ic3 to understand the
difference between SGD and MGD by following those trajec-
tories’ dynamics in the SGDs and MGD. After combining the
two games with two strategies, we obtain the MGD that has
four (categorical) strategies x11, x12, x21, and x22. The dynamics
are plotted in a three-dimensional simplex. All trajectories that
start above the unstable equilibrium in A2 end up in the line
given by E, the evolutionarily stable (ES) set. As shown in the
third panel of electronic supplementary material, figure A.4,
one can recover the SGD back from their combined game
dynamics to compare the MGD and SGDs, i.e. re-obtain p11 (¼
x11 þ x12), p12 (¼ x21 þ x22), p21 (¼ x11 þ x21), and p22 (¼ x12 þ
x22). As shown by the dynamics in this figure, the MGD is the
same as the separate SGDs. So the MGD can be separated back
into its constituent gameswhen both games have two strategies.
(ii) 2-player game with 3-strategiesþ3-player game with
2-strategies.
Next, we increase the number of strategies in the 2-player
game:
A1 ¼
1CCA
0BB@
1 2 3
1 0 !1 2
2 2 0 !1
3 !1 2 0
and A2 ¼
! 11 12 22
1 10 1 5:5
2 4 10 3
:
(3:2)
Now A1 is a Rock–Paper–Scissor game. Trajectories starting
from any internal initial conditions converge to a unique
stable equilibrium, q'1 ¼ (1=3, 1=3, 1=3) [3]. For A2, the equili-
brium solutions are q'21 ¼ 0:127 (stable) and q'22 ¼ 0:740
(unstable). The MGD takes place in a six-dimensional space,
thus to compare the MGD with their SGDs we project them in
the SGD space as shown in figure 3. The SGD for A1 and A2
are shown in the first panel. Since the two games, A1 and A2
have three and two strategies; respectively, their combined
MGDwill have six categorical strategies. The bottom panel dis-
plays the plots that compare the SGDs recovered from theMGD
(dashed lines) with the original SGDs (solid lines). The recov-
ered dynamics do not match that of the individual games.
Thus, increasing the number of strategies in at least one game
shows that the MGD differs from the SGDs. Therefore, while
modelling multiplayer game scenarios with more than three
strategies that involve individuals participating in multiple
interactions simultaneously, one must look at their combined
game dynamics to study the full picture [8]. We extend the
domain of such multiplayer, multiple games analysis where
both games have three strategies in the next section.
(iii) 2-player game with 3-strategiesþ4-player game with
3-strategies.
Finally, we illustrate a case of having three strategies in both
games (shown in matrices (3.3)). A1 is a Rock–Paper–Scissor
game like the one discussed in the previous example. A2 is a 4-
player 3-strategy game used previously in [10]. In the SGDs of
the individual games, A1 has a stable equilibrium
q'1 ¼ (1=3, 1=3, 1=3) andA2 has in total nine interior equilibrium
solutions: four stable, one unstable, and four saddle points. The
SGDs of A1 and A2 and their MGD are shown in figure 4.
A1 ¼
1CCA
0BB@
1 2 3
1 !1 10 !10
2 !6 !1 6
3 2 !2 !1
and A2 ¼
1CCA
0BB@
111 112 113 122 123 133 222 223 233 333
1 !9:30 3:83 3:86 !1:03 !1:00 !0:96 0:10 0:33 0:16 0:20
2 0:10 !1:03 0:13 3:83 !1:00 0:16 !9:30 4:06 !0:96 0:2
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0:20 0 0
:
(3:3)
The results show that in the MGD it is even possible
for an initial condition to end up in a completely different
equilibrium as opposed to the SGD.
Consider A2 which has four stable internal equilibria. In
figure 4 top row, the three initial conditions go to three of the
stable equilibria. After combiningwithA1 and then recovering
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rspb
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the dynamics ofA2, we see that ic2 switches its long-term equi-
librium behaviour (figure 4 bottom row, recovered dynamics).
Multiplayer games offer the possibility of multiple internal
equilibria and combined games can allow the trajectories to
switch between them. Thus, the constituent games of an
MGD, especially involving multiplayer games should be
studiedwith scrutiny since their long-term evolutionary trajec-
tory cannot bepredicted by the basins of attractions of the SGD.
In a previous study of 2-player games with two strategies
[31], it was shown that the SGD can be obtained back from
theirMGD. The dynamics lie on the generalized invariantmani-
fold [25,32] in theS4 simplexwhich is given byWK ¼ fx[ S4jx11
x22¼ Kx12x21g for K. 0. When K ¼ 1, we have W ¼ fx[ S4j
x11x22¼ x12x21gwhich is theWright manifold. On this manifold,
MGD can be separated back into the SGDs of the constituent
games (see the electronic supplementary material for details).
The attractor for a combination of two 2-player games having
two strategies each is a line E, an ES set [31]. The point where
the line E intersects the Wright manifold indicates a rest point.
All the trajectories in the simplex depicting the MGD fall onto
an attractor given by a line (ES set) on WK. The dynamics on
WK and the trajectories on eachWK were analysed in the same
study [31] and the conditions when they are qualitatively the
same as on the Wright manifold. However, for multiple games
having more than two strategies in at least one game, the
MGD cannot be separated even into a linear combination of
the constituent SGDs unless they are on W [8]. Increasing the
number of games and strategies increases the dimension of
MGD simplex and also that of the Wright manifold. Only on
the Wright manifold can the MGD be separated back into its
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
fre
qu
en
cy
 o
f 
st
ra
te
gy
 1
 in
 g
am
e 
2
time
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
fre
qu
en
ci
es
 in
 M
G
D
x11
x12
x21
x22
x31
x32
x32
x12
x22
x11 x21 x31
x12 x22
x32x31 x21 x11
time timetime
recovered dynamics (dashed)
as compared to the SGD
ic1
p11
p12 p13
ic3
ic1
ic2 ic3 ic2
ic3
ic1 ic2 ic3
p 2
1 
fre
qu
en
cy
 o
f 
st
ra
te
gy
 1
 in
 g
am
e 
2
single game dynamics
multi-game dynamics
recovering single game dynamics from MGD
game 1 game 2
p13 p12p12
p11
p13
ic2
ic1
p11
q*22
q*21
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
time
ic1
ic2
ic3
q*22
q*21
x2 x3
x1
q*1
q*1
q*1
q*1
Figure 3. Two games, each having three and two strategies, respectively. The first row shows the SGD of the games in (3.2). Game 1 is a Rock–Paper–Scissor
game with a stable internal equilibrium, q'1 ¼ (1=3, 1=3, 1=3). Game 2 has two internal fixed points at q'21 ¼ 0:127 (stable) and q'22 ¼ 0:740 (unstable). The
asterisks denote the positions from where the three trajectories ic1, ic2, and ic3 begin (initial conditions). The grey trajectories are other random initial conditions. For
the MGD, we have six ‘categorical types’ x11, x12, x21, x22, x31, and x32. We plot the time evolution of the strategies for the three different initial conditions. From this
MGD, we can recover the corresponding frequencies for the two SGD. These are plotted in the last row. The recovered p11 refers to playing strategy 1 in game 1, p21
refers to playing strategy 1 in game 2 and so on. All recovered trajectories (dashed) go to the same equilibria of the SGD in game A1 and in game A2 (solid). While
the equilibria of the MGD correspond to that of the SGD, the dynamics can follow different routes. The initial conditions used for (x11, x12, x21, x22, x31, x32) are:
ic1 ¼ (0.3, 0.1, 0.1, 0.05, 0.4, 0.05), ic2 ¼ (0.4, 0.1, 0.2, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1), and ic3 ¼ (0.2, 0.3, 0.1, 0.1, 0.2, 0.1). (Online version in colour.)
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SGDs (see the electronic supplementary material for details).
Therefore, it is important to know onwhichmanifold the initial
conditions are, foronly if they start from theWrightmanifoldW,
will the dynamics be a perfect match to the SGDs [8].
Multiple multiplayer games can give rise to numerous rest
points, and they can criss-cross with the Wright manifold
which for multiple strategies would be of a dimension
SNi¼ 1(mj ! 1), where N is the number of games and mj is the
numberof strategies in game j (see the electronic supplementary
material). Future work on multiple d-player games with many
strategies could involve finding traversablepaths in this complex
space as is shownby some unusual trajectories (figure 4). Differ-
ing from the earlier work on 2-player multiple games [8,31], we
show that MGDs cannot always be trivially separated into their
constituent SGDs inmultiplayer gameswithmultiple strategies.
Furthermore, including multiplayer games in combined games
can lead to the SGD and the recovered dynamics differing not
just in the dynamics of trajectories but also in their eventual
endpoints.We have a generalizedmethod that looks at a combi-
nation of manymultiplayer games having diverse strategy sets.
Until now, the analysis firmly rested on the deterministic
dynamics and on the derivation and analysis of the replicator-
like equation. This assumes an infinitely large population.
To understand combined games in realistic finite populations,
we turn our attention to stochastic methods.
(b) Finite population
Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations has the poten-
tial of having qualitatively different dynamics than their
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deterministic analogues [33]. In finite populations, the size of
the population controls the balance between selection and
drift with smaller populations showing higher levels of sto-
chasticity. We use a birth–death Moran process to model a
finite population of size Z in our framework [33,34]. An indi-
vidual is chosen (proportional to its fitness) to reproduce an
identical offspring. Another individual is chosen randomly
for death. Thus, the total population size remains constant.
Earlier we assumed that the fitness of a strategy was its aver-
age payoff. Besides the population size, we can control the
effect of the game on the fitness via a particular mapping
of payoff to fitness. The mapping could be a linear function
f ¼ 12 w þ wp where w is the selection intensity [3]. If w ¼
0, selection is neutral whereas for w ¼ 1 selection is strong
and the payoff determines the fitness completely. However,
since negative fitnesses in this framework are meaningless,
there are restrictions on the range of w. Alternatively, to
avoid this restriction, we can use an exponential function
f ¼ ewp [35]. Under any mapping scenario but weak selec-
tion, the fixation probability of strategy 1 in a population
of Z2 1 strategy 2 players playing a d-player game, is [10],
r1 (
1
Z
þ w
Z2
XZ!1
m¼ 1
Xm
g¼ 1
(p1 ! p2), (3:4)
wherepi is the fitness of strategy i and the payoffs dependon the
number of mutants g. We have generalized this result to mul-
tiple games. The strategies in a multiple game are categorical
ones. For instance, a two game systemwith each game contain-
ing two strategies, has four categorical strategies as shown in
figure 2. If one of the categorical strategies takes over the entire
population, we term it as the fixation of the strategy defined
by the category. If in a population of size Z playing N games,
there is a single individual playing strategy A1i1A
2
i2 . . .A
N
iN in a
population of Z2 1 individuals playing strategy
A1h1A
2
h2 . . .A
N
hN then we are interested in the probability that
this single individual takes over the population. First we need
to map the payoffs to fitness and there are two ways of imple-
menting any kind of mapping for multiple games: Method I.
For each game, the payoffs are mapped to fitness and then the
cumulative fitness is calculated. Here, the fixation probability
of a single individual of type A1i1A
2
i2 . . .A
N
iN in a population of
A1h1A
2
h2 . . .A
N
hN is given by (see the electronic supplementary
material for details)
rA1i1A
2
i2
...ANiN
,A1h1
A2h2
...ANhN
( 1
Z
þ w
NZ2
XZ!1
m¼ 1
Xm
g¼ 1
XN
j¼ 1
(p jij ! p jhj )
0@ 1A24 35: (3:5)
Method II.Thepayoffs can be added first and thenmapped to fit-
nesses. The fixation probability through this method is (see the
electronic supplementary material for details)
rA1i1A
2
i2
...ANiN
, A1h1
A2h2
...ANhN
( 1
Z
þ w
Z2
XZ!1
m¼ 1
Xm
g¼ 1
XN
j¼ 1
(p jij ! p jhj )
0@ 1A24 35: (3:6)
For illustration, let us consider a combination of two
games with two strategies each. For instance, the games in
(3.1). We make pairwise comparisons between all categorical
types, i.e. all the edges of the S4 simplex in electronic
supplementary material, figure A.4. Using these comparative
fixation probabilities, we can determine the flow of the
dynamics over pure strategies. Let us focus on the edge
A11, A
2
1
! !A11, A22, where game 1 does not change and only
game 2 matters. Hence, the fixation probabilities should be
the same as if only game 2 exists. The single game fixation
probability of game 2 is shown in electronic supplementary
material, figure A.5. As given in equations (3.5) and (3.6),
when game 2 is combined with game 1, there can be two
ways of mapping payoffs to fitness. The results from these
two methods in multiple games in finite populations are
also plotted in electronic supplementary material, figure A.5.
The fixation probabilities of a strategy in a single game
changes when ‘adding’ just one more game to it. Even on
the edge A11, A
2
1
! !A11, A22, where game 1 is neutral and
only game 2 matters, there is an effect of game 1 on game
2. With increasing selection intensity, the fixation probability
of a single individual playing A11A
2
1 strategy on the edge
A11A
2
1
! !A11A22, i.e. rA11A21,A11A22 is expected to decrease (elec-
tronic supplementary material, figure A.5). However, this
decrease is different for the two methods and for the fixation
probability of an individual with strategy 1 playing only
game A2, i.e. rA21,A22 . Method I gives a higher value of
rA11A21,A11A22 as compared to rA21,A22 , whereas Method II shows
that rA11A21,A11A22 is lower than rA21,A22 with increasing selection
intensity. This means that while in general the fixation prob-
abilities for the categorical type A11 A
2
1 decrease, it is even
harder for A11 A
2
1 to reach fixation in the scenario where all
the payoffs are first added and then converted to fitness as
opposed to if the payoffs are first mapped and then added
together. The difference can be explained by the difference
in the baseline fitness between the two methods. The baseline
fitness is provided by the game which the edge is indepen-
dent of, in the case of electronic supplementary material,
figure A.5, game A1. In the electronic supplementary
material, we calculate the difference between the two
methods and show how this difference changes according
to the different baseline fitness. For a large number of
games, the difference is independent of the number of games.
Fixation probability is a crucial property of stochastic evol-
utionary game dynamics. Instead of merely looking at the
fixation probabilities of certain types or strategies in a game,
we have expanded the method for analysing the ‘categorical
types’ in the MGD. Therefore, even for multiple games in
finite populations, it might be possible to derive the long-term
average dynamics [28,36] of entities playing a combination of
different roles (strategies) in various interactions (games).
(c) Territorial defence versus group hunts
We can find numerous applications of the multiple games con-
cept not only in economics and cultural evolution [37] but also
in classical ecology and evolutionary biology. As an illustration
of our methodology, we choose to focus on the lioness example
described in the Introduction. An explanation involving mul-
tiple games was already hypothesized in [18]. We shall
consider two games: the territorial defence and a hunting
game. The first game is a public goods game (PGG) with
loners (Lo, not participating in the defence), leaders (Le, coop-
erators), and laggards (La, defectors). The cooperators patrol
the territory together and thus provide an enhanced benefit of
better protection via numbers. The loners can protect the terri-
tory only by themselves and get limited benefit out of it (less
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rspb
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than the cooperators). The defectors take part in patrolling but
lag thus benefiting from the interaction without contributing.
The payoffs for these strategies are
pLe ¼ r1c1kd1 ! c1; pLa ¼
r1c1k
d1
; pLo ¼ c1s: (3:7)
For territorydefence,we set thenumberof individualspatrolling
d1,with the cost of cooperation c1. The parameter k is the number
of leaders (or cooperators). Here, r1 (1, r1, d1) is the common
pool’s interest rateoranenhancement factorands (0, s, r12
1) is the small and fixed payoff of loners. The SGD for d1 ¼ 12,
r1 ¼ 3, c1 ¼ 1, ands ¼ 1 is shown in figure5as in [38]. Thehomo-
clinic cycles show the coexistence of all the types: leaders,
laggards, and loners as discussed in the Introduction.
The second game is a hunting game (stag–hunt game)with
cooperators and defectors. In cooperative hunting among lion-
esses, the ‘wings’ attack a preyand force them tomove forward.
The prey ends up running towards the lionesses called ‘centres’
lurking to catch it [39]. Clearly, two players are not enough for
these games. For the two strategies of this multiplayer stag–
hunt game, the payoffs are calculated as per [9]
pC ¼ r2c2jd2 u(j!M)! c2 and pD ¼
r2c2j
d2
u(j!M), (3:8)
where u(z) is the Heaviside step function, i.e. u(z, 0) ¼ 0 and
u(z ) 0) ¼ 1. The number of cooperators j each pay a cost c2.
The enhancement factor for game 2 is given by r2. The value
M is theminimum threshold numberof players required to pro-
ducepublicgood.TheSGDfor this scenario isdepicted in figure
5. For specific parameter values, d2 ¼ 20, M ¼ 10, c2 ¼ 1, and
r2 ¼ 12, we observe two internal equilibrium solutions of the
replicator dynamics [9].
Combining the stag hunt with the territorial defence
game, the recovered dynamics from the MGD does not
necessarily reflect the SGDs. Certain trajectories can become
non-oscillatory resulting in the dominance of one of the strat-
egies (ic2) or the coexistence of all but in a static equilibrium
(ic3). For the stag–hunt game, we even see a complete switch
of equilibrium (ic2), as in figure 4. The combination of the two
games can change not just the dynamics but also the equili-
bria of both the games for certain initial conditions (figure 5).
From the MGD shown in figure 5, we see that judging a
lioness by her action in one game does not complete the pic-
ture. An apparent cheater lioness in one game, can be a
cooperator in another. For ic2, xLo D reaches fixation but for
ic1 the timing of observation matters. A lioness’ entire story
can only be told by looking at her ‘categorical type’ which
informs us about the combined effect of playing all games
as postulated by empirical observations [18]. Adding other
games like cooperative breeding, nursing, or mating may
also provide a better comprehension.
4. Conclusion
Nature is composed of many interactions in different contexts
(games) [40]. The games consist of different players and strat-
egy sets. In its lifetime, an individual plays many parts (in
various games). We have devised a method to combine the
various multiplayer multi-strategy games that individuals
play with an aim of developing realistic evolutionary game
theoretic models. For infinite populations, we provide a repli-
cator equation which can encapsulate multiple games with
multiple players and strategies. For finite populations, we
show that the fixation probabilities depend on the details of
the particular model at hand and especially how the payoffs
are converted to fitness.
Just as biological and social analogies of multiplayer evol-
utionary games can be found aplenty, the case for
considering multiple multiplayer games is strong. We have
discussed an application of our theory using the territorial
defence and hunting behaviour of lionesses. The example
highlights the fact that behaviour needs to be analysed in
the light of complex multiple interaction contexts. On a smal-
ler scale, the gut microbiota is a complex system which is
capable of showing a variety of stable states, often a dynamic
stability [14,41]. The different microbes within the gut com-
munity definitely interact in a variety of ways within
themselves but each also interacts with the host in a unique
manner. Within species and between species interactions,
together, have the potential to dictate the evolutionary
course of all involved species [42]. These interactions can cer-
tainly be interpreted as multiple games, each with a number
of strategies and (immensely) multiplayer games. On the
population genetics level, as an extension to previous work
[43], multiple games and multi-strategies can be seen as mul-
tiple loci with several alleles. The case for two loci (or games)
having two strategies [31], and 3-strategy games [8] has been
previously investigated. Now with our inclusion of multi-
player games, we can also investigate polyploidy [44].
Considering recombination at this point would be crucial
since it has been shown that under recombination the
dynamics of multiple games would converge to the Wright
manifold and thus to the SGD as in [45]. Deciphering the
linkage between strategies used across multiple games
could then be an exciting avenue for future research.
In finite populations, we have developed two methods to
map the payoffs to the fitnesses. These two methods produce
different fixation probability values for a particular selection
intensity (electronic supplementary material, figure A.5).
Both methods can have different biological justification. For
example, all the actions leading to a brood produced
during a season could be the culmination of all payoffs con-
verted to fitness and then added to give the lifetime fitness—
this is akin to Method I. On the other hand, in Method II, the
payoffs through all breeding seasons would be summed up
and then mapped to the lifetime fitness. The methods pro-
duce different results as compared with just one game (or
even when the game is combined with another neutral
game). Thus, even under finite populations, MGDs are differ-
ent from SGDs and our formulation can be used to study
multiple games in finite populations.
In a nutshell, our analysis reveals that the outcomes from
multiplayer 2-strategy games are similar to previous results
[31], where the MGD can be characterized by the separate
analysis of the individual games. However, when the
games have at least three pure strategies, different dynamics
emerge [8]. This dynamical (in)consistency has already been
pointed out [31,32] as ‘serious since it goes to the heart of
the evolutionary approach’ [32]. With the diverse use of mul-
tiplayer games in social evolution (e.g. tragedy of the
commons) and in biology, the problem is only exacerbated
due to the potential existence of multiple internal steady
states. For such cases, a fully comprehensive study of the initial
conditions is a potential future project (as in figures 4 and 5).
Even though complicated dynamics can still be captured by
the relatively simple replicator-like equations and fixation
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probabilities, vast domains in the multiple games space remain
unexplored.
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Figure 5. Lionesses in territory defence and stag–hunt games. The SGD of the games are plotted in the top panel. The leader Le, laggard La, and loner Lo are the
strategies in the territorial defence game. Cooperation C and defection D are the strategies for the stag hunt. The grey lines are trajectories from random initial
conditions to observe the SGDs. We choose three trajectories having initial conditions ic1, ic2, and ic3 to track the SGDs and MGD. Homoclinic orbits that emerge from
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22 . The MGD consists of six
categorical types xLe C, xLa C, xLo C, xLe D, xLa D, and xLo D. In the middle panel, the time evolution of the categorical types is plotted. For ic1, we recover oscillatory
dynamics but different dynamics as well as equilibria emerge for other initial conditions. In the last row, we show the recovered SGDs ( plotted in dashed lines) from
the MGD in comparison with the original SGDs ( plotted with solid lines). For the recovered territorial defence game, the initial conditions ic2 and ic3 do not end up
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Chapter 3
Combined dynamics of multiple
life-history traits with sex specific
di↵erences
“Astronomy gave you the inorganic
creation and evolution over a
15-billion-year period of time.
Evolutionary logic gave you the
comparable story over 4 billion years and
evolutionary logic applied to life.”
— Robert Trivers, Natural Selection and
Social Theory
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3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we looked at a mathematical framework to study multiple interlinked
interactions that group(s) of individuals take part in over a period of time. This framework
used evolutionary game theory (Maynard Smith, 1982) where each game was an interaction, and
provided a concise formula to calculate the evolution of various types of individuals in a population
who play di↵erent kinds of games. This formula can capture the dynamics of many games having
a varying number of agents or players and sets of strategies (phenotypes, traits, decisions) they
could adopt.
In this chapter, I use the idea of combined dynamics of multiple interactions to build a model
that studies interactions between life-history traits and how sex-specific di↵erences in life-history
traits a↵ect the fitness of species in the animal kingdom. Here, the focus is on sexually repro-
ducing animals with two distinct sexes: female and male. Females provide large costly eggs and
males smaller low-cost sperms. The sexes are defined by this di↵erence in gamete size also known
as anisogamy. In this model, three main inter-individual and intra- individual interactions of life-
history traits during a reproductive period were considered: parental investment, ornamentation
(displays used to attract potential mates) and immune response. All these traits manifest sex-
specific di↵erences. The overall life-history of a sex is a↵ected by diverse sex-specific interactions.
The model uses standard knowledge from population genetics and simple frequent dependent fit-
ness in addition to evolutionary game theory to study the consequences of sex-specific di↵erences
in life-history traits on lifetime reproductive success.
An important outcome that emerged out of this model is the bias in adult sex ratio in many
species and our results match with empirical observations (Pipoly et al., 2015). In this chapter,
I present the details of the model. An important result discussed in this chapter exhibits how
and when sex-specific di↵erences a↵ect adult sex ratios. For instance, our findings show that in
species with equal parental investment, sex-specific di↵erences in ornamentation are the major
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cause of skewed sex ratios.
Before diving into the model, let us first look at the basics of sexual selection and the above men-
tioned life-history traits with sex-specific di↵erences that are a crucial aspect of the reproductive
lifetime of an individual or until the time of senescence i.e. period after which the individual can
no longer reproduce.
3.2 Sexual selection
Most evolutionary biology problems boil down to studying how living organisms maximize their
fitness. The fitness of an individual depends on its survivability and fertility. The first step to
obtaining o↵spring starts with mating and this is where sexual selection occurs. Sexual selection
has been discussed ever since Darwin wrote on the subject (Darwin, 1871). Darwin defined
sexual selection as competition and di↵erential choice within members of one sex for obtaining
mates of the opposite sex. This means that females tend to choose some males over others and
males compete with each other for females. Intrasexual selection refers to mating competition
within the same sex (usually this is seen among males) whereas intersexual selection denotes mate
choice; where (usually) the females choose their mates (Wong and Candolin, 2005; Andersson
and Simmons, 2006). Studies on sexual selection can shed more light on the evolution of species
since it is a special case of natural selection that acts on the ability of a species to successfully
copulate with a mate. It is the reason that makes peacocks maintain their magnificent tails,
fruit flies to perform their courtship dances and certain birds to build elaborate nests. Thus,
sexual selection gives rise to sexual dimorphism which is defined as the set of di↵erences that
are observed between two sexes of a species. This set does not include variations in sex organs.
Sexual selection is also often powerful enough to produce features that are disadvantageous to
the individual’s survival. For example, extravagant and colorful tail feathers or fins useful for
attracting interested members of the opposite sex are likely to attract predators as well.
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3.3 Sex-specific di↵erences in life-history traits
3.3.1 Ornamentation and sex roles
Intrasexual selection is performed between individuals of the same sex to attract and obtain mates
from the other sex through fights, nuptial gifts, nests, sexual signals, ornament display and various
types of ‘attractiveness’. We refer to all of these as ‘ornaments’. Sex roles are of two types,
conventional and reversed. The former refers to males competing for females and the latter refers
to females competing for male mates. Sex-role reversal has nothing to do with male pregnancy
e.g. seahorse males undergo pregnancy, but still, seahorses are a conventional sex-role species as
the males compete for the females (Vincent et al., 1992).
3.3.2 Parental investment
The collection of all the investments by an individual for all the o↵spring produced in that
reproductive season is defined as parental investment (Trivers, 1972; Kokko and Jennions, 2008).
It can be described in three parts or stages: initial parental investment or investment in the
production of gametes (sperms or eggs), internal parental investment or pregnancy, and lastly,
external parental investment or parental care which entails all the parental care provided after
the birth of a juvenile. In nature, the amount of parental investment varies within members of
the two sexes of a species, and also varies between species. For example, within a species, say,
sticklebacks or seahorses, the males provide more parental investment as compared to females.
Between species where males perform most of the parental investment, male sticklebacks provide
all the parental care required for o↵spring, and seahorse males undergo pregnancy (Smith and
Wootton, 1999; Wilson et al., 2003).
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Figure 3.1: The relation between number of males and fertility relative to that with
one mate. The following result is from the paper by Bateman where he performed a series
of experiments with Drosophila melanogaster (Bateman, 1948). The solid lines correspond to
males and the broken lines refer to the females. This plot shows that the relative fertility of males
increases with the number of mates. Females do not gain as many mates as the male do in one
reproductive season since females also go through parental investment.
3.3.3 Sex di↵erence in immune response
Immunity is a crucial life-history parameter. In most sexually reproducing animals, females are
more immunocompetent than males, but in species with male pregnancy (pipefishes, seahorses),
males have a more e cient immune system. This sex-specific di↵erence in immunocompetence
is known as sexual immune dimorphism.
There are many hypotheses as to why there is sexual immune dimorphism. Initially, it was thought
that only ornamentation (which is proportional to testosterone and other male hormones levels)
was the proximate reason for sexual immune dimorphism since hormones such as testosterone
are known to be immunosuppressors (immunocompetence handicap hypothesis) (ICHH)(Hillgarth
and Wingfield, 1997). This hormone (restricted to vertebrate males) promotes secondary sexual
characteristics. The higher its testosterone level, the more chances a male succeeds in the mating
competition. Thus, this hormone strongly a↵ects mating behaviors and sex traits. Despite having
testosterone, seahorse males show higher immunocompetence than females. Invertebrates do not
have testosterone and yet Drosophila males are less immunocompetent as compared to females
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(Rol↵, 2002; McKean and Nunney, 2008). In fact, lately, it has been in question if testosterone
or sex-specific hormones are the only major immunosuppressants (Franco et al., 1990; Wedekind
and Folstad, 1994; Jansson and Holmdahl, 1998; Roberts et al., 2004).
Sexual immune dimorphism could also be a result of parental investment. High levels of
parental investment make the sex that undertakes it (usually females) more ‘fragile’ and prone
to illness, as resources are rather allocated into parental investment than into immune defense
Pregnant females (or males in case of seahorses and pipefishes) are the ones that are the o↵spring
are most dependent on and therefore, the sex that undergoes pregnancy needs to be ‘healthy’
and should also survive through the pregnancy period for being able to produce o↵spring.
According to Bateman’s principle (Bateman, 1948), males increase their lifetime reproductive
success by an increased number of matings (see Figure 3.1). Females (or males in case of
seahorses and pipefishes) are the limiting resources for the males to compete for, as they spend
most of the reproductive and breeding season in being pregnant, parturition and in some cases also
undertake external parental care. A female thus needs to live longer than a male to have as much
fertility as a male and higher immunocompetence enhances the probability to survive parasite and
pathogens infections and thus increases longevity (Roth et al., 2011; Lin et al., 2016). The males
have to mate with as many females as they can in each mating season, such that their genes
can be passed on. Therefore they evolved certain traits or secondary sexual signals (di↵erent
from females) that are attractive. For instance, male stags spend a lot of energy in developing
larger antlers to increase their probability of winning in a fight with other males as this would give
them increased chances of mates. Similarly, females may maximize their reproductive success
or increase their chance of passing on their genes as much as possible by living longer. A high
longevity requires a strong immune response (May, 2007; Caruso et al., 2013). The Bateman
curves for females and males shown in Figure 3.1 was a result of experiments done with the
fruit fly Drosophila melanogaster. In sex-role reversed species such as pipefishes where females
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compete for mates while males perform mate choice, the Bateman curves would also be reversed.
The features of Bateman’s principles appear in diverse forms in di↵erent mating systems (Arnold
and Duvall, 1994).
3.4 Emergence of sex-specific patterns from the model:
bias in adult sex ratio
Given the multiple examples of sexual dimorphism in various life-history traits across the animal
kingdom, parental investment and ornamentation in many species are suggested to correlate with
the e ciency of immune responses and longevity. (Trivers, 1972, 2002; Hedrick and Temeles,
1989; Austad, 2006; May, 2007; Roved et al., 2017). Our results showed that the combined
dynamics of these life-history interactions with sex-specific di↵erences produce a bias in adult
sex ratio (ASR) as seen in nature (Pipoly et al., 2015) even if the o↵spring produced at every
generation have an equal ratio. In our study, we refer to ASR as the ratio between the frequency
of adults of Sex 1 and Sex 2 i.e. frequency of Sex 1 : frequency of Sex2. As shown in many
empirical studies ASR has an impact on sex di↵erences and roles (Liker et al., 2013, 2015; Sze´kely
et al., 2014). Here, we show that the reverse is also possible (Kokko and Jennions, 2008).
Our results reveal that sex di↵erences in parental investment, ornamentation, and immunity give
rise to skewed adult sex ratio (see 3.2) even when we set the sex ratio at birth to be equal for
every generation.
Moreover, in the context of our model, when the equilibrium value of frequency of adults in one
sex is higher when compared to the other, it would also mean that one sex tends to live longer
than the other, and there are numerous examples in nature that validate the sex di↵erence in
longevity (Smith, 1959; Rol↵, 2002; Austad, 2006; Litzgus, 2006; Clutton-Brock and Isvaran,
2007).
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Figure 3.2: Sex-di↵erences in immunocompetence, parental investment and ornamen-
tation skew the sex-ratio among the adults. Sex 1 and Sex 2 exhibit sex-specific immune
responses that determine their survivability which a↵ects fitness. Here, both sexes have indi-
viduals with high and low levels of immune response, but Sex 1 has higher immunocompetence
on average. Sex 1 undergoes parental investment and both sexes benefit from this interactions
as they obtain o↵spring. This benefit (o↵spring produced) also contributes to fitness. Sex 2
performs mating competitions to gain more good mates and this also a↵ects its fitness. The
sex-specific traits evolve over a generation (time) by selection and therefore, get passed on to
subsequent generations. Thus, even when the sex ratio is kept equal among o↵spring at every
generation, their inherited sex-specific characteristics change their frequency in the population.
After a certain time point, the frequencies of adult Sex 1 and Sex 2 individuals attain equilibrium
as shown in the plots. Orange lines are for Sex 1 and purple for Sex 2. The solid lines are for the
heterozygous immunity genotype and dashed lines for the immunity homozygotes. The lighter
purple lines are for Sex 2 individuals with low ornamentation.
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Our model provides theoretical support for patterns that emerges out of combining life-history
traits with sex=specific di↵erences. The model provides a generalized idea about the explanation
for sex-specific lifetime reproductive success and skewed adult sex ratio by disentangling the dif-
ferent life-history strategies and sex itself. In the following section which contains our manuscript,
the model and its outcomes are described and analyzed in detail. The supplementary material
for this manuscript is provided in Appendix B of this thesis.
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Males and females evolved distinct life-history strategies, reflected in diverse life-12
history traits, summarized as sexual dimorphism. Life-history traits are highly interlinked.13
The sex that allocates more resources towards o↵spring is expected to increase its life14
span, and this might require an e cient immune system. However, the other sex might15
allocate its resources towards ornamentation, and this might have immunosuppressive16
e↵ects. Activity of immune response may not be specific to the sex that produces the17
eggs but could correlate with the amount of parental investment given. Informed by18
experimental data, we designed a theoretical framework that combines multiple life-19
history traits. We disentangled sex-biased life-history strategies from a particular sex to20
include species with reversed sex-roles, and male parental investment. We computed the21
lifetime reproductive success from the fitness components arising from diverse sex-biased22
life-history traits, and observed a strong bias in adult sex ratio depending on sex-specific23
resource allocation towards life-history traits. Overall, our work provides a generalized24
method to combine various life-history traits with sex-specific di↵erences to calculate the25
lifetime reproductive success. This was used to explain certain empirical observations as26
a consequence of sexual dimorphism in life-history traits.27
Keywords: Life-history traits, theoretical biology, evolutionary game theory, population dynamics,28
lifetime reproductive success, adult sex ratio29
Introduction30
Fitness is a complicated entity and describes the reproductive success of an individual reflecting the31
ability of individuals to produce o↵spring and survive. This arises from trade-o↵s between various32
1
life-history traits. Theoretical models assessing the interaction of multiple life-history traits are33
thus crucial to understand organisms’ overall life-history and how they impact fitness. Theoretical34
and experimental studies have shown how multiple life-history traits define an individual’s lifetime35
reproductive success (Moore, 1990; Martin, 1992; Chapman and Partridge, 1996; Pusey et al., 1997;36
Fleming et al., 2000; Alonzo, 2002; Kalbe et al., 2009; Alonzo, 2010). However, typically, these37
traits have been studied in isolation.38
In this study, we present a model that addresses the interaction of essential sex-specific life-history39
traits aiming to obtain the lifetime reproductive success of both sexes. This sheds light on how these40
traits are contributing to an individual’s life-history. We further present the consequences of various41
sex-specific strategies a↵ecting an evolving population.42
Most life-history traits have sex-specific di↵erences. Sex-specific life histories have evolved in43
the animal kingdom as a consequence of di↵erence in gamete size known as anisogamy (Bell,44
1978); females contribute large costly eggs to reproduction and males small cheap sperm. The45
distinct resource allocation into the o↵spring asks for sex-specific life-history strategies (Trivers,46
1972; Hedrick and Temeles, 1989; Trivers, 2002; Austad, 2006; May, 2007; Roved et al., 2017). Here47
we focus on the sex-specific di↵erences in three life history traits namely 1. Parental investment 2.48
Ornamentation and 3. Immunocompetence49
In many species, parental investment is not restricted to sperm and egg production. Parental50
investment (PI) is any behavioural and physiological investment by a parent provided to the o↵-51
spring (Trivers, 1972, 2002). The sex that needs to allocate more resources towards the o↵spring52
strives for increased longevity since o↵spring survival also depends on the survival of the parent.53
Increased longevity requires the allocation of resources into parasite defence and, hence, immunity.54
Intense costly intrasexual competitions for obtaining mates are performed by allocating resources55
towards ornamentation (Hillgarth and Wingfield, 1997; Wong and Candolin, 2005; Andersson and56
Simmons, 2006). To this end, fewer resources may be available for the immune defence in the sex57
majorly investing in intrasexual interactions. This implies that both ornamentation and parental58
investment contribute to sexual immune dimorphism (Forbes, 2007; Nunn et al., 2008; Roth et al.,59
2011; Lin et al., 2016). Thus focusing only on one life-history trait in isolation will not shed light60
on the individual’s true lifetime reproductive success.61
We aimed for designing a framework in which multiple life-history traits and their interactions62
can be studied simultaneously. Particularly, we have constructed a holistic framework that captures63
sex-specific di↵erences in parental investment, ornamentation and immune response and presents64
the outcomes of the overall life-history of a sex. We observed two important consequences of sex65
di↵erences in life history interactions: 1) skewed adult sex ratios and 2) di↵erent ratios of homozygous66
and heterozygous individuals between the sexes with regard to immune alleles. We validated our67
findings using empirical data from a broad range of animal taxa and diverse life-history strategies to68
test the limits of our approach.69
Model70
We amalgamated approaches from standard population genetics and eco-evolutionary processes (Free-71
man and Herron, 2007; Otto and Day, 2007; Venkateswaran and Gokhale, 2019) (within and between72
populations) to investigate the interaction dynamics of multiple life-history traits (with sex-specific73
di↵erences). We first developed a robust method (illustrated in Figure 1 to study the lifetime repro-74
ductive success (LRS) that arises from immune response, mating competition through ornaments75
and parental investment. Later, we used the LRS to investigate the consequences of combining the76
sex-specific interactions that are part of an individual’s reproductive lifetime.77
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Figure 1: Model representation. Life-history traits a↵ect the lifetime reproductive success. The
fitness components from parental investment, immune system and ornamentation are o↵-
spring success, survival of the parent plus o↵spring and mating success, respectively. These
contribute to an individual’s lifetime reproductive success. We assumed that Sex 1 pro-
vides more parental investment (PI) than Sex 2. The sex-specific fitness from parental
investment is modeled as frequency dependent since the number of copulations in one
sex depends on the availability of the other sex. The individuals within a sex also have
di↵erent levels of ornamentation, which they use to attract individuals of the other sex as
potential mates. The model uses evolutionary game theory which gives frequency depen-
dent fitnesses of two types of individuals: those with more and those with lesser levels of
ornaments. The individuals also di↵er in their immune genotypes. Each immune genotype
yields a certain immunity-related fitness value that depends on the type and number of
di↵erent immune alleles. The strength of immune response di↵ers between sexes (sexual
immune dimorphism). We modeled the evolution of these immune genotypes using popu-
lation dynamics. Finally, the fitness obtained from parental investment, ornamentation and
immune response were used to measure the lifetime reproductive success of an individual.
Consider the two sexes in a population, Sex 1 denoted by a filled circle •, and Sex 2 denoted by a78
diamond ⇧. We first consider one autosomal immunity locus A having two alleles A1 and A2. The79
three distinct zygotes genotypes would be A1A1, A1A2 and A2A2. For Sex 1, which throughout80
this manuscript does major PI, the frequencies of the three genotypes are denoted by x•1, x•2, x•3.81
The fitnesses, of the same, are denoted by W•1,W•2 and W•3. Similarly, we denote the frequencies82
and fitnesses for Sex 2.83
We used standard Mendelian segregation to model the evolution of the di↵erent types of individuals84
in the population. The genotype dynamics following this segregation patterns are denoted in the85
ESM. As with normal Mendelian segregation we assumed equal sex ratio; half of the o↵spring are86
Sex 1 and the other half, Sex 2.87
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Figure 2: Schematic representation of di↵erent scenarios of sex-specific di↵erences in host immunity-
related fitness versus immune allelic diversity. We considered three distinct immune geno-
types A1A1, A1A2, and A2A2 that result from mating between individuals having one
immune gene locus A with two alleles A1 and A2 (Mendelian segregation, see ESM). Fit-
ness positively correlates with the number of di↵erent alleles or allelic diversity (Apanius
et al., 1997; Eizaguirre et al., 2009). So genotypes A1A1 and A2A2 (homozygotes) will
have the same fitness value as they both have only one type of allele. But A1A2 (heterozy-
gote) which has two di↵erent types of alleles will have a higher fitness. This is known as
heterozygous advantage and occurs within both sexes. However, between the sexes, there
can be sex-specific di↵erences (Roved et al., 2017). This is shown in panels (A), (B) and
(C). In (A), ⌦ > 0 would imply that Sex 1 will have a higher value of immune response as
compared to Sex 2 for any given allelic diversity. When ⌦ < 0, Sex 1 has a lower values of
immune response for any given allelic diversity as compared to Sex 2. Another situation is
also possible: Sex 1 can have higher immune response for a homozygous locus, and lower
immune response for a heterozygous locus when compared to Sex 2. This shown in (B),
where ⇥ is the di↵erence between the angles of the two lines. In (C),   di↵ers from ⌦ by
considering lines that are not parallel to each other i.e. case C is a combination of cases
A and B. When both sexes have the same immune response patterns, ⌦ = ⇥ =   = 0.
Fitness88
The lifetime reproductive success i.e. the overall fitness of an individual, is related to its immuno-89
competence (the ability of an individual to produce a normal immune response following exposure90
to a pathogen), and o↵spring success (Stoehr and Kokko, 2006; Kelly and Alonzo, 2010). Thus,91
in our model the sex-specific fitness components resulting from immune response, ornamentation92
and parental investment give the lifetime reproductive success of individuals of a sex as shown in93
Figure 1. Below we introduce the fitness functions independently starting with immunity.94
Immune response. A host’s immunological diversity helps eliminate a large number of pathogens95
and disease causing agents. However, in some cases, having too high diversity may reduce e cient96
immune response e.g. auto-immune diseases triggered by high Major Histocompatibility Complex97
(MHC) diversity. Thus, having an optimal number of alleles (intermediate diversity) has been shown98
to be ideal in many systems (Nowak et al., 1992; Milinski, 2006; Woelfing et al., 2009). The host’s99
immunological diversity can be coarsely split up into three parts: low diversity (LD, low e ciency of100
the immune system), intermediate or optimal diversity (ID, optimal immune e ciency), and high101
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Figure 3: Schematic representation of host immunity-related fitness versus immune allelic diversity.
For two immune gene loci A and B each having two alleles A1,A2 and B1,B2, there would
be ten distinct zygote genotypes. The population will comprise of individuals with these
genotypes. Their immune responses would depend on these genotypes. The probability
of immune response might reduce if the individual has too many immunity allele diversity.
In the case of MHC, the auto-immune e↵ect of having high MHC allele diversity reduces
the probability of immune response (Nowak et al., 1992; Milinski, 2006; Woelfing et al.,
2009). Thus there is an optimal allele diversity, which gives the parabolic shape to the
curve. Recent studies have shown that males and females can have di↵erent optimal
diversities ((Roved et al., 2017, 2018) and Winternitz et al., unpublished). Plotted here
are hypothetical sex-specific optima of immune allelic diversity (Roved et al., 2017). The
realized population distribution is what is typically looked at, but in our study we consider
sex-specific optima of immune allelic diversity. Some immune genes may follow completely
di↵erent sex-specific patterns from the one shown here (Roved et al., 2017; De Lisle, 2019),
and this model can be used for most kinds of immune genes.
diversity (HD, might reduce the e ciency of the immune system). Recent experimental studies by102
Roved et al. (2017, 2018) and Jamie Winternitz and Tobias Lenz (personal communication) show103
that the optimal diversity could di↵er between the sexes. Based on these ideas, we have di↵erent104
cases that are shown in the Figure 2 for one immune locus A with two alleles A1 and A2 that gives105
three distinct parent and o↵spring genotypes A1A1, A1A2, and A2A2 denoted by j = {1, 2, 3}. We106
denote their immune responses by W I•j and W I⇧j for genotypes j = {1, 2, 3} in the two sexes. In our107
model, we refer to immune allelic diversity as the number of di↵erent immune alleles in the immune108
loci. A non-linear immune allelic diversity profile shown in Figure 3 where the negative e↵ect of HD109
is also addressed is considered later.110
These approaches can be generalised to any genetic system controlling the immune response or111
a completely di↵erent causal mechanism devoid of the genetic correlation. For example, the ef-112
fect of nutrients and its e↵ect of the immune system can be captured by a non-genetic model as113
well (Chandra, 1983). Thus, while we focus on the genetic mechanism in the current model, we114
stress that our framework is independent of the exact mechanism of how the immune response curves115
develop. Condition of an individual is directly proportional to immune response (resources allocated116
to self-maintenance, immune defense) which in turn determines the survivability (Stoehr and Kokko,117
2006).118
Parental investment. Both sexes pay the costs for initial PI, i.e. egg and sperm production119
(Hayward and Gillooly, 2011). Pregnancy and parental care vary massively among species (Trivers,120
1972; Wade and Shuster, 2002; Trivers, 2002; Kokko and Jennions, 2003; Alonzo, 2010) (Figure 1).121
We assume that Sex 1 provides major PI (e.g. male sticklebacks, male pipefish, most female122
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mammals). The fitness from PI will depend on the relative abundance of the other sex and are given123
by,WP• = (bP  cP• ). x⇧x•+x⇧ andWP⇧ = (bP  cP⇧ ). x•x•+x⇧ . Here, bP is the benefit (o↵spring produced)124
from PI while cP• and cP⇧ are the costs for PI by Sex 1 and Sex 2, respectively. The frequency of Sex125
1 equals x• = x•1+x•2+x•3 and the frequency of individuals in Sex 2 equals x⇧ = x⇧1+x⇧2+x⇧3.126
Since we have assumed that Sex 1 provides maximum parental investment, cP⇧ < cP• < bP .127
Ornamentation Mating competitions occur among individuals of the same sex to attract and obtain128
mates from the other sex. This is performed through fights, nuptial gifts, nests, sexual signals,129
ornament display and various types of ‘attractiveness’. We refer to all of these as ‘ornaments’.130
The investment into the display of ornaments will in most cases rise the chances of acquiring131
mates (Carranza et al., 1990; Petrie et al., 1991; Berglund et al., 1997; Wong and Candolin, 2005).132
However, ornamentation is often a costly signal (Zahavi, 1977; Andersson and Simmons, 2006;133
Milinski, 2006; Kurtz, 2007)). Individual assessment of immune responses helps defining the costs.134
When Sex 2 participates in mating competition as shown in Figure 1, two types of Sex 2 individuals135
were considered in this interaction: one type displays more ornaments (MO) and the other type136
displays less ornaments (LO). Therefore Sex 2 consists of six types of individuals - x⇧j,MO and137
x⇧j,LO where the genotype j = {1, 2, 3}. The frequency-dependent fitness that emerge from these138
interactions are written as WO⇧MO and W
O
⇧MO (see ESM for details).139
Overall dynamics140
The lifetime reproductive success is a multiplicative e↵ect of the fitness arising from immune re-141
sponse, ornamentation and parental investment (Stoehr and Kokko, 2006; Kelly and Alonzo, 2010)142
as shown in the ESM. Using the LRS values in the Mendelian population dynamics, we can obtain the143
combined interaction dynamics of each type of individuals in the population (details and calculations144
in the ESM). The population is divided into nine types of individuals - the three genotypes (j) of145
Sex 1, x•j , and the three genotypes of Sex 2 further split according to ornamentation into x⇧j,MO146
and x⇧j,LO. We refer to them as simply xi with i as the type of individual. The classical selection147
equation from population genetics (Crow and Kimura, 1970) gives the evolution of the frequency148
xi having average fitness Wi (Crow and Kimura, 1970; Schuster and Sigmund, 1983; Hofbauer and149
Sigmund, 1998; Gokhale et al., 2014). The equation can be written as,150
x˙i = xi
 
Wi  W
 
(1)
where W is the average population fitness.151
Results152
Linear immune allelic diversity profile: single locus153
The diversity levels in the immune alleles can result in di↵ering immune response (e.g. MHC154
homozygotes and heterozygotes, are known to have di↵erent immune responses (Apanius et al.,155
1997; Eizaguirre et al., 2009)). For one immune locus with two alleles, higher allele diversity boosts156
the immune response as shown Figure 2. The negative e↵ect of very high diversity is not considered157
here. Besides the null model of no sexual conflict within the allele diversity, we also include di↵erent158
cases of sexual conflict (Roved et al., 2018) (Figure 2).159
When we assume that both the sexes are not involved in mating competition i.e. ornamentation160
competition game is neutral; we can vary the cost of PI and the immune response curves (shown in161
Figure 2). The resulting equilibrium frequencies are shown in Figure 4. When the cost of PI is zero162
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Figure 4: Adult sex ratio (Sex 1: Sex 2) for varying parental investment (PI) and various cases of
sexual conflict within immune allelic diversity as shown in Figure 2. The ornamentation
game is neutral, i.e. no selection acting on it (details in the ESM). As maintained through-
out this study, Sex 1 does maximum PI. Sex 2 does negligible PI. Therefore, its cost is set
to zero i.e. cP⇧ = 0. The black line highlights the even adult sex ratio i.e. 1:1. In (A),
(B) and (C): When the cost of PI = 0 and there is no sex di↵erence in immune response
(⌦ =   = ⇥ = 0), the obtained adult sex ratio is 1:1. In (A) and (C): when PI increases,
the frequency of Sex 1 drops as PI is costly. When ⌦ > 0 and   > 0, this sex di↵erence
in immune response compensates for the cost of PI. The fall in frequency of Sex 1 is lower
than when ⌦ = 0 and   = 0 and Sex 1 has higher frequency than Sex 2 for most values of
PI cost. However, when ⌦ < 0 and   < 0, Sex 1’s frequency decreases with an increase
in PI. In (B): Frequency of Sex 1 is lower than Sex 2 for most values of PI cost for most
⇥ values. Moreover, ⇥ < 0 and ⇥ > 0 give the same results. The above results highlight
the fact that sexual conflict within immune allelic diversity can increase (when ⌦ > 0 and
  > 0 ) or reduce (when ⌦ < 0,   < 0, almost all ⇥) the adult sex ratio.
and there is no sex-biased di↵erence in immune response, we observe that the sex ratio is 1 : 1. Here,163
we focus on the adult sex ratio (ASR) (Kokko and Jennions, 2008). The classical definition of ASR164
is number of males:total number of males and females, but in our Sex 1 could be male or female.165
In this manuscript the term ASR is defined as the ratio between Sex 1 and Sex 2. Since in every166
generation, o↵spring are produced in equal sex ratios (see ESM), what we obtain is the sex ratio of167
the o↵spring after they become adults, perform mating interactions and parental investments. The168
frequency of Sex 1 decreases with increasing PI. However, Sex 1 increases in frequency under certain169
cases of sexual conflict over the immune allelic diversity (see   > 0, ⌦ > 0, or ⇥ 6= 0 in Figure 2).170
The results after including mating competitions are plotted in the figures in the ESM.171
Under selection, the obtained genotypes deviated from the Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium (see Fig-172
ures ??, ?? and ?? of the ESM). One sex has a higher number of heterozygotes when compared173
to the other sex. In this setup, the heterozygous immune genotype (A1A2) has a higher immune174
response than the homozygous genotypes A1A1 and A2A2 (Figure 3). Thus, an increase in heterozy-175
gotes within one sex compared to the other would also mean that this sex has a higher mean activity176
of the immune system. There are scenarios, such as a recent study with wild songbird populations,177
where the number of heterozygotes and homozygotes even under selection turned out to be equal178
between the sexes (Roved, 2019). However, this could just be the result of a particular immune179
response profile, parental investment and ornamentation costs in that species. Di↵erent profiles of180
sexual conflict within the immune allelic diversity would determine di↵erent ratios of homozygotes181
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and heterozygotes. More empirical studies with various model organisms would shed light on how182
species show diverse ways of sexual conflict within the immune allelic diversity.183
Nonlinear diversity profile184
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Figure 5: Qualitative di↵erence in the adult sex ratio for diverse polygamous species with varying
parental investment (PI) and ornamentation costs. As defined throughout the manuscript,
Sex 1 is the major PI provider. For these calculations, we used the sexual conflict Case
4 shown in Figure 3. (A) Species such as sticklebacks where one sex performs both
ornamentation and most PI. We observe that frequency of Sex 1 descends as its PI cost
increases and this further decreases with a rise in its ornamentation cost. (B) The panel
highlighted in gray shows bi-parental investment scenarios. In species where Sex 1 does
most PI and Sex 2 performs elaborate mating competitions, the frequency of Sex 1 reduces
with increasing PI. However, this value grows with ascending ornamentation cost in Sex 2.
Note that for certain ornamentation and PI values, the adult sex ratios are equal. As shown
by previous studies on multiple interactions between traits (Venkateswaran and Gokhale,
2019), even in the case where the cost of ornamentation is equal to zero in the mating
competition game, the mere presence of that game will deviate the frequency of Sex 2
from a scenario where there is no ornamentation game.
In a multi-loci scenario, one can include non-linear density profiles (Nowak et al., 1992; Woelfing185
et al., 2009) as shown in Figure 3. Across species, di↵erent sex-specific immune response profiles can186
be found, depending on the sex-specific selection and phenotypic divergence (Uekert et al., 2006;187
Love et al., 2008; Oertelt-Prigione, 2012). We hypothesis two such scenarios,188
• the optimal diversity of immune alleles for both sexes is the same but the immune responses189
at this optimal diversity could be di↵erent (for instance, females are more prone to acquir-190
ing autoimmune diseases; sex hormones such as estrogen, testosterone also a↵ect immune191
response (Hillgarth and Wingfield, 1997; To¨rnwall et al., 1999; Whitacre, 2001) or,192
• the two sexes have di↵erent optimal diversity of immune alleles and the immune response at193
this optimal diversity is the same for both sexes. For instance, as shown in Roved et al. (2017,194
2018), males and females have a di↵erent optimal diversity, where males need a higher number195
of allele diversity to mount maximum immune response. We considered such a scenario for196
this study (see Figure 3).197
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As done for the one locus scenario, we assume that only the number of di↵erent alleles i.e. allele198
diversity produces unequal fitness.199
Adult sex ratio in various species200
Our results showed that a sexual conflict within immune allelic diversity and varying parental invest-201
ment may result in adult sex ratio bias. The e↵ect of ornamentation also plays an important role in202
skewing adult sex ratios as shown Figure 5. Diverse reproducing species have distinct ornamentation203
and parental investment costs. Figure 5 shows the values of adult sex ratios that our model predicts204
for a wide range of species.205
Discussion206
Various intersexual and intrasexual interactions during the reproductive lifespan of an individual207
determine its lifetime reproductive success (Stoehr and Kokko, 2006; Kalbe et al., 2009; Kelly208
and Alonzo, 2010). We have presented a model framework where several individual life-history209
interactions can be studied simultaneously. As shown in many empirical studies, the ASR has210
an impact on sex-specific di↵erences and roles (Liker et al., 2013; Sze´kely et al., 2014; Liker et al.,211
2015; Henshaw et al., 2019). Our results showed that the interaction of sex-specific life-history traits212
result in a biased adult sex ratio (ASR) (Pipoly et al., 2015). We showed that the vice versa is also213
possible (Kokko and Jennions, 2008) i.e., our results showed that ASR is a consequence of sex-specific214
di↵erences. Our model incorporates the fact that fitness is a complex entity (Doebeli et al., 2017).215
The overall lifetime reproductive success is a combination of fitness values arising from the individual216
life-history strategies (here, parental investment, ornamentation and immunocompetence). This217
model showed that the variation in individuals’ or the sex-specific lifetime reproductive success (based218
on their cost of parental investment, ornamentation and immune response levels) has population219
level consequences i.e. a skew in adult sex ratio (see Figures ?? and ?? in the ESM). Here, the220
females and males of one generation mate and produce equal numbers of daughters and sons in the221
next generation. Therefore, at birth, sex ratio of every generation was 1:1. The life-history traits are222
passed on from parents to o↵spring. Thus, even though every generation starts with equal sex ratio,223
their sex-specific traits change the adult sex ratio in every generation until it reaches an equilibrium224
state.225
If a sex does both ornamentation and maximum parental investment, i.e. pays high costs of226
ornamentation and PI (eg. stickleback males), the ASR will be biased towards the sex that bears227
negligible costs for ornamentation and PI (e.g. female sticklebacks) (Hagen and Gilbertson, 1973)).228
Thus, the high costs for contributing to both PI and ornamentation cannot be compensated (Daly,229
1978) (Figure 5.A).230
In birds and free-spawning fish both sexes exhibit similar levels of parental investment (equally231
little parental investment by both sexes in case of free-spawning fish) (Perrone Jr and Zaret, 1979;232
Gross and Sargent, 1985; Cockburn, 2006). Our model shows that these species could show equal233
ASR for certain parental investment and ornamentation levels (see Figure 5.B). However, in species234
where males have a higher ornamentation level, the ASR will be biased. For instance, free-spawning235
species such as the Atlantic salmon where males have elaborate ornaments, show a high adult sex236
ratio (7:1 ratio of males to females) (Mobley et al., 2019). Therefore, the high sex ratio values237
shown in the gray shaded region of Figure 5.B matches natural observations.238
When one sex does maximum parental investment while the other displays ornaments, ASR is239
biased towards the sex that does more parental investment, as the other sex has to pay the costs240
of ornament display (Figure 5.B). Consider the pipefish species N. ophidion where males glue the241
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eggs on the belly and thus perform partial parental investment (Berglund et al., 1986). In contrast242
to pipefish species with placenta-like structure and an active transfer of nutrients and oxygen to the243
embryo (e.g. S. typhle (Berglund et al., 1986; Smith and Wootton, 1999)), N. ophidion only provide244
partial parental investment. We thus expect a decrease in frequency of S. typhle males compared245
to N. ophidion males (Berglund and Rosenqvist, 2003). However, with increasing ornamentation246
in females the frequency of males increases. Ornaments are costly as they make the bearer more247
vulnerable to predation. According to Bateman’s principle (Bateman, 1948), the reproductive success248
of the sex that performs mating competition depends on the number of mating events. The sex249
limited by parental investment will have to live longer for more reproductive events to achieve250
the same reproductive success as the males (Roth et al., 2011). Thus sex di↵erences in parental251
investment, ornamentation and immunity (Trivers, 1972; Hedrick and Temeles, 1989; Trivers, 2002;252
Roved et al., 2017) may also give rise to sexual di↵erences in longevity, an important life-history253
trait (Austad, 2006; May, 2007).254
Our model can be used to determine the lifetime reproductive success using fitness arising from255
sex-specific di↵erences in life-history traits of a particular sex in a population e.g. parental invest-256
ment, ornamentation and immunocompetence. Studying the combined dynamics of life-history traits257
highlights population level consequences such as skewed adult sex ratio (Trivers, 2002; Kokko and258
Jennions, 2008) emerging due to sex-specific diferences in life-history traits. With the aid of more259
empirical work directed towards investigating sexual conflict within the immune allelic diversity and260
other life-history strategies, we can obtain deeper understanding of the overall life-history of a sex or261
species. Disruptive selection leads to sexual dimorphism and in models that use tools like adaptive262
dynamics, traits that go through evolutionary branching may end up as two sex-specific traits i.e.263
sexual dimorphism. Recent studies addressed how coevolution of traits and resource competition264
drive the evolution of sexual dimorphism (Bolnick and Doebeli, 2003; Stoehr and Kokko, 2006;265
Vasconcelos and Rue✏er, in press). Work by Vasconcelos and Rue✏er (in press) demonstrated that266
even weak trade-o↵s between life-history traits can result in evolutionary branching that leads to267
evolution of two co-existing types. In this study, we investigated the eco-evolutionary consequences268
of interplay between two or more sex-specific life-history traits. Along with empirical evidence that269
matches our qualitative predictions, suggesting a skewed adult sex-ratio.270
The functions in our model that describe fitness from parental investment and ornamentation271
consider polygamous species. While many sexually reproducing animals are polygamous, species272
like seahorses are monogamous throughout their lifetime (Vincent and Sadler, 1995). The trade-273
o↵s between ornamentation, parental investment and immunocompetence in monogamous species274
would be di↵erent. For instance, they may not have to bear costs of attracting mates after one275
brooding season. Our model can be modified to study the e↵ect of integrating monogamous mating276
patterns. Also, with regard to immune genes such as the ones of the MHC, genetically dissimilar277
individuals mate more often as the evolutionary incentive is to produce optimal MHC diversity278
o↵spring (Milinski, 2006; Woelfing et al., 2009; Kalbe et al., 2009; Eizaguirre et al., 2009). To279
this end, mating is not random. Aspects of a model by Kirkpatrick (Kirkpatrick, 1982) for two280
autosomal loci with female mating preference for a trait that occurs in males is a potential extension281
of our model. Finally, novel studies directed at sexual conflict within the MHC and other immune282
genes as done by Roved et al. (2018) shall be very beneficial in providing further knowledge of how283
sex-specific immune defences manifest in di↵erent systems with distinct sex-specific ornamentation284
and parental investment patterns.285
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Chapter 4
Emergence of species or sex specific
di↵erences in life-history traits
“Natural selection is ecology in action.”
— Winfried Lampert
4.1 The relationship between parental investment and sex-
ual immune dimorphism
The last two chapters (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3), highlighted the importance and consequences of
probing combined interactions between individuals or traits. Chapter 3 investigated the outcomes
of the combined dynamics of various life-history traits (ornamentation, parental investment, and
immunocompetence) that have sex-specific di↵erences. In the model described in the preceding
chapter (Chapter 3), we used sex-specific di↵erences in life-history traits as given parameters. But
how does sexual dimorphism emerge in the first place? There might be di↵erent mechanisms for
the presence of sexual dimorphism for each of the above-mentioned traits. Sex-specific di↵erences
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in one trait might influence sexual dimorphism in another due to the competition for reserves
(between the traits) that result in sex-specific trade-o↵s. I used a state-dependent dynamic
optimization method, where parental investment and immunocompetence are two coupled traits
of an individual. I studied the trade-o↵ between individuals’ reserves allocated to parental e↵ort
and to immunity in such a way that they maximize an individual’s fitness.
The evolution of sex-specific di↵erences in the amount of parental investment (Trivers, 1972;
Lonstein and De Vries, 2000; Alonzo and Klug, 2012; Liker et al., 2015) and ornamentation
(Darwin, 1871; Jones et al., 2000; De Lisle, 2019) have been studied both experimentally and
theoretically. This chapter presents a model that studied the emergence of sexual dimorphism in
the ability to mount immune responses (immunocompetence) i.e. sexual immune dimorphism.
There have been studies, both experimental and theoretical to investigate the causes of sex-
ual immune dimorphism (Stoehr and Kokko, 2006; Forbes, 2007; Nunn et al., 2008; Restif and
Amos, 2010). But the theoretical models were focused on the trade-o↵ between ornamentation
and immunocompetence. An important trait was missing in them which is parental investment.
Parental investment has three parts: gamete production, pregnancy, and external parental care
(Trivers, 1972). Experimental results show that parental investment a↵ects immunocompetence.
For instance, it has been shown that pregnancy, mouthbrooding, etc give rise to a better im-
munocompetence in the sex that performs them (Roth et al., 2011; Lin et al., 2016; Peck et al.,
2016; Keller et al., 2017).
Using mathematical models where parental investment and immunocompetence can be consid-
ered as di↵erent traits of an individual of a particular sex, I have developed a model to show how
these traits a↵ect each other.
The model introduced in this chapter studies the ecology of sexually reproducing animals
during their reproductive lifetime. We look at sets of individuals and track them throughout
their reproductive lifetime to investigate how they allocate resources for parental investment and
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immunocompetence, respectively. Here, we do not track their o↵spring or the evolution of the
parents’ traits. This is a theoretical ecology, life-history and resource allocation model whose
outcomes are similar to empirical works that track at a population throughout its lifetime minus
the o↵spring. In these cases, one studies selection acting on the variation of traits. Evolution
by natural selection happens when these variations are inherited to the next generations. Thus,
future extensions of this model should be towards the direction of studying evolution by natural
selection i.e. how do the fittest individuals in the first generation pass on their traits to the
o↵spring? If they do, how do the traits in that species evolve? For now, I focused on how
individuals in a population make decisions based on the ecological factors a↵ecting them.
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Sexes of a species show di↵erent characteristics beyond the di↵erences in their sex-
ual organs; this is known as sexual dimorphism and applies to immunocompetence as
well. Immunocompetence is the ability of an individual to mount an immune response
when exposed to pathogens. Females are shown to have increased longevity that comes
with higher immunocompetence as compared to males and this may also lead to an in-
creased probability of autoimmune disease in females. However, for some species such as
pipefishes and seahorses belonging to the Syngnathid family, studies show that the males
have a higher immunocompetence. Experimental evidences suggest that this could be
due to the fact that these males undergo pregnancy i.e. the males have brood pouches
where the eggs are fertilized; the fathers provide oxygen and nutrition to their o↵spring
until they give birth to the juveniles. Therefore, an increase in immunocompetence may
also be related to the amount of parental investment.In this study, using state dependent
life-history theory, we show that for most species systems it is optimal to invest more in
immunocompetence when the time spent in parental investment is longer. Our findings
also show that an increase in parental investment brings about an earlier immunose-
nescence i.e. the gradual deterioration of the immune system that occurs with aging.
We observe that an increase in investment towards immunocompetence is more pro-
nounced in short-lived species with long brooding periods whereas species with a longer
lifespan allocate more reserves towards o↵spring production. Our model also accounts
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for intraspecies scenarios: if a sex spends a longer fraction of its reproductive season in
pregnancy or brooding (as compared to the other sex), then we find that this sex would
invest more towards immunocompetence.
Introduction
Crucial life-history parameters such as body size, reproductive investment, immunocompetence (the
ability of an individual to mount an immune response when exposed to pathogens) have sex-specific
di↵erences. The evolution of sex-specific di↵erences in the amount of parental investment (Liker
et al., 2015; Lonstein and De Vries, 2000; Alonzo and Klug, 2012; Trivers, 1972) and mating compe-
tition through ornamentations (Jones et al., 2000; Darwin, 1871; De Lisle, 2019) have been studied
experimentally and theoretically. Sexes of a species also show sexual dimorphism in immunocompe-
tence i.e. sexual immune dimorphism. There have been studies, both experimental and theoretical
to study the occurrence of sexual immune dimorphism (Stoehr and Kokko, 2006; Restif and Amos,
2010; Nunn et al., 2008; Forbes, 2007). Nunn et al. (2008) presented a means to study Bateman’s
principle for immunity independently of the immunocompetence handicaps hypothesis (ICHH) due
to lack of testosterone in insects. They found a female bias in immunocompetence and showed
that ICHH lacks a generic empirical support. They highlighted the fact that immunocompetence
can be explained using fitness-related di↵erences between the sexes. A review by Forbes (2007)
illuminated a model by Stoehr and Kokko (2006) that tested two common hypotheses that longevity
is more important to a female’s fitness than for a male’s fitness and the benefit from investing
in immunocompetence is an increase in longevity. The model showed that the male immunocom-
petence is lower than that of females when the above hypotheses are satisfied. But Stoehr and
Kokko (2006) further showed that sex di↵erences in parasitic impact might cause males to invest
more into immunocompetence. They modeled the impact of parasites on condition and that this
might di↵er between the sexes. Another study by Medley (2002) also demonstrated an increased
investment in immunocompetence when the parasitic impact increases. An adaptive dynamic model
which considered both host sexual reproduction host–pathogen population dynamics was developed
by Restif and Amos (2010) although it does not involve sexual selection. Their results revealed the
importance of ecological feedback loops in the eco-evolution of immune system.
The previous theoretical models mentioned above that investigated evolution of immune systems
were mostly in the lines of studying trade-o↵s between ornamentation and immunocompetence.
These studies missed an important factor - parental investment, which is the focus of our study.
Parental investment has three parts: gamete production, pregnancy, and parental care. Gamete
production is common to both sexes and the di↵erence in gamete size (anisogamy) is where the
definition of the sexes comes about: large gamete (egg) producers are referred to as females, and
smaller gamete (sperm) producers are called males. The time taken for parental investment varies
across taxa. In some taxa, parental investment involves preparing a nest, in others, it also involve
taking care of the eggs until they hatch. In some species, the maximum time taken for parental
investment is in brooding the eggs. Female mammals and males of the Syngathidae family undergo
pregnancy. During gestation or brooding period, the o↵spring is particularly dependent on the sex
that performs pregnancy or brooding.
Experimental results across diverse taxa show that increase in parental investment can be linked to
higher investments in immunocompetence in that sex (Roth et al., 2011; Keller et al., 2017; Lin et al.,
2016; Peck et al., 2016). This might be because the sex that performs mating competitions can
maximize their reproductive fitness earlier in life if they are able to successfully compete for mating
opportunities. In intrasexual competition, benefit from investing more in ornaments, weaponry,
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and size might come at an expense of immunocompetence. The sex that is involved in mating
competitions through ornamentation usually has a higher variance (as compared to other sex) in
reproductive success (Bateman, 1948). It may hence be beneficial for this sex to invest more in
the current reproductive season even if it may a↵ect their survival to the next reproductive season.
On the other hand, the sex that is limited by pregnancy and/or parental care can maximize fitness
by living longer through greater investment in immune defenses (Nunn et al., 2008). Thus, an
increase in immunocompetence must be related to the amount of parental investment in addition
to ornamentation and other factors. For instance, in mammals, we know that females tend to have
increased longevity that comes with higher immunocompetence and this could be because female
mammals go through pregnancy i.e. periods of gestation (Forbes, 2007; Rol↵, 2002; May, 2007).
However, in pipefishes, the males undergo pregnancy. In most pipefish species, the males have a
pouch on its stomach. The male receives eggs from females in this brood pouch and the eggs
are fertilized here. In this pouch, the fathers provide his embryos with nutrients (Wilson et al.,
2003). Experimental studies show that the males of these species have a higher immunocompetence
(Roth et al., 2011). In seahorses, males perform mating competitions as well as pregnancy (Vincent
et al., 1992). The mode of pregnancy in seahorses is similar to that of pipefishes. The males have
a completely enclosed saclike fleshy pouch where eggs are incubated. Here, virgin males showed
higher levels immunocompetence (Lin et al., 2016).
In this study, we focus on the e↵ect of parental investment on immunocompetence. Using state
dependent life history theory (Houston and McNamara, 1999; Mangel and Clark, 1988; Clark and
Mangel, 2000), where parental investment and immunocompetence are considered to be two di↵erent
traits of an individual, we studied the trade-o↵s between resources allocated to these traits in such
a way that they maximize individuals’ fitness. We also observe that immunosenescence, which is
the dip in immune responses that happens later in life, is also a↵ected by parental investment as
observed in experimental data (Das et al., 2008; Yan et al., 2010).
Methods
Let us consider an individual that has R(t) amount of reserves at a time t. These reserves are
either allocated to improve immunocompetence or directed towards o↵spring production. There are
natural observations and empirical studies that highlight such resource allocation across species of the
animal kingdom (Peck et al., 2016; Mangel and Heimpel, 1998; Lin et al., 2016; Loiseau et al., 2008;
Contreras-Gardun˜o et al., 2006; Wedell and Karlsson, 2003; Verhulst et al., 2005). Reproductive
success mainly results from trade-o↵s in allocations of resources between an individual’s survival and
its o↵spring success as shown in Figure 1.
We shall refer to the reserves allocated towards one’s own immunity and the parental e↵ort as ri
and ro, respectively. Here, the number of o↵spring produced by a parent is a decelerating function
of the amount of resources allocated to care i.e.   = ro↵, with 0 < ↵ < 1 (see Figure 2a).
Investment towards the immune system will increase the parent’s survival. Thus, we assume that
the probability of survival in the current reproductive period is Scurrent = e
 Mf
1+ ri , where f is the
fraction of time spent in gamete production plus pregnancy or brooding (depending on the taxa)
as discussed in the Introduction, M is the background mortality and   determines the e↵ect that
investment in immunocompetence has on this background mortality i.e. it is a scaling factor of
the e↵ect of investment in immunocompetence (ri) on survival. The parent that the o↵spring are
dependent on has to survive throughout the current reproductive period for the o↵spring to survive.
Thus, the current reproductive success would be a multiplicative function written as  ·Scurrent. The
probability that an individual survives to the next reproductive period is given by Sfuture = e
 M
1+ ri .
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Figure 1: Allocation of an individual’s reserves towards o↵spring and parents’ survivability to-
gether determine the reproductive success in the current reproductive season. Survivabil-
ity to the next season depends on the amount of reserves for immunity allocated towards
future survival.
In this discrete time model, the reserves available for immunocompetence or reproduction change
throughout the lifetime of an individual. The function describing the gain in reserves g(t) at time
t, is shown in Figure 2b. The function for g(t) is a decelerating one which saturates since the total
amount of reserves that an individual gains cannot increase indefinitely.
We use a state dependent dynamic model (Mangel and Clark, 1988) to investigate the optimal
allocation towards immunocompetence and parental e↵ort. We do this for individuals that di↵er in
the length of time spent in pregnancy or brooding f , across environments that vary in background
mortality M and the e↵ect that immunocompetence has on survival  . As a metric of fitness, we
use accumulated lifetime reproductive success (Stearns, 1992; Ro↵, 1993). To do so, we let W (r, t)
denote the maximum (taken over investment) expected (taken over stochastic events) accumulated
lifetime reproductive success from time t onwards, given that R(t) = r. We will call W (r, t) the
fitness function. At time t+ 1, its reserves will change to,
R(t+ 1) = r   r⇤o(r, t)  r⇤i (r, t) + g(t), (1)
where r⇤o(r, t) and r⇤i (r, t) are the optimal values for (ro, ri) for r reserves at time t and g(t) is
the gain in reserves after each reproductive period. The value r is bound by Rmax which is the
maximum value of the total reserves. An individual is no longer alive when r  0.
For all combinations of the reserve state R(t) and time t, we find the allocation to immunocom-
petence ri and parental e↵ort ro that maximize W (r, t). Assuming that no reproductive success can
be accumulated at or beyond time T i.e T is the time of reproductive senescence, we have the end
condition W (r, T ) = 0. For previous times,
W (r, t) = max
ri,ro
h
  · Scurrent + Sfuture · W (r0 , t+ 1)
i
. (2)
That is, expected cumulative fitness W (r, t) for R(t) = r reserves used at time t is equal to its
current reproductive success plus the future reproductive success (see Figure 1). In table 1, we
summarize the variables and parameters in the model. Solution of Equation 2 gives the optimal
values of investment, r⇤o(r, t) and r⇤i (r, t) for every possible value of r and at each time. As seen in
Equation 2, one must go backwards from end time T to a starting time to get the optimal values
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for (ro, ri) from r that the individual would allocate for all the times.
Table 1: A list and summary of parameters used in the model.
Parameter Definition
R(t) = r Reserves at time t
Rmax = 1.0 Maximum value of total reserves
ro Reserves allocated towards (energy required for) parental e↵ort
i.e. for producing eggs and o↵spring
ri Immune reserves allocated towards the parent’s survival in a
reproductive season
f Fraction of one time period used in pregnancy or brooding
  = ro↵ O↵spring produced
M Background mortality
  Scaling factor for the e↵ect of investment in immunocompe-
tence (ri) on survival
g(t) Gain in reserves after each reproductive period
Scurrent = e
 Mf
1+ ri Probability that the parent survives in the current reproductive
season
  · S Current fitness i.e. o↵spring success (the number of o↵spring
surviving)
Sfuture = e
 M
1+ ri Probability of survival to next reproductive season
W (r, t) Fitness function
  Variance in g(t) in a fluctuating (stochastic environment).
gh = g(t) +   and gl = g(t)    Highest and lowest values that g(t) can take
Including stochasticity in the amount of resources gained between each
reproductive season
In the previous section we assumed that the reserves increased deterministically between seasons. In
Equation 2, we have assumed that survival is a stochastic event, but that the increment in reserves
is deterministic. We now consider the situation in which the gain in reserves fluctuates depending
on the time and environment. Here, gh(t) = g(t) +   and gl(t) = g(t)     are the two upper and
lower values of resource that can be gained by an individual where 0 <   < Rmax. Let x be the
probability of receiving gh(t). For this study, we assumed equal probability of obtaining gh(t) and
gl(t). Thus gh(t) and gl(t) average to g(t) and this can happen for di↵erent values of  . i.e resource
gain can fluctuate according to   around g(t). To capture this, one would use a stochastic version
of the model where Equation 2 would be re-written as,
W (r, t) = max
ri,ro

  · Scurrent + 1
2
[Sfuture · W (rh, t+ 1)] + 12[Sfuture · W (rl, t+ 1)]
 
(3)
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Figure 2: Functions describing o↵spring produced   = ro↵ and gain in reserves after each
reproductive period g(t). (a) For the results presented in this study, o↵spring success  
is an increasing function with respect to reserves allocated towards o↵spring success (ro).
Here, ↵ = 0.5. (b) Gain in reserves after each reproductive period g(t) increases with
time t (here, g(t) = 0.32+4e 0.5t ). In the beginning of an individual’s lifetime, an individual
is smaller and would spend more on growth. But over time it stops growing and therefore,
more resources can be spend on reproduction. The function g(t) saturates since the total
amount of reserves that an individual gains cannot increase indefinitely.
where r = R(t) and rh = r   r⇤o(r, t)  r⇤i (r, t) + gh(t), rl = r   r⇤o(r, t)  r⇤i (r, t) + gl(t).
Forward Monte Carlo simulation algorithm
individual k
r o(rk, t) o spring
r i (rk, t) immunity
t = 0; rk(0) = g(0) t = t+ 1 t = T
else Rk(t+ 1) = rk   r o(rk, t)  r i (rk, t) + gl(t)
Rk(t+ 1) = rk   r o(rk, t)  r i (rk, t) + gh(t)
............Rk(t) = rk reserves
if  k   1
2
if pk   Sfuturek
Figure 3: Forward stochastic routine Algorithm of the forward Monte Carlo simulation used for
tracking individuals’ dynamics. Here, g(t) equals gain in reserves at each reproductive
period, and gh(t) and gl(t) are the two upper and lower values of resource that can
be gained by an individual k at time t. As described previously, x be the probability of
receiving gh(t) and Sfuturek = e
 M
1+ r⇤i (rk,t) is the probability of survival to next reproductive
season. The values pk 2 [0, 1] and  k 2 [0, 1] are two numbers drawn at random for each
individual at every time which determine their survival to the next brooding season and
gain in reserves to the upper value gh(t), respectively.
The backward (in time) method provides us with a ’handbook’ of all possible optimal values of
(ro, ri) at any given r for time t. However, this method shows all possible outcomes. At any given
r for time t. We simulate the dynamics of an individual k starting with an initial amount of reserves
Rk(0) = g(0) (Forward routine). With an equal probability, the individual will encounter the high
or low reserve gain values gh and gl, respectively. This way, at time t + 1, an individual’s reserves
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will be,
Rk(t+ 1) = rk   r⇤o(rk, t)  r⇤i (rk, t) +
8<: gh(t)or
gl(t)
(4)
where r⇤o(rk, t) and r⇤i (rk, t) are the optimal values (ro, ri) for rk reserves at time t for individual k.
The individuals die when their reserves drop to a critical level. Here, when rk  0, the individual dies
as it no longer can invest in its own immunity. The survival function Sfuturek gives the probability
of an individual k’s survival to the next reproductive season. A flowchart illustrating this algorithm
is shown in Figure 3.
Results
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Figure 4: Investment in immunocompetence as a function of background mortality (M), scal-
ing factor for the e↵ect of investment in immunocompetence on survival ( ) for
di↵erent lengths of the brooding or pregnancy period (f). In general, more resources
are allocated towards immunocompetence as parental investment increases. Ascending
background mortality further makes the individual allocate more towards immunocompe-
tence. When background mortality is high, having a low value of   allows individuals to
invest more reserves into immunocompetence. These results are for R(1) = Rmax, where
Rmax = 1.0 is the maximum value of total reserves as mentioned in Table 1.
The optimal invest in immunocompetence ri for a range of background mortality M and scaling
factor for the e↵ect of investment in immunocompetence (ri) on survival   values using the backward
(in time) deterministic Equation 2 is shown in Figure 4. This result manifests the e↵ect that the
fraction of time spent in parental investment has on immunocompetence. For a given value of M
and  , with increasing fraction of time spent in internal parental investment or brooding (f), the
optimal investment of reserves towards immunocompetence also increases. We can also observe that
an increasing amount of background mortality, further increases an individual to boost its immune
responses by investing more in immunocompetence and generally more so for smaller values of  .
A general pattern of the e↵ect of fraction of time spent in pregnancy or brooding on immunocom-
petence is shown in Figure 5(a). The individuals of this population were tracked from the beginning
i.e. time t = 0 until the time of reproductive senescence T . From the results shown in this figure,
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Figure 5: E↵ect of time spent in pregnancy or brooding on immunocompetence The values
for background mortality and mortality scaling factor are M = 2.5 and   = 5. Population
size is 200 and   = 0.3. (a) The individual trajectories are plotted for the 200 individuals
in the population. These trajectories rise and fall since at each brooding season, an indi-
vidual can receive a high (gh) or low (gl) value of gain in reserves. Immunocompetence
initially increases with time t, and drops later in life which is referred to as immunosenes-
cence. There is a slight rise in the peak with increasing fraction of time spent in parental
investment, f . The population average is plotted by the orange lines in the second row.
The gray shaded area shows the variance between these 200 individuals. (b) Population
density decreases with time. This decrease is slower for a higher f , and this highlights
the positive e↵ect parental investment in life-span. The slope of each line is the realized
mortality experienced by the population and this is a property that has emerged out of
this model.
we infer that investment in immunocompetence increases with time t for all values of pregnancy or
brooding periods f . Investment towards immunocompetence initially increases, but drops with time.
Therefore, these results also show the occurrence of immunosenescence, which is the phenomenon
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of immunocompetence dropping later in life (Metcalf et al., 2019). We could also compare the in-
vestment of a parent having a long pregnancy or brooding period (high f) to another parent having
a negligible investment (f = 0.1). This would correspond to di↵erent sexes of a species where one
parent undergoes pregnancy or brooding. The plots in Figure 5(a) also show that this increase of
investment in immunocompetence is higher for the parent having larger f . Figure 5(b) shows how
the population density decreases with time. However, this decrease is slower for a higher f , and
this highlights the how pregnancy a↵ects mortality i.e. when an individual undergoes pregnancy, it
becomes beneficial to invest more resources in immunocompetence leading to higher survival.
Optimal allocation of reserves in long-lived and short-lived species
The resource allocation towards immunocompetence in relation to pregnancy or brooding period,
for both long and short-lived species is shown in Figures 6 and 7. Here, long-lived and short-lived
species have low M and high M , respectively. The e↵ect of   (variation in high and low resource
gain between seasons) in the optimal allocation of resources in short-lives species do not di↵er much
between the di↵erent   value (see Appendix). Our results show that short-lived species spend more
reserves for producing o↵spring rather their own immunocompetence. This further decreases for a
low   (see Figure 6). However, for high f values, we see an increase in investment of resources
towards immunocompetence i.e. investment towards immunocompetence is stronger in short-lived
species with long brooding periods. This is more pronounced under high   conditions. We see that
when the e↵ect of invest towards immunocompetence on survival is low, it drives the individuals
to allocate more towards their o↵spring since they most likely would not live for more than one
reproductive season. On the other hand, for long-lived species shown in Fig. 7, individuals live
longer as compared to short-lived individuals shown in Fig. 6. For such species, the background
mortality is low which allows them to focus their reserves to o↵spring production since they would
anyway survey to next reproductive seasons even without much invest to the immune system. As
observed in short-lived species, here too we see that when   is low, the individuals allocate more
towards their o↵spring to ensure as much reproductive success as possible while the individual is
alive. For both low and higher   values, the investment towards immunocompetence increases in
long-lived species for longer brooding or pregnancy periods (higher f values). For both short-lived
and long-lived species, the results also show how species with high   value allocate more towards
their immunocompetence and this e↵ect is stronger for short-lived species and low  . We also
observe that the rise in immunocompetence with time t increases for higher fraction of time spent
in pregnancy or brooding (f) values. Our study illuminates the e↵ect that pregnancy and brooding
periods have on optimal investment in mounting a higher immune response.
Discussion
Empirical evidence suggests that sexual dimporphism in immunocompetence could be due to sex-
specific di↵erences in life-history traits and relative di↵erences in reproductive investments (Vincent
and Gwynne, 2014; Stoehr and Kokko, 2006; Restif and Amos, 2010; Nunn et al., 2008; Forbes,
2007) such as sex di↵erences in parental investment (Roth et al., 2011; Lin et al., 2016; Keller et al.,
2017). Higher immunocompetence is not attached to a particular sex. Commonly females have
higher immunocompetence. For instance, evidences from nature such as those done among humans,
show that women live longer than men (Austad, 2006; May, 2007) due to sex-specific di↵erences in
immunocompetence. However, in some species males are known to invest more towards immuno-
competence. For instance, in pipefish species, Syngnathus typhle and Syngnathus rostellatus males
have a placenta-like structure and perform internal parental investment i.e. pregnancy. However,
9
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Figure 6: Optimal allocation of resources in short-lives species. Here, the value for background
mortality is M = 2.5. Here, high and low scaling factor for the e↵ect of investment in
immunocompetence (ri) on survival are represented by   = 1 and   = 5, respectively.
The population size is 200. The results shown here for optimal values of ri and ro are
average values of the population of 200 individuals for   = 0.8. The shaded area in gray
is the variance between the individuals. The black curve shows the frequency of alive
individuals in the population i.e. it highlights the population density. Short-lived species
spend more reserves for o↵spring production instead of their own immunocompetence. For
high f values, we see an increase in investment of resources towards immunocompetence;
especially under high   conditions. When   is low, individuals allocate more resources
towards o↵spring since they most likely would not live for more than one reproductive
season.
Nerophis ophidion males only glue the eggs on their belly, thus providing partial parental investment.
(Keller, Hildebrand and Roth, in review) showed that in species with a higher parental investment (S.
typhle and S. rostellatus) males have stronger immune response than females whereas in Nerophis
ophidion, sexual immune dimorphism was absent. In the seahorse Hippocampus erectus, which is
a conventional sex-role species with males undergoing pregnancy, sexually mature virgin seahorse
males showed a stronger immune response than females. Results from Roth et al. (2011) and Lin
et al. (2016) showed that male pipefishes and seahorses which are the sexes that undergo pregnancy
have an increase immune responses. Keller et al. (2017) present similar findings from their exper-
iments with the female mouthbrooding cichlid Astatotilapia burtoni. They showed that maternal
and o↵spring immune defense is a↵ected by parental investment.
Our results reveal that the increase in the amount of parental investment increases the investment
in immunocompetence for most species systems. This is a trade-o↵ in resources which favor higher
investment in immunocompetence (ri) at the cost of lower investment in o↵spring (ro). We show
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Figure 7: Optimal allocation of resources in long-lived species. The value for background
mortality species is M = 0.5. High and low scaling factor for the e↵ect of investment
in immunocompetence (ri) on survival are represented by   = 1 and   = 5, respectively.
The population size is 200. The results shown here are the optimal values of ri and ro
are average values of the population of 200 individuals for   = 0.8. The shaded gray
area is the variance between the individuals. The black curve shows the frequency of
alive individuals in the population i.e. it represents the population density. For long-lived
individuals the background mortality is low which allows them to focus their reserves to
o↵spring production since they would anyway survey to next reproductive seasons even
without much invest to the immune system. When   is low, the individuals allocate
more towards their o↵spring to ensure as much reproductive success as possible while
the individual is alive. Overall, we see that the investment towards immunocompetence
increases in long-lived species for longer brooding or pregnancy periods.
that in both short-lived and long-lived species, investment towards immunocompetence increases
with increasing brooding or pregnancy periods. Our model also accounts for intraspecies scenarios
where a higher value of f corresponds to the sex having long brooding or pregnancy periods, and
a negligible value of f refers to the other sex that does negligible investment. So if a sex spends
a long fraction of its reproductive season in internal parental investment or brooding as compared
to the sex that does not spend as much time in parental investment, then our results how that this
sex would invest more towards immunocompetence. This suggests that the one sex would have a
higher immunocompetence as compared to the other i.e. sexual immune dimorphism can arise out of
sex-specific di↵erences in parental investment, as supported by empirical studies (Roth et al., 2011;
Lin et al., 2016; Keller et al., 2017). Immunosenescence is commonly observed phenomena that
occurs after a certain lifetime. Studies suggest that sex-specific immunosenescence can occur due
to sex di↵erences in traits such as immunocompetence, parental investment (Metcalf et al., 2019).
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We show that an increase in the time spent in internal parental investment could bring about an
earlier immunosenescence. More experiments across a wide range of taxa, focused in the direction of
measuring immunocompetence between the sexes at various stages of their lifetime and in relation
to parental investment, would shed more light on the understanding of sexual immune dimorphism
across the animal kingdom.
The works by Stoehr and Kokko (2006) and Medley (2002) showed that sex di↵erences in parasitic
impact might cause either sex to invest more into immunocompetence. Therefore, a potential
enhancement to our model related to immunology, should involve host-pathogen dynamics. The
parameter   that describes an individual’s intrinsic scaling factor for the e↵ect of investment in
immunocompetence (ri) on survival could also be used to describe di↵erent kinds of species. In
figures 6 and 7, low and high values of   could denote species with high and low intrinsic ability
to ’fight’ pathogens. The first row shows species with high   i.e. they are better adapted to
the environment by investing more towards immunocompetence and therefore, the number of alive
individuals is also higher here (especially for long-lived species) as compared to species with a lower
  value. Varying   along with another parameter that describes either the pathogen impact in a
certain environment, or parameters that describe low and high infectious environments could tackle
finer details and provide more thorough results.
The immunocompetence handicap hypothesis (ICHH) cannot be completely dismissed (Zahavi,
1977; Houle and Kondrashov, 2002; Roberts et al., 2004; Stoehr and Kokko, 2006; Kurtz, 2007).
Attracting potential mates through ornamentation which gives rise to increased mating success is also
crucial for the lifetime reproductive success. However, these ornaments might be very costly and thus,
there could be a trade-o↵ between maintaining elaborate ornamentation and immunocompetence.
In sticklebacks, for instance, females have a better immunocompetence than the males who have
to attract mates using ornamentation and also perform almost entire parental care. However,
seahorses males that also have to undergo both pregnancy and attracting mates are shown to
have a higher immunocompetence, unlike stickleback males. This might be due to their highly
monogamous mating system where a males obtains a lifetime mate during its first reproductive
season itself and therefore, can invest more towards its immunocompetence for its own survival and
the survival to future reproductive seasons. As mentioned earlier, in most pipefishes, the males
can undergo pregnancy (whereas the females attracting mates through ornamentation) and the
males exhibit a higher immunocompetence. In summary, with regard to mating roles and parental
investment we can list three di↵erent types of systems (i) conventional sex role species where
females provide significant PI (peacocks, primates), (ii) conventional sex role species where males
provide significant PI (sticklebacks, seahorses) and (iii) sex-role reversed species where males provide
significant PI (pipefishes, seadragons, phalarope birds) where conventional role species are ones
where the males perform male-male (intrasexual) mating competitions whereas in sex-role reversed
species, the females perform female-female competitions. Sexual immune dimorphism is biased
towards males, females or neither depending on the system. Therefore, a third trait, ornamentation
(Candolin, 2000) could also be included in future extensions of this model.
As mentioned earlier, parental investment consists of three parts (initial gamete production, inter-
nal pregnancy, and external parental care) and this varies between species, and within the sexes of a
species (Trivers, 1972). In this model, our assumption that the time of parental investment directly
relates to the amount of parental investment is a legitimate approximation since parental takes up
both time and energy (Trivers, 1972; Sargent and Gross, 1985). However, we only studied species
systems where pregnancy or brooding is necessary for o↵spring success. A clear distinction between
the three components of parental investment may help to look into the details of parental investment
systems. Di↵erent taxa perform diverse forms of parental investment. Thus, the di↵erent parts of
parental investments, and ornamentation can be studied separately as well. It might be practical to
12
study their e↵ect on the immune response by varying one trait and keeping the others as constant
values.
Informed by our theoretical predictions, further empirical studies that investigate sexual immune
dimorphism in relation to parental investment for long and short-lived species; species with diverse
reproductive strategies (semelparity or iteroparity); species in niches with varying pathogen impact
or virulence, will shed more light on the general understanding of how diverse sex-specific life-history
traits a↵ect each other.
Appendix
O
pt
im
al
 in
ve
st
m
en
t i
n 
re
se
rv
es
  = 0.2
  = 0.5
  = 0.8
r iImmunocompetence
r oOffspring
time
Figure 8: E↵ect of   in the optimal allocation of resources in short-lives species. Here, the
value for background mortality isM = 2.5. The values   = 5 and f = 0.5. The population
size is 200. The results shown here for optimal values of ri and ro are average values of
the population of 200 individuals for   = 0.2 (triangle marker),   = 0.5 (circle marker)
and   = 0.8 (square marker). The shaded area is the variation between the individuals.
Here the probability for obtaining gh(t) i.e. x = 0.5 is fixed. Thus, the values for gh(t)
and gl(t) average to g(t) ans this can happen for di↵erent values of  . i.e resource gain
can fluctuate according to   around g(t). Wee see that the results do not di↵er much
between the di↵erent   value i.e there is no e↵ect of  . Using a normally distributed g(t)
with   variance might show better pronounced di↵erences.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
“Mathematics without natural history is
sterile, but natural history without
mathematics is muddled.”
— John Maynard Smith
The universe, our planet, and its inhabitants can be described by mathematical equations.
This allows us to understand causes for empirical observations, find patterns in nature, factors
that shape evolution. Theoretical results from mathematical models have also given rise to new
empirical questions. Galileo quoted that ‘The laws of Nature are written in the language of
mathematics’, and eco-evolutionary dynamics are no exception.
The commencement of the modern synthesis by mathematicians and statisticians such as Wright,
Fisher, Haldane, which marked the birth of population genetics, also gave rise to the application
of mathematical analyses to study natural selection (Haldane, 1927, 1937; Wright, 1930; Fisher,
1949). Using mathematical tools to study eco-evolutionary dynamics has been in use in a plethora
of fields such as population genetics (Crow and Kimura, 1970), microbial communities (Sala et al.,
2016; Wu and Ross, 2016; Rako↵-Nahoum et al., 2016), cancer dynamics (Komarova et al.,
2003; Michor et al., 2004; Zhang et al., 2017), antibiotic resistance (Conlin et al., 2014), and
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agriculture (Clay and Kover, 1996; Thrall et al., 2011). A well-used and established mathematical
tool, evolutionary game theory, is used to investigate situations where fitness is dependent on the
frequencies of the types of individuals in the population. Game theory, a term coined by John
von Neumann, has its origins in economics in which it was used to study optimal strategies in
competitions between adversaries (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). This was extended
to evolutionary game theory by John Maynard Smith and George R. Price (Maynard Smith and
Price, 1973). In fact, game theory is a branch of optimization theory useful for understanding
many aspects of animal behavior (Mangel and Clark, 1988).
In this thesis, I used population dynamics, evolutionary game theory, and state-dependent dynamic
optimization modeling in order to study the outcome of multiple interlinked interactions between
individuals or between traits within individuals.
Brief summary of the results from this thesis work
Species are connected within and between each other through interactions, and probably no
interspecies or intraspecies interaction happens in isolation from other interactions. Various
examples ranging across diverse taxa show the importance of investigating combined evolutionary
dynamics as seen in the introduction. The previous three chapters of this thesis investigated the
dynamics of combined interactions and the conclusions from these studies are as follows:
• Combined multiple interaction dynamics di↵ers from looking at each interaction
in isolation with regard to the evolution of frequencies of types of individuals in the popu-
lation, and the equilibrium values which these frequencies converge over time.
I constructed a mathematical framework using evolutionary game theory and stochastic
Moran process, that combines many multiplayer games (interactions) with a diverse set of
strategies in each game. Through this framework, one can combine diverse multiplayer
interactions and study their resulting dynamics. In infinite populations, I found that the
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composition of a population in which individuals are involved in combined games showed
di↵erent dynamical trajectories and di↵erent equilibrium points as compared to a population
in which individuals only take part in single games considered in isolation. For finite popu-
lations, I derived an expression for calculating the fixation probability of a strategy, which is
an important stochastic property and here too, I found that combining even a neutral game
with another game could change the dynamics.
• An important outcome that emerged out of studying a combination of multiple
life-history traits with sex-specific di↵erences is a bias in the adult sex ratio.
For this study, in addition to evolutionary game theory, I also used population genetics,
frequency-dependent fitness models and life-history theory to measure the lifetime repro-
ductive success of an individual. Fitness components from three crucial life-history traits
with sex-specific di↵erences i.e parental investment, mating competition, and immune re-
sponse were used to determine the overall fitness (here, lifetime reproductive success) of the
di↵erent types of individuals in both the sexes. This allowed me to probe the consequences
of the combined dynamics of life-history traits with sex-specific di↵erences. The outcome
of my model showed a population-level skew in the adult sex ratio, and my results matched
various empirical evidence.
• Sexual dimorphism can occur in one trait as an e↵ect of sex-specific di↵erences
in another trait that it interacts with.
Using state-dependent dynamic programming, the occurrence of sexual immune dimorphism
in relation to the fraction of time spent in parental investment was investigated.
In the model that I constructed, parental investment and immunocompetence were con-
sidered to be two di↵erent traits of an individual. I modeled and studied the trade-o↵
between allocating the energy reserves (of individuals in a population) to parental e↵ort
and to immunity in such a way that they maximize the individual’s fitness. Through this
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study, I showed that the di↵erences in the proportion of time spent in parental investment
and overall resources allocated to parental investment have an e↵ect on the amount of
resources allocated to immune response when exposed to an environment with fluctuating
amount of resources. My results showed that for most species systems, it is optimal to
invest more towards immunocompetence when the time spent in pregnancy or brooding is
longer; and within a species, the sex that can undergo pregnancy or brooding invests more
in immunocompetence.
A general conclusion from all the chapters is that studying coupled interactions between
individuals or between the traits within an individual is necessary to obtain more realistic and
meticulous results. This is because our results show that combined interactions dynamics di↵ers
from studying an isolated interaction. The dynamics di↵er in terms of trajectories of frequencies
of individuals of every type and the equilibrium values for the frequencies, both. Coupling even
a neutral interaction to another interaction a↵ects their dynamics. I successfully applied the
multiple interactions approach to interactions between life-history traits as well. By doing so, I
was able to investigate how one trait a↵ects another and also how the combined dynamics of the
traits can result in population-level consequences.
A couple of future outlooks
Di↵erences in life-history trade-o↵s due to di↵erent fitness expectations can result in the evolution
of diverse animal personalities. The multiple interactions approach can be used is this recently
well-discussed and relatively young field i.e. the evolution of personalities through interactions
between multiple personality traits (Wolf et al., 2007; Carter et al., 2013). Many personality
traits determine the personality of an individual, and di↵erent personalities govern the behavior
of the individual. If we look at each personality as a game where di↵erent traits are the strategies,
then the multiple games dynamics framework that uses ‘simple’ equations can be used even in
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these complex studies. Using this, one can study the coexistence of behavior types and behavior
correlations more clearly.
Another future outlook would be to extend the multiple-game dynamics to spatial structure
(Shibasaki and Shimada, 2018). The multiple-game dynamics framework can be extended to
evolutionary graphs (Szabo´ and Fa´th, 2007) to study interacting agents that are connected
through diverse social networks.
Interspecies and intraspecies interactions shape evolution and each interaction is coupled with
other interactions. One can use mathematical tools to study various questions related to natural
history, eco-evolutionary interactions being one of them. Therefore, my mathematical models
that investigate the combined dynamics of multiple interactions would allow one to capture more
realistic eco-evolutionary scenarios and provide more insight. This is another feather in the cap
for the pursuit of understanding evolution.
93

Appendix A
Electronic Supplementary Material of the
article in Chapter 1
95
Electronic Supplementary Material: Evolutionary1
dynamics of complex multiple games2
Vandana Revathi Venkateswaran and Chaitanya S. Gokhale
Research Group for Theoretical Models of Eco-evolutionary Dynamics
Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology
Department of Evolutionary Theory
August Thienemann Str. 2, 24306, Plo¨n, Germany
Email: gokhale@evolbio.mpg.de
3
1 Infinite population4
1.1 Single Game Dynamics (SGD)5
A two player replicator approach6
Consider a 2 ⇥ 2 (two player two strategy) payoff matrix (A.1) : There are two players and7
each of them can adopt two strategies. The two types of strategies they could employ are 18
and 2 and their respective frequencies are x1 and x2.9
 1 2
1 a1,(1,0) a1,(0,1)
2 a2,(1,0) a2,(0,1)
!
(A.1)
In matrix A.1, we write the elements in the form ai,↵, where i is the strategy of the focal10
player. Using multiindex notation, ↵, is a vector written as ↵ = (↵1,↵2), together representing11
the group composition. The average payoffs of the two strategies are given by f1 = a1,(1,0)x1+12
a1,(0,1)x2 and f2 = a2,(1,0)x1+ a2,(0,1)x2. The replicator equation Eq. (A.2) [1, 2] describes the13
change in frequency xi of strategy i over time.14
x˙i = xi[(fi    )] (A.2)
where fi is the fitness of strategy i and   is the average fitness. For an infinitely large pop-15
ulation size we have x1 = x, x2 = 1   x Thus the replicator equation for the change in the16
1
frequency of strategy 1 is,17
x˙ = x(1  x)(f1   f2)
= x(1  x)[(a1,(1,0)   a1,(0,1)   a2,(1,0) + a2,(0,1))x+ a2,(1,0)   a2,(0,1)].
(A.3)
Apart from the trivial fixed points (x = 0 and x = 1), there is an internal equilibrium given18
by,19
x? =
a2,(0,1)   a2,(1,0)
a1,(1,0)   a1,(0,1)   a2,(1,0) + a2,(0,1) . (A.4)
Multiplayer games20
We now extend the dynamics to multiplayer games [3]. The payoff matrix (A.5), represents a21
three player (d = 3) two strategy (n = 2) game; a 2⇥ 2⇥ 2 game.22
 11 12 22
1 a1,(2,0) a1,(1,1) a1,(0,2)
2 a2,(2,0) a2,(1,1) a2,(0,2)
!
(A.5)
The rows correspond to the focal player. Focal player interacting with two other players, both23
with strategy 1 will receive a payoff a1,(2,0). While interacting with a one strategy 1 player and24
a strategy 2 player, he will get a1,(1,1). When interacting with two other strategy 2 individuals,25
the payoff is equal to a1,(0,2). Assuming that the order of players does not matter, the average26
payoffs (or in this case, the fitnesses) will be,27
f1 = x
2a1,(2,0) + 2x(1  x)a1,(1,1) + (1  x)2a1,(0,2)
f2 = x
2a2,(2,0) + 2x(1  x)a2,(1,1) + (1  x)2a2,(0,2).
(A.6)
The replicator equation in this case is given by,28
x˙ = x(1  x)((a1,(0,2)   2a1,(1,1) + a1,(2,0)   a2,(0,2) + 2a2,(1,1)   a2,(2,0))x2
+( a1,(0,2) + a1,(1,1) + a2,(0,2)   a2,(1,1))2x+ a1,(0,2)   a2,(0,2)).
(A.7)
The quadratic x2 term in Eq. (A.7) can give rise to a maximum of two interior fixed points. In29
general, for a d-player two strategy game, the replicator equation can result in d   1 interior30
fixed points (maximum). For an n strategy d-player game, the maximum number of internal31
equilibria is (d  1)(n 1) as shown in [4].32
1.2 Multi Game Dynamics (MGD)33
Linear combination of two 2⇥ 2 games34
To start looking into the dynamics of combinations of games i.e. Multi Game Dynamics35
(MGD) in contrast with the Single Game Dynamics (SGD), consider the example: two games36
2
with two strategies in each. Let the payoff matrix of Game 1 and Game 2 be,37
A1 =
0@
A11 A
1
2
A11 a
1
1,(1,0) a
1
1,(0,1)
A12 a
1
2,(1,0) a
1
2,(0,1)
1A A2 =
0@
A21 A
2
2
A21 a
2
1,(1,0) a
2
1,(0,1)
A22 a
2
2,(1,0) a
2
2,(0,1)
1A
The individuals can be partitioned into four classes. Individuals playing strategy 1 in game38
A1 and game A2, strategy 1 in A1 and 2 in A2, strategy 2 in A1 and 1 in A2, and strategy 2 in39
A1 and A2. So, there are four types of strategies, A11A21, A11A22, A12A21 and A12A22. We refer to40
them as “categorical types”. Their respective frequencies are written as x11, x12, x21 and x22.41
We shall now use a new notation, pjij or playing strategy ij in game j, which is just a variable42
transformation that can be written as (here, ij 2 {1, 2} and j 2 {1, 2}),43
p11 = x11 + x12
p12 = x21 + x22
p21 = x11 + x21
p22 = x12 + x22.
(A.8)
The fitnesses for playing strategy ij in game j can be written out as,44
f11 = x11 a
1
1,(1,0) + x12 a
1
1,(1,0) + x21 a
1
1,(0,1) + x22 a
1
1,(0,1)
f12 = x11 a
1
2,(1,0) + x12 a
1
2,(1,0) + x21 a
1
2,(0,1) + x22 a
1
2,(0,1)
f21 = x11 a
2
1,(1,0) + x12 a
2
1,(0,1) + x21 a
2
1,(1,0) + x22 a
2
1,(0,1)
f22 = x11 a
2
2,(1,0) + x12 a
2
2,(0,1) + x21 a
2
2,(1,0) + x22 a
2
2,(0,1).
(A.9)
A crucial assumption here is that the effective average payoff is a linear composite of the45
constituent games. The replicator dynamics will be given by the following set of coupled46
different differential equations:47
˙x11 = x11[(f11 + f21)   ]
˙x12 = x12[(f11 + f22)   ]
˙x21 = x21[(f12 + f21)   ]
˙x22 = x22[(f12 + f22)   ].
(A.10)
The average fitness   is given by,48
  = x11(f11 + f21) + x12(f11 + f22) + x21(f12 + f21) + x22(f12 + f22)
= f11(x11 + x12) + f12(x21 + x22) + f21(x11 + x21) + f22(x12 + x22)
= f11 p11 + f12 p12 + f21 p21 + f22 p22.
(A.11)
3
The single games’ dynamics and their multi game dynamics will be the same or in other49
words, an MGD can be separated back into all its SGDs if pjij = xij 8 ij in a game j, for all50
N games. At times, even if this equality holds, the trajectories in the MGD space might be51
different from the SGD space. Both these cases are shown in the examples in the main article.52
A previous study with two player games with two strategies [5], showed that the SGDs can53
be separated from their MGD. The dynamics lie on the generalized invariant manifold. [1, 6]54
in the S4 simplex which is given by WK = {x 2 S4 | x11x22 = Kx12x21} for K > 0. When55
K = 1, we haveW = {x 2 S4 | x11x22 = x12x21} which is the Wright manifold. The Wright56
manifold WK [6, 1] is a population dynamic concept. The states belonging to the Wright57
manifold are for the population in linkage equilibrium i.e. the games (or loci/traits, in biology)58
are inherited completely independently in each generation. Thus, on this manifold, MGD can59
be separated back into the SGDs of the constituent games. The attractor for a combination of60
two 2-player games having two strategies each is a line E, an evolutionarily stable set [5]. The61
point where the lineE intersects the Wright manifold indicates a rest point. All the trajectories62
in the simplex depicting the MGD fall onto an attractor given by a line (ES set) on WK . The63
dynamics onWK and the trajectories on eachWK were analyzed in the same study [5] using64
methods used in dynamical systems to show they are qualitatively the same as on the Wright65
manifold.66
However, for multiple games having more than two strategies in at least one game, the67
MGD cannot be separated even into a linear combination of the constituent SGDs unless they68
are on W [7]. Increase in the number of games and the number of strategies increases the69
dimension of MGD simplex. This high dimensional space of MGD, which would be equal70
to ⌃Ni=1(mj   1) (where N is the number of games and mj is the number of strategies in a71
game j), is densely packed with manifolds. All the manifolds are non-intersecting while W72
is the invariant. Even for a simplified example of 2 games each with m1 and m2 number73
of strategies the generalised invariant manifold is given by WK = {x 2  m1⇥m2 |xi,kxj,l =74
Kik,jl xi,lxj,k 8 1  i, j  m1, 1  k, l  m2} where K = {Kik,jl} is a set of positive75
constants for which WK is a non-empty set. When Kik,jl = 1, we have the Wright manifold76
on which the MGD can be separated back into its SGDs. While combining two 2-player77
games with three strategies [7], the evolutionarily stable set E would be in a four-dimensional78
hyperplane [6]. So while combining many games, even if one individual game has more than79
two strategies, the ES set may no longer be a line. It would be a hyperplane in the WK80
hyperspace. Thus, it is important to know on which manifold the initial conditions are, for81
only if they start from the Wright manifold W , will the dynamics be a perfect match to the82
SGDs [7].83
If the initial condition is not onW , if the strategies between the different games are allowed84
4
to recombine then the dynamics converges to W . While the relationship between strategies85
under recombination is genetically plausible, for phenotypic strategies, social learning or hor-86
izontal adoption of traits could have a similar effect [8, 9].87
2 Finite population88
2.1 Single game dynamics89
In a population of size Z consisting of strategy 1 and strategy 2 players, the probability that90
one of the strategies, say 1, fixates, is given by the fixation probability ⇢1. An individual91
is chosen proportional to its fitness to reproduce an identical offspring. Another individual92
is chosen randomly and discarded from the group. Therefore, the group size is kept at a93
constant value Z. Fitness of a strategy s can be a linear function of its average payoff ⇡s i.e94
fs = 1   w + w⇡s. In a population that has i strategy 1 players, the fitnesses can be used to95
calculate the transition probabilities T+i and T
 
i for the number of type 1 players to increase96
and decrease by one, respectively.97
T+i =
if1
if1 + (Z   i)f2
Z   i
Z
T i =
(Z   i)f2
if1 + (Z   i)f2
i
Z
.
(A.12)
With probability 1  T+i   T i the system does not change. Using the transition probabilities,98
the fixation probability can be calculated [2, 10] to be,99
⇢1 =
1
1 +
PZ 1
m=1
Qm
i=1
T i
T+i
. (A.13)
Since T
 
i
T+i
= f2f1 =
1 w+w⇡2
1 w+w⇡1 ⇡ 1 w(⇡1 ⇡2) for selection intensity w ⌧ 1 i.e. weak selection.100
Therefore,101
⇢1 ⇡ 1
1 +
PZ 1
m=1
Qm
i=1 1  w(⇡1   ⇡2)
. (A.14)
For a d-player game, the payoffs are obtained using a hypergeometric distribution given by,102
H(k, d; i, Z) =
 
i 1
k
  
Z i
d 1 k
  
Z 1
d 1
  . (A.15)
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Figure A.1: Fixation probability for a single individual playing strategy 1 varying with
selection intensity for a three player game having two strategies. For the game shown in
this figure, the payoff of strategy 2 is greater than strategy 1 (⇡2 > ⇡1), the fixation probability
decreases, according to equation (A.17). The results from analytics and simulations (averaged
over 106 realizations) are plotted as solid lines and solid circles, respectively.
Thus,103
⇡1 =
d 1X
k=0
 
i 1
k
  
Z i
d 1 k
  
Z 1
d 1
  a1,↵
⇡2 =
d 1X
k=0
 
i
k
  
Z i 1
d 1 k
  
Z 1
d 1
  a2,↵. (A.16)
Maintaining weak selection, then from [4] we have,104
⇢1 ⇡ 1
Z
+
w
Z2
Z 1X
m=1
mX
i=1
(⇡1   ⇡2). (A.17)
Figure A.1 contains the fixation probabilities of strategy 1with respect to varying selection105
intensities for a three player game with two strategies.106
2.2 Multiple game dynamics107
We begin with the same example that was used to explain the combination of two d-player108
games where both games have two strategies; and use the same notations for a finite population109
of size Z. The population consists of individuals of four types : A11A21, A11A22, A12A21 and110
A12A
2
2. The combined dynamics results in an S4 simplex as shown in Fig. A.2. We perform111
pairwise comparisons for all the edges of the simplex. On a particular edge, only the two112
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Figure A.2: Fixation probabilities over pure strategies. Figure shows the fixation probabil-
ities and the direction of selection between the vertices in a tetrahedron (which contains the
MGD of the two games A1 and A2 shown in the matrices). Here selection intensity w = 0.01
and population size Z = 100. It has been assumed that both the games have the same selection
intensity and hence the average payoffs have been added first and then the mapping (linear or
exponential mapping from payoffs to fitness) has been performed i.e. Method II (Method I
would produce a different figure). For the edges where one of the games does not change
(e.g. A11, A21   A11, A22), only one of the game (here game 2) matters and hence the fixation
probabilities are the same as if only one game.
7
vertex strategies are present. Let us start with the edge containing x11 and x12 vertices. If113
there are  11 individuals playing strategy A11A21, then there are  12 = Z    11 individuals114
of type A11A22. The number of A12A21 and A12A22 individuals i.e.  21 and  22 is zero. In the115
individual games, the number of players adopting strategy ij in a game j is given by pjij .116
Since we are looking at the edge with A11A21 and A11A22 individuals, we have117
p11 =  11 +  12 = Z
p12 =  21 +  22 = 0
p21 =  11 +  21 =  11
p22 =  12 +  22 = Z    11.
(A.18)
In contrast to the binomial distribution which is used for infinite populations where the draws118
can be considered independent, the hypergeometric distribution was used for sampling with-119
out replacement in the case of finite populations [4, 11]. For infinite population, we used the120
multinomial distribution to calculate the average payoffs for a combination of N multiplayer121
games in an infinite population size. Therefore, for finite populations, we shall use the multi-122
variate hypergeometric distribution. For a population of size Z containing  11 type A11A21 and123
Z    11 type A11A22 individuals, the average payoffs ⇡jij for playing strategy ij in game j (in124
our example, ij 2 {1, 2} and j 2 {1, 2}) are125
⇡11 =
X
|k|=d1 1
 
p11 1
k1
  
p12
k2
  
Z 1
d1 1
  a11,k
⇡12 =
X
|k|=d1 1
 
p11
k1
  
p12 1
k2
  
Z 1
d1 1
  a12,k
⇡21 =
X
|k|=d2 1
 
p21 1
k1
  
p22
k2
  
Z 1
d2 1
  a21,k
⇡22 =
X
|k|=d2 1
 
p21
k1
  
p22 1
k2
  
Z 1
d2 1
  a22,k.
(A.19)
In general, for N multi-strategy d-player games,126
⇡jij =
X
|k|=dj 1
 pjij 1
kij
 Qmj
n=1,n 6=ij
 
pjn
kn
 
 
Z 1
dj 1
  ajij ,k. (A.20)
We can calculate the fitnesses using linear or exponential mapping. If wj is the intensity127
8
of selection in game j, then128
fjij =
8<:1  wj + wj⇡jij for linear mappingewj⇡jij for exponential mapping. (A.21)
Thus, in the combined dynamics, the fitness (assuming it to be additive) of type A1i1A
2
i2 ...A
N
iN
129
is130
Fi1i2....iN =
NX
j=1
fjij . (A.22)
If we are looking at an edge with types A1i1A
2
i2 ...A
N
iN
and A1h1A
2
h2 ...A
N
hN
, the transition prob-131
ability T+  for type A1i1A
2
i2 ...A
N
iN
to increase from   to   + 1 (and type A1h1A
2
h2 ...A
N
hN
to be132
randomly selected for death) is133
T+  =
 Fi1i2....iN
 Fi1i23....iN + (Z    )Fh1h2....hN
Z    
Z
. (A.23)
Likewise, T   will be134
T   =
(Z    )Fh1h2....hN
 Fi1i2....iN + (Z    )Fh1h2....hN
 
Z
. (A.24)
So, for a A1i1A
2
i2 ...A
N
iN
and A1h1A
2
h2 ...A
N
hN
edge, the fixation probability ⇢A1i1A2i2 ...ANiN of type135
A1i1A
2
i2 ...A
N
iN
is136
⇢A1i1A
2
i2
...ANiN
, A1h1
A2h2
...ANhN
=
1
1 +
PZ 1
m=1
Qm
 =1
T  
T+ 
. (A.25)
Method I137
As T
 
 
T+ 
=
Fh1h2h3....hN
Fi1i2i3....iN
, Eq. (A.25) can be written as,138
⇢A1i1A
2
i2
...ANiN
, A1h1
A2h2
...ANhN
=
1
1 +
PZ 1
m=1
Qm
 =1
Fh1h2h3....hN
Fi1i2i3....iN
=
1
1 +
PZ 1
m=1
Qm
 =1
PN
j=1 fjhjPN
j=1 fjij
=
1
1 +
PZ 1
m=1
Qm
 =1
✓
N+
PN
j=1 wj+wj⇡jhj
N+
PN
j=1 wj+wj⇡jij
◆ .
(A.26)
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where the fitness is obtained using a linear mapping. In order to further simplify the model,139
we consider that all games have the same selection intensity. In this case,140
⇢A1i1A
2
i2
...ANiN
, A1h1
A2h2
...ANhN
=
1
1 +
PZ 1
m=1
Qm
 =1
✓
N Nw+w(PNj=1 ⇡jhj )
N Nw+w(PNj=1 ⇡jij )
◆
=
1
1 +
PZ 1
m=1
Qm
 =1
✓
1 w+ wN (
PN
j=1 ⇡jhj )
1 w+ wN (
PN
j=1 ⇡jij )
◆ . (A.27)
It is worth mentioning here that the assumption of having equal intensities for all games is141
strong. Many times, the selection on one game may be more intense than others. These have142
to be taken into account as it strengthens the precision of the model and Eq. (A.26) must be143
used in these scenarios. However for the sake of our analysis, we shall assume wj = w for all144
j 2 [0, N ].145
For weak selection intensity,146
⇢A1i1A
2
i2
...ANiN
, A1h1
A2h2
...ANhN
⇡ 1
1 +
PZ 1
m=1
Qm
 =1[1  w{1 
(
PN
j=1 ⇡jhj )
N }]⇥ [1 + w{1 
(
PN
j=1 ⇡jij )
N }]
⇡ 1
1 +
PZ 1
m=1
Qm
 =1[1  wN (
PN
j=1(⇡jij   ⇡jhj))]
.
(A.28)
Eq. (A.28) can be written as,147
⇢A1i1A
2
i2
...ANiN
, A1h1
A2h2
...ANhN
⇡ 1
Z   wN
PZ 1
m=1
Pm
 =1(
PN
j=1(⇡jij   ⇡jhj))]
. (A.29)
Following Taylor expansion and since w ⌧ 1, we get148
⇢A1i1A
2
i2
...ANiN
, A1h1
A2h2
...ANhN
⇡ 1
Z|{z}
Under neutrality (w=0)
+
w
NZ2
[
Z 1X
m=1
mX
 =1
(
NX
j=1
(⇡jij   ⇡jhj))]. (A.30)
For w = 0 and N = 1 i.e. neutrality condition while there is only one game, the above149
equation is also equal to the classic neutral fixation probability 1Z for single games. ForN = 1150
in Eq. (A.30) , we can retrieve Eq. (A.17) for a single multiplayer game i.e.151
⇢A1i1 , A
1
h1
⇡ 1
Z|{z}
Under neutrality
+
w
Z2
Z 1X
m=1
mX
 =1
(⇡1i1   ⇡1h1). (A.31)
10
For N = 2 Eq. (A.28) becomes,152
⇢A1i1A
2
i2
, A1h1
A2h2
⇡ 1
1 +
PZ 1
m=1
Qm
 =1 1  w2 [(⇡1i1 + ⇡2i2)  (⇡1h1 + ⇡2h2)]
. (A.32)
While looking at an edge for which, say, game 1 in both vertices has the same strategy and153
thus, we need to only look at differences in one game i.e. only game 2 matters (⇡1i1 = ⇡1h1),154
⇢A1i1A
2
i2
, A1h1
A2h2
⇡ 1
1 +
PZ 1
m=1
Qm
 =1 1  w2 [(⇡2i2   ⇡2h2)]
=
1
Z
+
w
2Z2
Z 1X
m=1
mX
i=1
(⇡2i2   ⇡2h2)
(A.33)
We can make pairwise comparisons between all categorical types (all the edges of the S4155
simplex in containing the MGD of the two games with two strategies). Using these compar-156
ative fixation probabilities we can determine the flow of the dynamics over pure strategies as157
shown Fig. A.2.158
Method II159
If all games have the same intensity, we could also add the payoffs first and then perform the160
fitness mappings, then Fi1i2i3....iN = 1   w + w
⇣PN
j=1 ⇡jij
⌘
and Fh1h2h3....hN = 1   w +161
w
⇣PN
j=1 ⇡jhj
⌘
. Thus, the combined fitness (of a vertex) is not just a sum of the fitnesses162
of strategies used in the inherent games (in that vertex). The combined fitness is obtained163
by summing the average payoffs of playing the respective strategies in the games involved in164
a particular vertex and using that to calculate the fitness of that vertex. Only the payoffs of165
the games that have the same selection intensity can be added together and mapped to fitness166
through this method. An example of a situation where the combined effect of the payoffs for167
the strategies of the games on that vertex leads to the combined fitness, would be in models of168
mating and sexual selection. Numerous interactions (parenting, mating, brooding) or games169
during a mating season decides the reproductive success or fitness of an individual during that170
period. This combination of games is not trivial as bringing all the smaller games into one171
larger game but we cannot always deconstruct the multi-game back to all the inherent single172
games. The fixation probability, Eq. (A.25), in this case will be,173
⇢A1i1A
2
i2
...ANiN
, A1h1
A2h2
...ANhN
=
1
1 +
PZ 1
m=1
Qm
 =1
✓
1 w+w(PNj=1 ⇡jhj )
1 w+w(PNj=1 ⇡jij )
◆ . (A.34)
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For weak selection intensities,174
⇢A1i1A
2
i2
...ANiN
, A1h1
A2h2
...ANhN
⇡ 1
1 +
PZ 1
m=1
Qm
 =1
⇣
1  w[1  (PNj=1 ⇡jhj)] + w[1  (PNj=1 ⇡jij)]⌘
=
1
1 +
PZ 1
m=1
Qm
 =1
⇣
1  w[(PNj=1 ⇡jij   (PNj=1 ⇡jhj)]⌘ .
(A.35)
and this can be further written as,175
⇢A1i1A
2
i2
...ANiN
, A1h1
A2h2
...ANhN
⇡ 1
Z|{z}
Under neutrality (w=0)
+
w
Z2
[
Z 1X
m=1
mX
 =1
(
NX
j=1
(⇡jij   ⇡jhj))]. (A.36)
If we consider two games, then Eq. (A.35) will be reduced to176
⇢A1i1A
2
i2
, A1h1
A2h2
⇡ 1
1 +
PZ 1
m=1
Qm
 =1 (1  w[(⇡1i1 + ⇡2i2)  (⇡1h1 + ⇡2h2)])
. (A.37)
Here, if we look at an edge for which, say, game 1 in both vertices has the same strategy177
(⇡1i1 = ⇡1h1), then looking at differences in game 2 is what matters. In this scenario,178
⇢A1i1A
2
i2
, A1h1
A2h2
⇡ 1
1 +
PZ 1
m=1
Qm
 =1 (1  w(⇡2i2   ⇡2h2))
. (A.38)
This corresponds to equation Eq. (A.14) for a single game with two strategies i1 and h1. This179
can also be written as ,180
⇢A1i1A
2
i2
, A1h1
A2h2
⇡ 1
Z
+
w
Z2
Z 1X
m=1
mX
i=1
(⇡2i2   ⇡2h2) (A.39)
and this is similar to Eq. (A.17) for single game dynamics. We can make pairwise comparisons181
between all categorical types (all the edges of the S4 simplex in containing theMGD of the two182
games with two strategies). Using these comparative fixation probabilities we can determine183
the flow of the dynamics over pure strategies as shown Fig. A.2.184
Difference between Method I and II185
The difference between Method I and II is given by,186
| ( 1
Z
+
w
Z2
[
Z 1X
m=1
mX
 =1
(
NX
j=1
(⇡jij   ⇡jhj))])  (
1
Z
+
w
NZ2
[
Z 1X
m=1
mX
 =1
(
NX
j=1
(⇡jij   ⇡jhj))]) |
=| w
Z2
[
Z 1X
m=1
mX
 =1
(
NX
j=1
(⇡jij   ⇡jhj))].[1 
1
N
] | .
(A.40)
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Figure A.3: Fixation probability of a single individual playing A11A21 strategy on the edge
A11A
2
1   A11A22 varying with selection intensity for a combination of two games having
two strategies each (special case A1). For a population of Z = 10 the fixation probabilities
are normalised according to the neutral fixation probability, 1Z = 0.1. We look at the edge
A11A
2
1   A11A22 where A1 is the same for both vertices i.e. neutral in both the vertices, and A2
is what matters. The payoffs in Game A1 are zero. Since the payoff of playing strategy
2 in A2 is greater than playing strategy 1 (⇡22 > ⇡21), the fixation probability decreases
as shown in the earlier sections of the ESM. The line labeled ‘single game’ corresponds to
single game dynamics of A2. The plots from Method I (mapping payoffs to fitnesses and then
adding the fitnesses) and Method II (adding the payoffs first, and then mapping to fitness) for
a combination of the two gamesA1 andA2. Since ⇡11(= ⇡12) = 0, results fromMethod II and
the SGD of A2 are the same. However, Method I shows a different result. Here, MGD differs
from the SGD. Adding another game to A2 modifies the dynamics. Thus, within the MGD,
the two methods of mapping from payoffs to fitness i.e. Method I and Method II differ from
each other (by Eq. A.41 shaded region). The difference is due to the different baseline payoffs
that the different mappings produce. The results from analytics and stochastic simulations
are plotted as solid lines and symbols, respectively. The simulations are averaged over 106
realisations. Thus while looking at a combination of various games, there can be different
methods of mapping and one needs to choose a mapping method that reflects their model best
as they can bring about different results.
As N increases, the difference between the two methods becomes independent of the number187
of games. ForN = 2, if we look at an edge where game 1 at both vertices has the same strategy188
(⇡1i1 = ⇡1h1) then game 2 is what matters. Here, the difference betweenMethods I and II is the189
difference between the equations (A.39) and (A.33) which is equal to wZ2 [
PZ 1
m=1
Pm
 =1(⇡2i2 190
⇡2h2)].
1
2 . In the main text Fig. 6 shows the fixation probability ⇢A11A21, A11A22 (both Method191
I and Method II) with respect to varying selection intensities in the A11A21, A11A22 edge of the192
13
tetrahedron simplex that contains the multiple game dynamics for a combination of two games193
with two strategies each. While this is the general case where both the games matter, Fig. A.3194
is a particular case where the payoff in game A1 is zero. Here, there is no difference between195
Method II and SGD. However, in Method I, its results differ from SGD. Eq. A.40 becomes,196
| ( 1
Z
+
w
Z2
[
Z 1X
m=1
mX
 =1
(⇡21   ⇡22)])  ( 1
Z
+
w
2Z2
[
Z 1X
m=1
mX
 =1
(⇡21   ⇡22)]) |
=| ( w
Z2
[
Z 1X
m=1
mX
 =1
(⇡21   ⇡22)].1
2
) | .
(A.41)
Thus the kind of mapping method that one chooses becomes important in multi game dynam-197
ics as there are various ways of mapping payoffs to fitness especially when we remove the198
assumption that the selection intensity are the same value w for all N games i.e. the value wj199
would be different from one game j to another.200
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The results show that in the MGD it is even possible
for an initial condition to end up in a completely different
equilibrium as opposed to the SGD.
Consider A2 which has four stable internal equilibria. In
figure 5 top row, the three initial conditions go to three of
the stable equilibria. After combining with A1 and then reco-
vering the dynamics of A2, we see that ic2 switches its long-
term equilibrium behaviour (figure 5 bottom row, recovered
dynamics). Multiplayer games offer the possibility of mul-
tiple internal equilibria and combined games can allow the
trajectories to switch between them. Thus, the constituent
games of an MGD, especially involving multiplayer games
should be studied with scrutiny since their long-term evol-
utionary trajectory cannot be predicted by the basins of
attractions of the SGD.
In a previous study of 2-player games with two strategies
[31], it was shown that the SGD can be obtained back from
their MGD. The dynamics lie on the generalized invariant
manifold [25,32] in the S4 simplex which is given by WK ¼
fx[ S4j x11 x22 ¼ Kx12x21g for K. 0. When K ¼ 1, we have
W ¼ fx[ S4j x11 x22 ¼ x12x21g which is the Wright manifold.
On this manifold, MGD can be separated back into the
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Figure A.4. Two games with two strategies. The SGD of a 2-player and a 3-player game from equations (3.1) are shown in the top panel. Initial conditions of the
highlighted trajectories correspond to the ones used in the MGD. The vertices of an S4 simplex (tetrahedron) denote these ‘categorical strategies’. The asterisks depict
the initial conditions (ic1, ic2, and ic3) chosen to correspond to the initial conditions from the SGD. Other random initial conditions are plotted in grey. Recovering the
SGDs from the MGD, we see that p11 ( playing strategy 1 in game 1, dashed lines) converges to q!1 ¼ 0:5 which is the equilibrium solution for strategy 1 in game
1. If we start above the unstable equilibrium solution for game 2, i.e. q!21 ¼ 0:27, then p21 ( playing strategy 1 in game 2, dashed lines) converges to q!22 ¼ 0:73,
the stable equilibrium solution. For trajectories commencing below the unstable equilibrium, strategy 1 goes extinct. Comparing the recovered (dashed) dynamics to
the SGD (solid), we see that while the equilibria of the recovered dynamics are the same as that of the SGD, the trajectories do not follow the same path. This is
because the trajectories traverse a higher dimension which offers optional paths to the same equilibrium solutions. The initials conditions for (x11, x12, x21, x22) used
in these plots are: ic1 ¼ (0.1, 0.1, 0.6, 0.2), ic2 ¼ (0.2, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5), and ic3 ¼ (0.1, 0.6, 0.1, 0.2). (Online version in colour.)
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chosen randomly for death. Thus, the total population size
remains constant. Earlier we assumed that the fitness of a
strategy was its average payoff. Besides the population
size, we can control the effect of the game on the fitness
via a particular mapping of payoff to fitness. The mapping
could be a linear function f ¼ 12 w þ wp where w is the
selection intensity [3]. If w ¼ 0, selection is neutral whereas
for w ¼ 1 selection is strong and the payoff determines the
fitness completely. However, since negative fitnesses in this
framework are meaningless, there are restrictions on the
range of w. Alternatively, to avoid this restriction, we can
use an exponential function f ¼ ewp [35]. Under any mapping
scenario but weak selection, the fixation probability of strat-
egy 1 in a population of Z2 1 strategy 2 players playing a
d-player game, is [10],
r1 $
1
Z
þ w
Z2
XZ% 1
m¼ 1
Xm
g¼ 1
(p1 % p2), (3:4)
where pi is the fitness of strategy i and the payoffs depend
on the number of mutants g. We have generalized this
result to multiple games. The strategies in a multiple game
are categorical ones. For instance, a two game system with
each game containing two strategies, has four categorical
strategies as shown in figure 2. If one of the categorical strat-
egies takes over the entire population, we term it as the
fixation of the strategy defined by the category. If in a popu-
lation of size Z playing N games, there is a single individual
playing strategy A1i1A
2
i2 . . .A
N
iN in a population of Z2 1 indi-
viduals playing strategy A1h1A
2
h2 . . .A
N
hN then we are
interested in the probability that this single individual
takes over the population. First we need to map the payoffs
to fitness and there are two ways of implementing any kind
of mapping for multiple games: Method I. For each game, the
payoffs are mapped to fitness and then the cumulative fit-
ness is calculated. Here, the fixation probability of a single
individual of type A1i1A
2
i2 . . .A
N
iN in a population of
A1h1A
2
h2 . . .A
N
hN is given by (see the electronic supplementary
material for details)
rA1i1A
2
i2
...ANiN ,A
1
h1
A2h2
...ANhN
$ 1
Z
þ w
NZ2
XZ% 1
m¼ 1
Xm
g¼ 1
XN
j¼ 1
(p jij % p jhj )
0@ 1A24 35: (3:5)
Method II. The payoffs can be added first and then mapped
to fitnesses. The fixation probability through this method is
(see the electronic supplementary material for details)
rA1i1A
2
i2
...ANiN
, A1h1
A2h2
...ANhN
$ 1
Z
þ w
Z2
XZ% 1
m¼ 1
Xm
g¼ 1
XN
j¼ 1
(p jij % p jhj )
0@ 1A24 35: (3:6)
For illustration, let us consider a combination of two
games with two strategies each. For instance, the games in
(3.1). We make pairwise comparisons between all categorical
types, i.e. all the edges of the S4 simplex in figure 3. Using
these comparative fixation probabilities, we can determine
the flow of the dynamics over pure strategies. Let us focus
on the edge A11, A
2
1
%! % A11, A22, where game 1 does not
change and only game 2 matters. Hence, the fixation prob-
abilities should be the same as if only game 2 exists. The
single game fixation probability of game 2 is shown in
figure 6. As given in equations (3.5) and (3.6), when game 2
is combined with game 1, there can be two ways of mapping
payoffs to fitness. The results from these two methods in mul-
tiple games in finite populations are also plotted in figure 6.
The fixation probabilities of a strategy in a single game
changes when ‘adding’ just one more game to it. Even on
the edge A11, A
2
1
%! % A11, A22, where game 1 is neutral and
only game 2 matters, there is an effect of game 1 on game
A2 =
11 12 22
1 −2 3 −2
2 0 0 0
A1 =
1 2
1 −1 1
2 0 0
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
n
o
rm
al
iz
ed
 fi
xa
tio
n 
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
r ∑
×
Z
selection intensity w
single game A2
1A1
2A2
1A2
2A2
1A2
2A1
1A1
2A1
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
II. adding payoffs then
mapping to fitness
I. mapping to fitness
then adding fitnesses
Figure A.5. Fixation probability of a single individual playing A11A
2
1 strategy on the edge A
1
1A
2
1
%! % A11A22, i.e. rA11A21 ,A11A22 varying with selection intensity for a com-
bination of two games having two strategies each. For a population of Z ¼ 10, the fixation probabilities are normalized according to the neutral fixation probability,
(1/Z ) ¼ 0.1. We look at the edge A11A21 %! % A11A22 where A1 is the same for both vertices, i.e. neutral in both the vertices, and A2 is what matters. Since the payoff
of playing strategy 2 in A2 is greater than playing strategy 1 (p22. p21), the fixation probability decreases (see the electronic supplementary material for more
details). The line labelled ‘single game’ corresponds to A2. The plots from Method I (mapping payoffs to fitnesses and then adding the fitnesses to get the combined
fitness) and Method II (adding the payoffs first, and then performing the payoff to fitness mapping) for a combination of the two games A1 and A2 show how the
MGD is different from the SGD. Adding another game to A2 modifies the dynamics. Within the MGD, the two methods of mapping from payoffs to fitness, i.e.
Methods I and II show different results. The shaded region (calculated in the electronic supplementary material) shows this difference between the two methods
with increasing selection intensity. The results from analytics and stochastic simulations are plotted as solid lines and symbols, respectively. The simulations are
averaged over 106 realizations. (Online version in colour.)
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rspb
Proc.R.Soc.B
286:20190900
8
Appendix B
Supplementary Material for the
manuscript in Chapter 2
113
Electronic Supplementary Material:
Consequences of combining life-history
traits with sex-specific di↵erences
Vandana Revathi Venkateswaran1,⇤, Olivia Roth2 and Chaitanya S.
Gokhale1
1Research Group for Theoretical Models of Eco-evolutionary Dynamics,
Department of Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for
Evolutionary Biology, August Thienemann Str. 2, 24306, Plo¨n,
Germany.
2Pipefish Group, GEOMAR - Helmholtz Center for Ocean Research,
Wischhofstrasse 1-3, 24148, Kiel, Germany. ⇤Correspondence and
request for materials should be addressed to (email:
vandana@evolbio.mpg.de).
S.1 One locus, two alleles
Let the fitnesses of the three genotypes be A1A1, A1A2 and A2A2 are W1,W2 and W3. The
frequencies of the three genotypes are denoted by x1, x2 and x3 Thus,
p(t+ 1) = x1 +
1
2
x2 = p(t)
2.
W1
W
+
1
2
2p(t)q(t).W2
W
. (S.1)
Similarly,
q(t+ 1) = x3 +
1
2
x2 = q(t)
2.
W3
W
+
1
2
2p(t)q(t).W2
W
. (S.2)
The W s could be survivability (viability) or fertility or both. Under neutrality they are all
equal to unity (Otto and Day, 2007).
1
S.2 Separate population into males and females
If the population is separated into the two sexes, Sex 1 which could be male (or female)
denoted by a solid circle symbol •, and Sex 2 which could be female (or male) denoted by
a diamond symbol ⇧. We stick to calling the sexes as Sex 1 and Sex 2 instead of males and
females (and we also do not use the standard √ and ƒ symbols as it might be misleading)
because we want to show a generalized idea of the dependence of sexual immune dimorphism
on the amount of parental investment (or mating competition and other factors) given and
not to the sex itself.
For Sex 1, let frequency of A1A1 = x•1, frequency of A1A2 = x•2 and frequency of
A2A2 = x•3. Similarly, for Sex 2, let frequency of A1A1 = x⇧1, frequency of A1A2 = x⇧2
and frequency of A2A2 = x⇧3.
In Sex 1, let the fitness of individuals with genotype A1A1 = W•1, fitness of A1A2 =
W•2 and fitness of A2A2 = W•3. Similarly, for Sex 2, let the fitness of individuals with
genotype A1A1 = W⇧1, fitness of A1A2 = W⇧2 and fitness of A2A2 = W⇧3. The sex that
performs mating competitions (say, Sex 2) is further divided into individuals with Less or
More Ornamentation (LO or MO). Through Mendelian population dynamics we obtain the
of frequency of each genotype at subsequent generations (Gokhale et al., 2014),
W x0•1 =
W•1
2
⇣
x•1.x⇧1 +
x•1x⇧2
2
+
x•2x⇧1
2
+
x•2x⇧2
4
⌘
W x0•2 =
W•2
2
✓
x•1x⇧3 + x•3x⇧1 +
x•1x⇧2
2
+
x•2x⇧1
2
+
x•3x⇧2
2
+
x•2x⇧2
2
+
x•2x⇧3
2
◆
W x0•3 =
W•3
2
⇣
x•3x⇧3 +
x•3x⇧2
2
+
x•2x⇧3
2
+
x•2x⇧2
4
⌘
.
(S.3)
and
W x0⇧1,MO =
W⇧1,MO
2
⇣
x⇧1,MOx•1 +
x⇧1,MOx•2
2
+
x⇧2,MOx•1
2
+
x⇧2,MOx•2
4
⌘
W x0⇧2,MO =
W⇧2,MO
2
✓
x⇧1,MOx•3 + x⇧3,MOx•1 +
x⇧1,MOx•2
2
+
x⇧2,MOx•1
2
+
x⇧3,MOx•2
2
+
x⇧2,MOx•2
2
+
x⇧2,MOx•3
2
◆
W x0⇧3,MO =
W⇧3,MO
2
⇣
x⇧3,MOx•3 +
x⇧3,MOx•2
2
+
x⇧2,MOx•3
2
+
x⇧2,MOx•2
4
⌘
W x0⇧1,LO =
W⇧1,LO
2
⇣
x⇧1,LOx•1 +
x⇧1,LOx•2
2
+
x⇧2,LOx•1
2
+
x⇧2,LOx•2
4
⌘
W x0⇧2,LO =
W⇧2,LO
2
✓
x⇧1,LOx•3 + x⇧3,LOx•1 +
x⇧1,LOx•2
2
W x0⇧3,LO =
W⇧3,LO
2
⇣
x⇧3,LOx•3 +
x⇧3,LOx•2
2
+
x⇧2,LOx•3
2
+
x⇧2,LOx•2
4
⌘
(S.4)
where W is the average fitness of all genotypes. Also, x0•i and x0⇧i is the change in
2
frequencies of the genotypes i (for the di↵erent sexes) with time. Also, here we assume
equal sex ratio; half of the o↵spring are males and the other half, females.
Now, let W⇧1 = W•1 = W1, W⇧2 = W•2 = W2 and W⇧3 = W•3 = W3. where
W⇧i = W⇧i,MO +W⇧i,LO. Then,
Wx01 = Wx
0
⇧1 +Wx
0
•1 = W1

(x•1.x⇧1) +
(x•1.x⇧2)
2
+
(x•2.x⇧1)
2
+
(x•2.x⇧2)
4
 
Wx02 = Wx
0
⇧2 +Wx
0
•2 = W2

(x•1.x⇧3) + (x•3.x⇧1) +
(x•1.x⇧2)
2
(x•2.x⇧1)
2
+
(x•3.x⇧2)
2
+
(x•2.x⇧2)
2
+
(x•2.x⇧3)
2
 
Wx03 = Wx
0
⇧3 +Wx
0
•3 = W3

(x•3.x⇧3) +
(x•3.x⇧2)
2
+
(x•2.x⇧3)
2
+
(x•2.x⇧2)
4
 
.
(S.5)
S.3 Mating competition
Mating competition is performed through fights, sexual signals, nuptial gifts, ornament dis-
play and various types of attractiveness. We shall refer to all of these as ‘ornaments’. Let’s
assume there are individuals of two types in this interaction: ones that display more orna-
ments (MO) and ones that display less (LO). Consider the mating competition interaction
between individuals of Sex 2. For the three di↵erent genotypes i the population in Sex 2 will
consist of six di↵erent kinds of individuals, x⇧j,MO and x⇧j,LO.
We model this interaction as an evolutionary game (Maynard Smith, 1986; Sigmund and
Nowak, 1999). The payo↵ matrix is written as,
 MO LO
More Ornament or MO b
O
2   cO⇧ bO   cO⇧
Less Ornament or LO 0 b
O
2
!
(S.6)
where bO is the benefit arising from mating competitions i.e. mating gain and cO⇧ is the cost
that Sex 2 bears to maintain ornament(s). The frequency dependent fitnesses resulting from
these interactions are given by,
WO⇧MO =
✓
bO
2
  cO⇧
◆
x⇧,MO
x⇧,MO + x⇧,LO
+
 
bO   cO⇧
  x⇧,LO
x⇧,MO + x⇧,LO
WO⇧LO = 0
x⇧,MO
x⇧,MO + x⇧,LO
+
bO
2
x⇧,LO
x⇧,MO + x⇧,LO
(S.7)
where x⇧,MO =
P3
j=1 x⇧j,MO and x⇧,LO =
P3
j=1 x⇧j,LO and c
O < b
O⇧
2 .
The payo↵ matrix (S.6) is an interaction between a pair of individuals i.e. two player game.
We can extend this to d-players (Gokhale and Traulsen, 2014; Chen et al., 2017) and the
payo↵s are given by,
3
PMO =
⇢
bO   cO⇧ k = 1
bO
k   cO⇧ k > 1
(S.8)
PLO =
⇢
bP
n k = 0
0 k > 0
(S.9)
where k is the number ofMO (More Ornament) players and n is the total number of players.
k and n can vary between the sexes.
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Figure S.1: Evolution of frequency of all possible type of individuals in a population
that exhibits sexual dimorphism in immunity and ornamentation, and sex
di↵erence in parental investment. When sex 1 performs major parental invest-
ment and individuals of Sex 2 perform mating competitions, then the population
will have nine types of individuals - x•i,x⇧i,MO and x⇧i,LO for the three immunity
genotypes i. For the results shown in this figure, cP• = 0.6, cP⇧ = 0 and cO⇧ = 0.4.
Fitness from immune response comes from ⌦ > 0 of the linear immune allelic
diversity vs immune response profile in Figure 2 in the main article. Red lines are
for Sex 1 and blue for Sex 2. The solid lines are for the heterozygous genotype
and dashed lines for the homozygotes. The lighter blue lines in Sex 2 are for
individuals with low ornamentation.
If we consider that Sex 1, the sex undergoes major parental investment does not involve
in mating competitions and individuals of Sex 2 perform mating competitions, then the
population will have nine types of individuals - x•i,x⇧i,MO and x⇧i,LO for the three genotypes
i. We shall refer to them as x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7, x8 and x9.
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The lifetime reproductive success of each type within a sex is a multiplicative combination
of mating gains, fertility and survival probability (Stoehr and Kokko, 2006; Kelly and Alonzo,
2010). These are given by,
W•1 =
WP•
1 W I•1
W•2 =
WP•
1 W I•2
W•3 =
WP•
1 W I•3
W⇧1,MO =
WP⇧ .WO⇧MO
1 W I•1
W⇧2,MO =
WP⇧ .WO⇧MO
1 W I•2
W⇧3,MO =
WP⇧ .WO⇧MO
1 W I•3
W⇧1,LO =
WP⇧ .WO⇧LO
1 W I•1
W⇧2,LO =
WP⇧ .WO⇧LO
1 W I•2
W⇧3,LO =
WP⇧ .WO⇧LO
1 W I•3
.
(S.10)
Here, W I•i and W I⇧i are the fitness from immune responses (survivability) of type i for Sex 1
and Sex 2 as described in the main text. Similarly, WP• and WP⇧ are the fitness that arise
from parental investments performed by members of Sex 1 and Sex 2, respectively. The
fitness from More and Less ornamentation (WOMO and W
O
LO are as defined in the previous
section. Using equations (S.3) and (S.4), we can obtain the average fitnesses for each type
of individuals in the population. For Sex 1 they are given by,
W•j =
W x0•j
x•j
(S.11)
where j = {1, 2, 3} and W is the average fitness of all types. For Sex 2 they are given by,
W⇧j,MO =
W x0⇧j,MO
x⇧j,MO
W⇧j,LO =
W x0⇧j,LO
x⇧j,LO
(S.12)
where again j = {1, 2, 3}. Here, MO and LO correspond to individuals with more and
less ornamentation, respectively. From equations (S.11) and (S.11) we know that there are
nine di↵erent types of individuals whose frequencies can be just described by xi for i =
{1, 2, 3, ...9} and their respective average fitnesses are denoted by Wi (for i = {1, 2, 3, ...9}).
Using the above given equations we have,
x0i   xi =
✓
xiWi
W
◆
  xi. (S.13)
The classical selection equation (Crow and Kimura, 1970; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998)
that gives the evolution of each type (see Figure S.1) is then obtained by taking the time
derivative of (S.13) given by,
x˙i = xi
 
Wi  W
 
. (S.14)
The frequencies of all types reach an equilibrium value at some time point. This is our
value of interest that is used in the results throughout this ESM and the main article.
5
The frequencies of each sex is a summation of frequencies of all types of individuals in a
sex. Figure S.2 shows how the frequency of the sexes changes with sex-specific di↵erences
in immunocompetence, parental investment, and ornamentation.
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 Only sexual dimorphism in immunocompetence 
B
 Sexual dimorphism in immunity and 
sex difference in parental investment 
C
 Sexual dimorphism in immunity and 
ornamentation, and sex difference in parental 
investment 
time time
Figure S.2: Evolution of frequency of Sex 1 in the population. Since frequency of Sex
1 (x•) and frequency of Sex 2 (x⇧) equals unity, x⇧ equals 1   x•. These
frequencies are obtained by summing up all types of individuals within the sexes.
(A) When Sex 1 has a higher values of immune response a compared to Sex 2
for all immune allelic diversity (⌦). (B) When condition A is met, but Sex 1 also
performs parental investment, while Sex 2 does not. (C) When conditions A and
B are met, and Sex 2 also exhibits ornamentation. The sex-specific traits evolve
over generation (time) by selection and therefore, get passed on to subsequent
generations (for example, case C is shown in Figure S.1). Therefore, even when
the sex ratio is kept equal among o↵spring at every generation, their sex-specific
characteristics change their frequency in the population.
S.4.2 One locus: Results
Heterozygosity vs Homozygosity
Under Hardy Weinberg or when all interactions are neutral, the number of heterozygous and
homozygous individuals within a sex would be equal. However, under selection (through
di↵erent probabilities of immune response for homozygotes and heterozygotes), varying cost
of parental investment and ornamentation the number of heterozygotes and homozygotes
would deviate from neutrality. An increase in heterozygotes within one sex compared to
the other, would also mean than it has a higher immune response on average. When we
allow for selection to act on all the three factors (parental investment, immunity genes
and ornamentation), we can observe their combined e↵ect on the increase in frequency of
heterozygous individuals within a sex (results shown in Figures S.3,S.4 and S.5).
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S.5 Two loci having two alleles each
S.5.1 Population dynamics with separation of population into males and
females
For Sex 1, let the frequency of A1B1|A1B1 = f•(A1B1|A1B1) = x•1, f•(A1B1|A1B2) =
x•2, f•(A1B2|A1B2) = x•3, f•(A1B1|A2B1) = x•4, f•(A1B2|A2B1) = x•5, f•(A1B2|A2B2) =
x•6, f•(A2B1|A2B1) = x•7, f•(A2B1|A2B2) = x•8, f•(A2B2|A2B2) = x•9 and f•(A1B1|A2B2) =
x•10. Similarly, for Sex 2.
From Mendelian population dynamics (as done in the one locus case), the frequency of
the homozygotes in Sex 1 will be:
Wx0•1 =
W1
2
✓
x•1.x⇧1 +
x•1.x⇧2 + x•1.x⇧4 + x•1.x⇧10 + x•2.x⇧1 + x•4.x⇧1 + x•10.x⇧1
2
+
x•2.x⇧2 + x•2.x⇧4 + x•2.x⇧10 + x•4.x⇧2 + x•4.x⇧4 + x•4.x⇧10 + x•10.x⇧2 + x•10.x⇧4 + x•10.x⇧10
4
◆
.
(S.15)
Wx0•3 =
W3
2
✓
x•3.x⇧3 +
x•2.x⇧3 + x•3.x⇧2 + x•3.x⇧5 + x•3.x⇧6 + x•5.x⇧3 + x•6.x⇧3
2
+
x•2.x⇧2 + x•2.x⇧5 + x•2.x⇧6 + x•5.x⇧2 + x•5.x⇧5 + x•5.x⇧6 + x•6.x⇧2 + x•6.x⇧5 + x•6.x⇧6
4
◆
.
(S.16)
Wx0•7 =
W7
2
✓
x•7.x⇧7 +
x•4.x⇧7 + x•5.x⇧7 + x•7.x⇧5 + x•7.x⇧8 + x•8.x⇧7
2
+
x•4.x⇧4 + x•4.x⇧5 + x•4.x⇧8 + x•5.x⇧4 + x•5.x⇧5 + x•5.x⇧8 + x•8.x⇧4 + x•8.x⇧5 + x•8.x⇧8
4
◆
.
(S.17)
Wx0•9 =
W9
2
✓
x•9.x⇧9 +
x•6.x⇧9 + x•8.x⇧9 + x•9.x⇧6 + x•9.x⇧8 + x•9.x⇧10 + x•10.x⇧8
2
+
x•6.x⇧6 + x•6.x⇧8 + x•10.x⇧8 + x•8.x⇧6 + x•8.x⇧8 + x•8.x⇧10 + x•10.x⇧6 + x•10.x⇧9 + x•10.x⇧10
4
◆
.
(S.18)
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Frequency of the single heterozygotes will be:
Wx0•2 =
W2
2
✓
x•1.x⇧3 + x•3.x⇧1 +
x•1.x⇧2 + x•1.x⇧5 + x•1.x⇧6 + x•2.x⇧1 + x•2.x⇧2 + x•2.x⇧3 + x•3.x⇧2
2
+
x•3.x⇧4 + x•3.x⇧10 + x•4.x⇧3 + x•5.x⇧1 + x•5.x⇧2 + x•6.x⇧1 + x•10.x⇧2
2
+
x•2.x⇧4 + x•2.x⇧5 + x•2.x⇧6 + x•2.x⇧10 + x•4.x⇧2 + x•4.x⇧5 + x•4.x⇧6 + x•5.x⇧4 + x•5.x⇧10
4
+
x•6.x⇧2 + x•6.x⇧4 + x•6.x⇧10 + x•10.x⇧2 + x•10.x⇧5 + x•10.x⇧6
4
◆
.
(S.19)
Wx0•4 =
W4
2
✓
x•1.x⇧7 + x•7.x⇧1 +
x•1.x⇧4 + x•1.x⇧5 + x•1.x⇧8 + x•4.x⇧1 + x•4.x⇧4 + x•4.x⇧7 + x•5.x⇧1
2
+
x•7.x⇧2 + x•7.x⇧4 + x•7.x⇧10 + x•8.x⇧1 + x•10.x⇧7 + x•10.x⇧8
2
+
x•2.x⇧4 + x•2.x⇧5 + x•2.x⇧7 + x•2.x⇧8 + x•4.x⇧2 + x•4.x⇧5 + x•4.x⇧8 + x•4.x⇧10 + x•5.x⇧2 + x•5.x⇧4
4
+
x•5.x⇧10 + x•8.x⇧2 + x•8.x⇧4 + x•8.x⇧10 + x•10.x⇧4 + x•10.x⇧5
4
◆
.
(S.20)
Wx0•6 =
W6
2
✓
x•9.x⇧3 + x•3.x⇧9 +
x•2.x⇧9 + x•3.x⇧6 + x•3.x⇧8 + x•3.x⇧10 + x•5.x⇧9 + x•6.x⇧3 + x•6.x⇧6
2
+
x•6.x⇧9 + x•8.x⇧3 + x•9.x⇧2 + x•9.x⇧5 + x•9.x⇧6 + x•10.x⇧3
2
+
x•2.x⇧6 + x•2.x⇧8 + x•2.x⇧10 + x•5.x⇧6 + x•5.x⇧8 + x•5.x⇧10 + x•6.x⇧2 + x•6.x⇧5 + x•6.x⇧8
4
+
x•6.x⇧10 + x•8.x⇧2 + x•8.x⇧5 + x•8.x⇧6 + x•10.x⇧2 + x•10.x⇧5 + x•10.x⇧6
4
◆
.
(S.21)
Wx0•8 =
W8
2
✓
x•7.x⇧9 + x•9.x⇧7 +
x•4.x⇧9 + x•5.x⇧9 + x•6.x⇧7 + x•7.x⇧6 + x•7.x⇧8 + x•7.x⇧10 + x•8.x⇧7
2
+
x•8.x⇧8 + x•8.x⇧9 + x•8.x⇧10 + x•9.x⇧4 + x•9.x⇧5 + x•9.x⇧8 + x•10.x⇧7
2
+
x•4.x⇧6 + x•4.x⇧8 + x•4.x⇧10 + x•5.x⇧6 + x•5.x⇧8 + x•5.x⇧10 + x•6.x⇧4 + x•6.x⇧5 + x•6.x⇧8
4
+
x•8.x⇧4 + x•8.x⇧5 + x•8.x⇧6 + x•10.x⇧4 + x•10.x⇧5 + x•10.x⇧8
4
◆
.
(S.22)
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Frequency of the double heterozygotes will be:
Wx0•5 =
W5
2
✓
x•3.x⇧7 + x•7.x⇧3 +
x•2.x⇧7 + x•3.x⇧4 + x•3.x⇧5 + x•3.x⇧8 + x•4.x⇧3 + x•5.x⇧3
2
+
x•5.x⇧5 + x•5.x⇧7 + x•6.x⇧5 + x•7.x⇧2 + x•7.x⇧5 + x•7.x⇧6 + x•8.x⇧3
2
+
x•2.x⇧4 + x•2.x⇧5 + x•2.x⇧8 + x•4.x⇧2 + x•4.x⇧5 + x•4.x⇧6 + x•5.x⇧2 + x•5.x⇧4 + x•5.x⇧6
4
+
x•5.x⇧8 + x•6.x⇧4 + x•6.x⇧7 + x•6.x⇧8 + x•8.x⇧2 + x•8.x⇧5 + x•8.x⇧6
4
◆
.
(S.23)
Wx0•10 =
W10
2
✓
x•1.x⇧9 + x•9.x⇧1 +
x•1.x⇧6 + x•1.x⇧8 + x•1.x⇧10 + x•2.x⇧8 + x•4.x⇧8 + x•6.x⇧1 + x•8.x⇧1
2
+
x•9.x⇧2 + x•9.x⇧4 + x•9.x⇧10 + x•10.x⇧1 + x•10.x⇧9 + x•10.x⇧10
2
+
x•2.x⇧6 + x•2.x⇧9 + x•2.x⇧10 + x•4.x⇧6 + x•4.x⇧9 + x•4.x⇧10 + x•6.x⇧2 + x•6.x⇧4
4
+
x•6.x⇧10 + x•8.x⇧2 + x•8.x⇧4 + x•8.x⇧10 + x•10.x⇧2 + x•10.x⇧4 + x•10.x⇧6 + x•10.x⇧8
4
◆
.
(S.24)
Here, the Wis are the fitnesses of each genotype i with frequency xi and W is their mean
fitness. Similarly, we can obtain the frequencies of the genotypes in Sex 2.
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Figure S.3: Ratio of Heterozygotes: Homozygotes in Sex 1 and the frequency of Sex 2 for a
full range of ⌦. The parameter ⌦ is a measure of the sex di↵erence in immune
response through sexual conflict within the MHC as shown in Figure 2 in the
main article. It represents the sex-specific fitness e↵ect of Sex 1 relative to Sex
2. When ⌦ = 0, there is so sex-specific di↵erence in immune response. There
is no e↵ect of ornamentation and parental investment (PI) on the ratio of allele
diversity. However, ⌦ has an e↵ect on this ratio. All factors: coat of PI, cost of
ornamentation and ⌦ have an e↵ect on the frequency of the sexes. Thought the
e↵ect of ⌦ is not profound, the cost of ornamentation in Sex 2 and cost of PI in
Sex 1 reduce their frequency, respectively.
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Figure S.4: Ratio of Heterozygotes: Homozygotes in Sex 1 and the frequency of Sex 2 for a
full range of ⇥. The parameter ⇥ is a measure of the sex di↵erence in immune
response through sexual conflict within the MHC as shown in Figure 2 in the main
article. It represents the e↵ect of allelic diversity on sex-specific fitness of Sex
1 relative to Sex 2. When ⇥ = 0, there is so sex-specific di↵erence in immune
response. The parameter ⇥ has an e↵ect on the allele diversity ratio. But there
is no e↵ect of ornamentation and parental investment (PI) on this ratio. There
is no e↵ect of ⇥ on the frequency of Sex 1. The cost of ornamentation in Sex 2
increases the frequency of Sex 1 while the cost of PI decreases its frequency.
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Figure S.5: Ratio of Heterozygotes: Homozygotes in Sex 1 and the frequency of Sex 2 for a
full range of  . The parameter   is a measure of the sex di↵erence in immune
response through sexual conflict within the MHC as shown in Figure 2 in the main
article. It represents the sex-specific fitness e↵ect (that also includes the e↵ect
of diversity on sex-specific fitness) of Sex 1 relative to Sex 2. When   = 0,
there is so sex-specific di↵erence in immune response. There is no e↵ect of
ornamentation and parental investment (PI) on the ratio of allele diversity. But
  has an e↵ect on this ratio. As observed in the previous figure, here too, the
cost of ornamentation in Sex 2 and cost of PI in Sex 1 reduce their frequency,
respectively while the e↵ect of   is not as profound.
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